ARTICLES

EUROPEANISATION FACES BALKANISATION: POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY AND DEMOCRATISATION - CROATIA AND MACEDONIA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE - Roxana Mihaila

NUCLEAR ENERGY IN BULGARIA: STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU AND RUSSIA Elvira Oliva, Paolo Sorbello

UKRAINE-NATO: THE DISSONANCE OF EXPECTATIONS Katerina V. Malshina

GEOPOILITICS & ORGANIZED CRIME AND CORRUPTION IN THE EARLY 21ST CENTURY WITH REFERENCE TO THE BALKANS Blageje Grahovac

EURO BALKAN BROTHERHOOD IN NEW MILLENNIUM (FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA TOWARDS THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA (2000-2011)) Petra Bregant

EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES
Journal on European Perspective of the Western Balkans

EDITOR: Milan Jazbec
ASSISTANT EDITOR: Nina Cepon
REVIEWS’ EDITOR: Polona Mal

EDITORIAL BOARD
Matej Accetto (University of Ljubljana) • Dennis Blease (University of Cranfield) • Vlatko Cvetlja (University of Zagreb) • Vojin Dimitrijević (Belgrade Centre for Human Rights) • Klemen Grošelj (University of Ljubljana) • Erik Kopač (University of Ljubljana) • Vladimir Prebilč (University of Ljubljana) • Albert Rakipi (Albanian Institute for International Studies, Tirana) • Erwin Schmied (University of Vienna) • Vasilka Sancin (University of Ljubljana) • Uroš Svet (University of Ljubljana) • Biljana Vankovska (Ss. Cyril and Methodius University, Skopje) • Katja Zajc Kajzar (University of Ljubljana) • Jernej Župančič (University of Ljubljana) • Mitja Žagar (Institute for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana)

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD
Murat Bilhan (Istanbul Kultur University) • Erhard Busek (Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe, Vienna) • Mustafa Cerić (University of Sarajevo) • Victor Jackovich (Jackovich International, Maryland) • Jacques Rupnik (Centre for International Studies and Research, Paris) • Goran Svilanović (OSCE, Vienna) • Savo Kentera (Centre for International Relations, Podgorica)

EDITORIAL OFFICE ADDRESS
Foundation - Centre for European Perspective,
Grajska cesta 1, SI – 1234 Loka pri Mengšu, Slovenia,
phone: +386 (0) 1 560 86 11, fax: +386 (0) 1 560 86 01, mobile: +386 (0) 40 530 976,
e-mail: info@europeangeperspectives.si, http://europeangeperspectives.si.

European Perspectives is a peer-reviewed journal, published twice a year (in April and October) by Foundation – Centre for European Perspective (Samuel Zbogar, President of the Executive Board of CEP).

Manuscripts should be forwarded to the Assistant Editor for European Perspectives at the Foundation – Centre for European Perspective via e-mail on info@europeangeperspectives.si. For more information visit our website: http://www.europeangeperspectives.si.

ISSN 1855-7694
Letter from the Editor 3

GUEST VIEW
Western Balkans – The Way Ahead 7
Helga Schmid

ARTICLES
Europeanisation Faces Balkanisation: 13
Political Conditionality and Democratisation -
Croatia and Macedonia in Comparative Perspective
Roxana Mihaila

Nuclear Energy in Bulgaria:
Strategic Implications for the EU and Russia 35
Elvira Oliva, Paolo Sorbello

Ukraine-NATO: The Dissonance of Expectations 57
Katerina V. Malshina

Geopolitics & Organized Crime and Corruption in the
Early 21st Century with Reference to the Balkans 79
Blagoje Grahovac

Euro Balkan Brotherhood in New Millennium 97
- Foreign Policy Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia
towards the Republic of Serbia (2000-2011)
Petra Bregant
SARAJEVO 2014
Moving Beyond the Crisis: Contrasting Ambitions and Future Challenges in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Erhan Türbedar

REVIEWS
Regional Security and Intelligence Cooperation in the Western Balkans and Global Asymmetric Threats
Di Rienzo, Stephen R., Damir Črnčec, Liliana Brožič (Nika Posavec)

Democracy, Islam & Secularism In Turkey
Ahmet T. Kuru, Alfred Stepan

CROQUIS
Apollonia
Anja Fabiani
Our current issue brings us already in the fourth consecutive year. We continue with enthusiasm and dedication, focused on our academic endeavour. We also try to maintain the so far existing trend of preparing not only a well-readable but also policy useful issues of The European Perspectives, the journal, which primarily targets the Western Balkan topics and audience. Again, almost a tide of paper proposals arrived to the editor’s desk and through the usual selection process we’ve tried to carve out the new issue. It looks like that the main purpose of this academic endeavour – to contribute to the contemplation efforts about the European perspective of the Western Balkans as well as to offer the academic niche for authors from the region – is a kind of a never ending spring of inspiration.

The region never sleeps, one perhaps could afford to say. Hence, academic contemplation and policy advice would always find an ear and a place on the agenda. We try to concentrate on the former, though if there were a useful outcome from our contributions for the latter, we would of course not mind. The value, which we could see in this approach, would be that of coming from the spot, from contributors, who, while dealing with the issue, are attached to it within the broader local environment and might offer what would be a unique usefulness. So, let us have a brief glance at the actual content.

Our current guest view again comes from the prominent senior diplomat and official, namely Helga Schmid, Deputy Secretary General for Political Affairs and Political Director of the European External Action Service. Her contemplation focuses on the present stand in the Western Balkans affairs, combined with the view ahead. The message is clear about the seriousness of the EU approach as well as about the crucial importance of the years 2012 and 2013, while pointing out the credible and decisive fashion at addressing the reform issues. Also, in this issue’s Croquis our esteemed author discovers the beauty and mystery of Apollonia, once among the 30 biggest cities in the world. Even more, its richness, which should be among main inspirations for the region’s development, is uncovered.
The Sarajevo 2014 section deals with, we could say, the issue: “Bosnia and Herzegovina is undergoing its most serious crisis of the post–war era”, argues the author. A huge challenge for the academic thought over, in particular having in mind the genuine and metaphorical purpose of this section. It could never be echoed enough, when we think about the last century and its conflicts in the region concerned.

In the main section, there is a variety of choice for the reader. We bring two case studies: one focuses on a comparison between Croatia and Macedonia (political conditionality and democratization), while the other one on Serbia and Slovenia (an analysis of the Slovene Foreign Policy Strategy). Additionally, there are papers dealing with nuclear energy issue in Bulgaria, the relations between Ukraine and NATO as well as the one, analyzing organized crime and corruption at the beginning of the new century. Excluding the personal choice, the Editor would not find it easy where to start reading and would not resist temptation to take this issue often in his hands.

Hence, it is again our ambition, regarding the respected reader, to speak with the content. We hope to have achieved this goal at least generally and are convinced to continue with our work. Therefore, I wish you again a useful reading and hope for future contributions to deepen and upgrade our intellectual offer.

The Castle of Jable, April 2012

M. J.
Western Balkans – The Way Ahead

Helga Schmid
Western Balkans – The Way Ahead

Helga Schmid

Shortly after assuming office in 2009, the High Representative defined three priorities for her five year mandate: the establishment of the European External Action Service, strengthening the EU’s policy in its neighbourhood and deepening relations with its strategic partners. During the last year it was clear that the events in our Southern Neighbourhood dominated the headlines. However, the importance of the Western Balkans as expressed in the 2003 European Security Strategy fully remains in 2012: “the credibility of our foreign policy depends on the consolidation of our achievements in the Western Balkans”.

As we go through 2012, it is fair to say that the EU has significantly contributed to inducing change and has achieved positive results in the Western Balkans. Better policy making and greater coherence resulting from the Treaty of Lisbon, Catherine Ashton’s personal engagement and constructive cooperation with our strategic partners are among the factors that have made this progress possible. Croatia is about to join the EU as a full member; decisive steps in the same direction are within reach for Serbia and Montenegro; Bosnia-Herzegovina is hopefully on the path of unlocking its true capacity to work for the best of the country.

The cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Kosovo in particular illustrate how the EU process has recently served as an engine for reform and positive change. In Bosnia and Herzegovina that has been at risk of lagging behind the rest of the region, there has been a spark of positive developments during the first months of 2012. Formation of the state level government, adoption of the two laws required for further progress towards the EU and of the 2011 state budget have contributed to a new dynamic on the ground. This momentum is not only welcome, it is essential. The efforts of the leaders across the political parties to move from confrontation to productive dialogue have been instrumental in this process.

1 Helga Schmid is Deputy Secretary General for Political Affairs and Political Director of the European External Action Service

ISSN 1855-7694 © 2012 European Perspectives, UDK: 327 (4)
Thanks to a reinvigorated policy agreed in March 2011 and a personal involvement of HR who facilitated the agreement that helped avoid a political confrontation in May 2011, the EU is in a position to help the leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina transform the prevailing desire for EU-integration, into a process that gradually builds trust and generates solutions. In the past, the visa liberalisation process has illustrated the full potential of conditionality. Visa liberalisation had become a tangible electoral deliverable; a failure of the leaders to comply with the benchmarks would have been severely punished at the ballot box. At an unusual speed, the leadership was able to deliver impressive results. Recent steps towards the implementation of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement reconfirm that well formulated EU policy can help achieving credible and sustained progress. The political leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina need to continue taking decisions that reflect a strong public opinion’s backing for the EU perspective.

To underpin this development, we have strengthened our presence on the ground in line with the overall endeavour of the European External Action Service to generate more coherence in EU’s external policies. By bringing together the political tools of the EU Special Representative, with the resources and the technical expertise of the Head of Delegation in Sarajevo, we can now maximise our leverage and help anchor the EU agenda in the local political debate. We can now match the technical recommendations with a political follow-up and help encourage a forward looking dynamic.

Kosovo and Serbia are further examples of EU tailor-made efforts in the region. In the aftermath of the International Court of Justice opinion and the adoption of the UN General Assembly resolution in September 2010, the EU offered to facilitate a dialogue between the two sides. The aim of this dialogue is to stabilise the region, work out practical solutions that improve people’s daily lives and help the two sides move closer to the EU. The dialogue has indeed resulted in a number of agreements on issues such as civil registry, customs stamps, acceptance of university diplomas and freedom of movement. The implementation of these agreements improves people’s lives.

We will continue to encourage both sides to respect and implement their commitments and to strive for more results. This is vital for their future and certainly vital for their future in Europe. I am convinced that the European perspective for both is the most conducive context for finding a way forward and that practical solutions based on the EU acquis are the most easily agreeable to both. The EU will remain demanding with Serbia and Kosovo and will want to make sure the significant resources invested in particular
through EULEX are matched by adequate engagement from the political leadership in Pristina and Belgrade.

While 2011 and early 2012 saw some clear progress, there are also signs of worrying stagnation and risks of back-sliding. We must not be complacent if we want to ensure a continued success for the EU’s historical challenge of stabilising and integrating the Western Balkans successfully into the EU.

While the basic policy is in place, a renewed engagement is needed from both sides in order to ensure a successful completion of the process. The successful integration of the Western Balkans into the EU will require our full attention, engagement and commitment. We will need new imaginative political initiatives, new driving factors in order to break stalemates and stagnation. It is a fact that the EU best achieves these results when it stands united and when it deploys all its instruments in a cohesive way.

A renewed engagement will also be needed from candidate and potential candidate countries. Political leaders in the region must make the domestic desire to join the EU a top priority and they must anchor that desire across the “aisle” in each Parliament. The history of EU enlargements shows that when a deeply and broadly anchored domestic desire for the EU acquis is real, pervasive and predominant, then EU enlargement policy can work effectively and quite rapidly. When all these factors are in place all EU Member States take their responsibility and things can happen smoothly and effectively.

Candidate and potential candidate countries need to make additional efforts. The art of compromise must go in wedlock with a forward-looking focus, rather than allowing disputes hold the countries of the Western Balkans back. Every Member States has gone through that search and found it worthwhile to transfer some sovereignty, to make some compromises and to be part of the EU project. Coming together across old fields of war was not easy for France, Germany, the Benelux and Italy, but there was no other way forward, including for the new member states that followed. Neither is there any other way for the Western Balkans region: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia.

The EU remains serious about conditionality. While we will continue to formulate tailor-made approaches for each country, we will not compromise with basic principles. The message sent to candidates and potential candidates in this regard is clear: the political leadership needs to address
serious internal issues in a credible and decisive fashion to be able to move forward in the Stabilisation and Association Process track.

2012 and 2013 can be decisive years for the Western Balkans. Let us hope that the leaders in the region will show leadership and willingness to compromise both domestically and with their neighbours in order to achieve decisive new steps on their path towards European integration.
Europeanisation Faces Balkanisation: Political Conditionality and Democratisation - Croatia and Macedonia in Comparative Perspective - Roxana Mihaila

Nuclear Energy in Bulgaria: Strategic Implications for the EU and Russia Elvira Oliva, Paolo Sorbello

Ukraine-NATO: The Dissonance of Expectations Katerina V. Malshina

Geopolitics & Organized Crime and Corruption in the Early 21st Century with Reference to the Balkans Blagoje Grahovac

Europeanisation Faces Balkanisation: Political Conditionality and Democratisation - Croatia and Macedonia in Comparative Perspective

Roxana Mihaila

ABSTRACT
The European Union’s (EU) experience with Bulgaria and Romania, whose fragmented reform process has stalled post-accession, has prompted it to re-evaluate its approach toward candidate countries. The western Balkans experience enhanced EU political conditionality focusing on democratic state-building and regional cooperation. The literature on democratisation is largely in agreement over the positive effects of enlargement-led Europeanisation, but in the western Balkans the EU faces unprecedented challenges. It has to balance concerns related to security and regional instability with its requirements for accession.

Taking Croatia and Macedonia as case studies, this paper looks at the impact of political conditionality on democratic consolidation in the western Balkans. As the only two countries in the region granted accession and candidate status respectively, these states provide relevant insights into the interplay between domestic and EU factors in fostering reforms. The paper relies on Freedom House democracy scores from the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreements of the two countries in 2001 to the end of 2010. It traces variation in these scores back to domestic events, thus identifying challenges that affect the fulfilment of the required EU reforms. It simultaneously tests the argument that EU incentives no longer meet the needs of this region.

KEYWORDS
EU enlargement, political conditionality, democratisation, Europeanisation, western Balkans

1 CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: Roxana Mihaila, Doctoral Researcher, Sussex European Institute, Department of Politics & Contemporary European Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9SP, UK, e-mail: R.I.Mihaila@sussex.ac.uk.

ISSN 1855-7694 © 2012 European Perspectives, UDK: 327 (4)
Introduction

The western Balkans stand as the EU’s unfinished story - the 2004 enlargement to the East brought the question of the EU’s immediate neighbourhood to the fore, forcing the EU to consider its geo-political interests in the region. Stability in this post-conflict area was crucial, as the EU needed to secure its external borders. At the same time however the EU was not ready to promise anything close to membership as an incentive for these countries to reform and achieve the needed political and economic capacity to ensure stability. As a result it coined the term “privileged partnership” to describe its plans for cooperation with the western Balkans. Before committing to any form of enhanced relations with these countries, the EU would ensure they fulfil strict political conditionality ensuring political stability, respect for democracy, rule of law, human rights and regional cooperation. The EU committed to assisting these countries, both financially and politically, in meeting these benchmarks.

Theoretical Underpinnings

The association between political conditionality and democratic consolidation was first introduced in the context of the EU’s relations with third countries. The academic debate focused on the role of the EU as a normative actor and its capacity to promote democratic principles, and respect for the rule of law and human rights (Smith 1998, Von Bogdandy 2000, Manners 2002). The Union would only engage in preferential trade agreements with these countries if they met a set of political criteria securing the fulfilment of these principles. With the fall of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the EU reoriented its interest toward the Union’s politically unstable immediate neighbourhood. The Eastern enlargement would prove to be the “most ambitious effort of the EU to promote democracy, rule of law and human rights in a third country” (Borzel and Risse 2005: 7). Although initially set up as minimum criteria to ensure stable regimes in the region and serve as a basis for bilateral relations with the countries to the EU’s Eastern borders, this conditionality gradually developed into clearly defined prerequisites for the EU membership aspirations of these countries.

The literature on Europeanisation identifies conditionality as the EU’s most powerful instrument of change (Grabbe 2003). It is conceptualised as a “bargaining strategy of reinforcement by reward” in which the use of threats and promises influences the likelihood of compliance with the imposed criteria.
(Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2004:662). Conditionality thus acts as a gate-keeping mechanism, as EU allows, based on satisfactory performance, access to the upper stages of the association or integration process (Grabbe 2003). The Union controls this process by means of 1) access to negotiations, 2) the provision of legislative and institutional templates, 3) aid and technical assistance, 4) policy advice, and 5) monitoring (Grabbe 2002: 253).

In the case of the Central and Eastern European countries (hereafter CEECs), “the acquis, the whole acquis and nothing but the acquis” dictum underlined the “maximalist interpretation” of the conditionality principle imposed on their negotiations (Grabbe 2006:33). In addition, the EU applied political conditionality building on the Copenhagen criteria2, looking to align the CEECs to the Union’s political and economic realities. EU requirements were non-negotiable, allowed for no opt-out possibilities and yearly monitoring reports regularly assessed the countries’ progress throughout the accession process. This inflexible approach anticipated the potential difficulties of these countries’ reform process and limited domestic actors’ room for manoeuvre to minimise political resistance to the imposed requirements.

Following the success of its conditionality strategy in CEE, the EU sought to extend the same approach to secure the political stability of the western Balkans. These expectations became even more stringent for the candidate and potential candidate countries in this region. The EU Treaties now include specific references3 to ensuring respect for democratic norms and values as the building blocks of any potential association / accession perspective. Furthermore, they emphasise crucial objectives such as regional co-operation and collaboration with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), instituting a “more forceful and intrusive, more comprehensive and complex, and often contested” type of political conditionality (Anastasakis 2008: 365). These new requirements however expose the question of the appropriate adaptation of the EU’s strategy to the particularities of the region and its potential to address post-conflict tensions, border issues and ethnic conflicts.

The literature on conditionality accounts for two main sets of factors that mediate EU influence, distinguishing between the EU and the domestic

---

2 A set of economic and political criteria required for a country before joining the EU: the existence and stability of institutions ensuring democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for the protection of minorities; a functional market economy and the ability to take on the obligations of membership (European Council, Copenhagen, 1993)

3 Art. 6 TFEU on the fundamental principles of the EU in conjunction with art. 49 TFEU on enlargement.
level components (Grabbe 2002). At the EU level, the intervening variables include the content of rewards (mostly the accession probability / proximity of accession), the credibility of threats and commitments and the clarity of demands. At the national level influence is mediated by the number and decision-making power of veto players (political elites, NGOs, trade union interests, business interests) and the domestic ‘costs’ of change. Some scholars have argued that governments “who are relatively certain that they would lose under genuine democratic contestation will be less likely to push ahead with democratisation, even in the face of external pressure” (Kubicek 2003: 17). For the western Balkans, one of the most problematic issues for the EU’s influence capability has been the asymmetry between EU imposed conditionality and rewards respectively. While for the CEE enlargement the EU had explicitly committed to offering those countries membership status, for the western Balkans it has been much more reserved and has kept the prospect of membership rather insulated from reform talks. Instead, the EU emphasised the importance of changes across the political benchmarks rather than the ultimate status of membership of these countries within the EU. These circumstances have put more pressure on domestic political elites in terms of weighing the desirability of undertaking the required reforms in the absence of the most important acknowledgement of their progress, the progression to negotiating the acquis chapters.

This article looks at whether the EU’s approach toward the western Balkans has been appropriately adapted to the needs of this region, by analysing the link between political conditionality and democratic consolidation. It takes Croatia and Macedonia as case studies – the two countries in the region closest to membership status - and checks for a correspondence between the variance in Freedom House (hereafter FH) democracy indices and the EU political conditionality benchmarks. It answers the question of whether improvements or setbacks in terms of democratic governance can be attributed to the EU’s strategy toward these countries or whether domestic political considerations and exogenous factors outweigh the Union’s leverage.

**Methodology**

Researchers warn that the stringent EU conditionality requirements may determine an over-empowerment of the EU when assessing its transformative capacity in relations with other states (see for example the discussion in Dyson 2000; Haverland 2005, 2007; Pridham 2007; Stolfi 2008; Radaelli 2009). To counteract this tendency one ought to envisage Europeanisation
as a process and follow a deductive strategy of evaluating its effects rather than rely solely on a rational choice approach to explain the interplay between EU and national interests (Sasse 2007). To this end this article relies on the method of process tracing, appropriate for “testing theories in a world marked by multiple interaction effects, where it is difficult to explain outcomes in terms of two or three independent variables” (George 1979 qtd. in George and Bennet 2005:206).

This article employs process tracing to identify if and how EU conditionality can be associated with variation in democratisation scores (Haverland 2005, 2007). It looks to support or refute the argument that EU conditionality reinforces the consolidation of democracy in the two countries. One works with the assumption that EU impact is variable and uneven and is influenced by different factors at different points in time (Agh 2008; Papadimitriou and Gateva 2009). Building on this assertion, process tracing starts from the bottom up, allowing one to work backwards and trace the causes of domestic change and/or resistance back to EU level. For the cases of Croatia and Macedonia, the researcher first identifies changes in the democracy scores assigned by Freedom House across the 2001-2010 sequence covering the time span from the signing of the SAAs to present. The second step then recreates, by process tracing these scores through the years, the chain of intervening variables leading to each of the identified changes in these scores in the two countries.

The researcher looks at the context in which each of the scores is assigned, at all the actors, discourses, and legal / institutional developments connected to them, and formulates, based on these observations, causal inferences between variations in these scores and EU-driven influence. It specifically focuses on establishing whether EU incentives outweigh domestic veto points or if the reverse applies better and underscores faults in EU’s strategy toward the region. One thus creates a “theoretically informed narrative of the process of interest” (George and Bennet, 2005:210), allowing the researcher to distinguish between EU pressure and its consequent domestic (non)impact.

This article builds on previous conclusions of studies on the link between EU political conditionality and democratisation (see for example Schimmelfenning et al. 2002, Vachudova 2003, Freyburg and Richter 2008, Pridham 2008, Zuokui 2010), and therefore takes this connection for granted,

\[\text{Democratisation scores compiled by the author from Freedom House Nations in Transit reports for the 2001 – 2010 period available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/nations-transit. Please see Table 1 at the end of this document in Annex I.}\]
Compiled by the author based on information from EU reports on the progression of relations between the country and the EU and media coverage (EUObserver) of the country. For each year, the timeline associates a Freedom House score (in parentheses) and the national and EU events corresponding to the year in question.
Compiled by the author based on information from EU reports on the progression of relations between the country and the EU and media coverage (EUObserver) of the country. For each year, the timeline associates a Freedom House score (in parentheses) and the national and EU events corresponding to the year in question.
without seeking to define democratisation or measure the countries’ progress is securing respect for democratic norms and values. It looks to test the conjecture that EU political conditionality has led to the democratisation of the western Balkans for the cases of Macedonia and Croatia and establish whether the chosen strategy was appropriate for the region. It looks at variation in Freedom House democracy scores for the 2001-2010 period as a proxy measurement for democratisation. Albeit an imperfect measurement, these scores suffice for the purpose of the current analysis, because this paper does not seek to assess the actual degree of success of political conditionality but rather look for prima facie evidence of the link between EU conditionality and domestic reforms. It relies on data from Freedom House, EU official documents and media coverage (focusing on the daily EU Observer).

THE BEGINNINGS: CROATIA, MACEDONIA AND THE EU’S WESTERN BALKANS APPROACH

Faced with the ineffectiveness of its previous strategies in the region (particularly the Regional Approach\(^5\) launched in 1997) and with severe ethnic tensions, the EU re-oriented its approach toward the Western Balkans to better address the particularities of the region (Commission of the European Communities 1999). In 1999 it launched the Stabilisation and Accession Process (SAP), designed to bring stability and provide a coherent and credible framework for enhanced cooperation between the Union and the countries of the western Balkans.

The SAP built on the requirements of the previous strategies, but introduced region-specific, categorical political conditionality. Acknowledging these countries’ belligerent past, it emphasised their obligations to ensure the successful prosecution of war crimes, peace, justice, good neighbourly relations, restitution of pre-war properties and most importantly the prosecution of war criminals by means of co-operation with International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia in the Hague (Council of the European Communities 1999). At the same time, given these countries’ state and institutional weakness, the primary focus of the strategy was set on supporting the countries’ state building efforts. The SAP upgraded the previous arrangements by ultimately offering, contingent upon satisfactory

\(^5\) For detailed information see the Council Conclusions on the Application of Conditionality with a view to developing a Coherent EU-Strategy for the Relations with the Countries of the Region, PRES/97/129, Annex 3, April 29, 1997. The main provisions included: limited political conditionality, financial support, trade concessions, and economic cooperation.
progress across the stated objectives, the opportunity for the signatory countries to be considered for EU membership (Council of the European Communities 2001).

The fulfilment of the required political criteria ensured progression to Stabilisation and Accession Agreements⁶ (SAAs). Modelled on the Europe Agreements (EAs) that structured the pre-accession process of the ten CEE countries of the 2004 enlargement, the SAAs added a further dimension formulated in terms of a state’s capacity to ensure good neighbourly relations and regional co-operation. The requirements for this region were made clear: integration with the EU was only possible if future members could demonstrate that they were willing and able to amiably interact with their neighbours (as emphasised in the SAP reports). The EU would not accept any half-measures of reform, especially in terms of securing the elements of political conditionality introduced. By contrast to the EAs, the SAAs contain a suspension clause stipulating that the EU could at any point suspend negotiation talks if it found a “serious and persistent breach” of the principles of liberty, democracy, human rights and rule of law enshrined in the Treaties (European Council 2004). In spite of more stringent requirements, the SAAs did not contain, as the EAs had, a specific mentioning of the objective of integration, couching the relationship between the countries of the western Balkans and the EU in terms of “potential candidates” for EU accession.

THE PRE-CANDIDATE STATUS RUSH: STABILISATION AND ACCESSION AGREEMENTS

The two countries started their co-operation with the EU from opposite points. While in 2001 Croatia was hailed for its clear progress in terms of democratic developments (reflected especially in the considerable changes in the democracy and rule of law components of the index), Macedonia was just settling one of its most serious political crises. The months of heavy fighting between Albanian separatists and Macedonian security forces had left the country deadlocked, its governing parties unable to push through any type of reforms (as a consequence, in 2001 the country registered its lowest scores in the analysed time frame). Following this point however

⁶ According to the Commission’s document, in the short- to medium-term, the SAAs offer a framework for developing relations between the signatory countries and the EU view a view of promoting economic development, regional cooperation, as well as securing the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law. These measures will align these countries to EU standards, secure respect for democratic principles and gradually introduce the core principles of the functioning of the EU single market. The long-term perspective looks to establish a Free Trade Area between the EU and the countries of the western Balkans.
the country saw a rapid and consistent increase in FH democratisation scores over the following years. The scores describe an upward trend that coincides with the year the country was granted candidate status. Counter intuitively, in Croatia’s case, the year it received its official candidate status coincides with a considerable downfall (more than .75 units, cf. FH scores) in its overall score, making for the lowest score in the ten years period analysed. Croatia would not manage to replicate to present the 2001-2002 success in terms of raw democratisation scores – both in the year prior to and the year of signing its accession treaty, the scores were lower than the ones it had registered at the start of EU negotiations.

The 2001 success in Croatia was mostly associated with the 2000 elections – the first free, democratically held elections that instituted a reform-committed government. The EU saw it as a “key step in ending the country’s international isolation and securing Western aid to revive Croatia’s moribund economy” (Freedom House Report, Croatia 2002:142). Accordingly, these developments were promptly rewarded by the EU with the signing of a SAA, which came as an acknowledgment of the “steadily improving relationship between Croatia and the EU” (SAP Report 2002). However, the same offer was extended to Macedonia as well, who by the same report had made less progress compared to Croatia. The EU’s 2002 report on Macedonia characterised the year 2001 as the “most serious political and security crisis in its history” (p. 22), associated with an overall weakness of democratic institutions, poor guarantees of democracy, rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. The major differentiation made in the EU’s assessment was a linguistic one: while in the case of Croatia it spoke of “steadily improving relationship,” it was more reserved for Macedonia and underlined it was an “important step in efforts to move closer to the EU” and the “only real indicator of progress” would be the “implementation of these obligations” (p. 22). The EU thus offered very little differentiation in terms of actual progress-rewards balance (the SAP was granted as a reward to Croatia but as a further incentive to Macedonia), other than signalling that genuine national “efforts” are rewarded but are by no means a way to secure further progress.

By the EU’s own admission, the SAP had “acted as a catalyst for democratic change” (SAP Progress Report 2002: 8), facilitating the progression toward the SAAs. “Obvious weaknesses” notwithstanding, the report read, “the commitment is there and is in part attributable to the countries having been embraced in the Stabilisation and Association process.” The most thorny issues remained, for Croatia, co-operation with the ICTY, judicial reform
(both structural and on terms of law enforcement), structural reforms to tackle corruption and ensure respect for minority rights (including the integration of the Serb minority), and overcoming nationalistic pressures concerning the return process of displaced population (SAP Progress Report 2002). Consequently, the messages coming from the EU were clear: “EU membership is an objective if there is a continuation of the reform programme” (Romano Prodi, interview for EU Observer, 29.01.2003). There would be “no shortcuts to accession,” he added.

The EU report however unequivocally stated that it will be the “the pace and extent of change inside each country which will determine their prospects for future membership and not the date of any application for membership” (SAP Progress Report 20002: 14), refraining from an early stage to commit to any sort of timetable for the region. EU officials went above and beyond in making it clear that the dates were not the issue of concern, but the government’s approach toward meeting EU-imposed benchmarks. Especially in Croatia’s case, the report criticised the fact that the government “continues to focus too much on the headline political objectives of Croatia’s European policy rather than on the enormous effort that moving closer to European standards requires” (SAP Progress Report 2002: 19). This language was softened by the EU’s High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy who declared early in the following year that there was “no doubt Croatia will be a member of the EU” (EU Observer, 29.01.2003).

**THE PERPETUAL CANDIDATES: EU MEMBERSHIP REVISITED?**

Croatia’s application for membership followed in February 2003 and was accepted by the EU in June the same year. The outcome appears conspicuous at first look, as FH scores for this year show a downward evolution from the previous two years. According to the theories on the link between domestic change and EU incentives, one would have expected to be able to associate a higher democratisation score to the year of application for membership. In order for the membership application to be approved, domestic political elites should have shown a greater commitment toward reforms. One can argue however that the decision to approve the application had been largely taken based on considerations from the previous year, in which Croatia had maintained its impressive score from 2001. EU incentives thus played a role, coupled with a responsive domestic political elite, in determining the pace of reforms in the country.
By the same logic, one would expect an improvement in the democracy score for the following year, as the EU had extended the incentive of membership and the country was entering the preparatory stage for securing candidate status. In October 2003 the Croatian government was told it could start accession talks as early as the following year, contingent on its progress with prosecuting war crimes (Gunter Verheugen, Enlargement Commissioner, EU Observer, 9.10.2003). The EU had respected its commitments by rewarding Croatia for its sustained progress with the acceptance of its membership and with a commitment to promptly start negotiations. It had thus established a credible incentive - reform – reward cyclical sequence, which justified the expectation that the country would sustain its pace of reform (following the credibility of reward logic, see for example Borzel 2000). Contrariwise, however, Croatia registered its lowest democratisation score in the analysed sequence in 2004, signalling that the “conditionality by reward” approach adopted by the EU was not enough on its own to secure lasting reform.

Early in 2004, PM Ivo Sanader had expressed his government’s commitment to meet EU demands, especially in terms of satisfying the requirement for cooperation with the ICTY: “when I say full co-operation, I mean full co-operation” (interview with EU Observer, 12.01.2004). On the EU side, Brussels announced Croatia was on track for membership, but again refrained from advancing any date for the start of accession talks. Commissioner Chris Patten had declared at the time that “the timetable is not important, otherwise a lot of energy goes to keeping to dates rather than to actual work. […] Other countries have to understand that this process is real and we will help them in every step of the way” (EU Observer, 21.04.2004). Croatia was granted candidate status in June 2004, but this acknowledgment once again fails to find correspondence in an improvement of the country’s democratisation indicators. The overall score had gone further down in 2004 reaching its lowest value in the 10 year period analysed in this paper. The Commission’s 2004 Opinion on Croatia’s Application for Membership welcomed the changes made by the government, but at the same time showed that while overall progress could be considered satisfactory, individual reform areas such as corruption, restitution of dispossessed property, integration of minorities and bilateral relations lacked tangible improvement.

The candidacy incentive had failed to bring about a shift in domestic reform patterns. Although a rhetoric commitment existed on both sides, it failed to materialise, as democratisation scores had been consistently descending
over the 2001-2004 period leading to Croatia receiving its candidate status. The country’s poor ratings were determined mainly by yearly drops in the judicial framework and corruption indices for the 2003-2007 time period, which correspond to the pre-candidate and pre-accession talks intervals. EU monitoring and pressure for change do not seem to have been a determining factor for democratisation, as domestic elites were unresponsive in spite of high EU pressure and monitoring. The reverse applies in Macedonia’s case however, where FH indices show an upward trend in democracy scores over the 2001-2005 pre-candidate status period – the year it was granted candidate status (2005) coincides with the highest democratisation score since 2001 (cf FH, a score of 3.89, showing an improvement of over .5 units from the critically low point in 2002).

The positive changes in the scores can be traced back to a combination of immediate EU pressure and a clearly articulated schedule for negotiations. The literature on conditionality supports the argument that the clarity of demands and the proximity of rewards act as catalysers for reform (see for example Grabbe 2002). In Croatia’s case, most progress in terms of democracy indices has been achieved in 2008, two years after the start of negotiations on specific chapters. Domestic elites proved more responsive to immediate EU pressure when they could also foresee the benefits of change (complying with requirements would lead to closing the chapter in question which would bring the country one step closer to concluding its accession negotiations). A similar pattern shows up in Macedonia’s accession progression: scores for the 2006-2010 period have been consistently lower than for the pre-candidate status duration. Although EU commitments were not firm in terms of setting a date for the country’s progression to official candidate status, the ensuing lack of commitment on the EU’s side and the prolongation of any specific indications of whether or not the country should have realistic expectations for membership in the near future contributed to domestic apathy. The EU’s elusive statements, associated with domestic political struggles, have led to a stagnation of the country’s progress on its democratic reform path (FH scores have been constant over 2006-2009, apart from a slight drop of .04 units in 2008).

Contrasting the two cases shows that EU incentives were not sufficient in mobilising domestic reform. One of the main drawbacks of the Commission’s approach was its reluctant attitude in setting any concrete dates for the two countries’ negotiations. The countries had engaged in a reform process with no tangible end other than a statement of ‘belonging’ to the EU family. Whenever talks concerning potential dates for starting negotiations
arose, EU officials would recycle the same phrase they had promoted since the signing of the SAAs: “the future of the western Balkans lies in the EU.” However, as EU officials reassured these countries the EU was “not suffering from enlargement fatigue and the western Balkans should not succumb to enlargement apathy” and “reiterated its unequivocal commitment to the European perspective of the Western Balkans countries” (quoted in EU-Observer, 3.06.2010), individual member states publicly voiced dissenting opinions. Slovenia had blocked Croatia’s negotiations over the border dispute, while leaders such as Angela Merkel talked increasingly about a “European perspective” rather than membership. The chancellor was quoted declaring that “from [my] point of view I would like to say we should not avoid the term ‘privileged partnership.’ Full membership should not be the next question at all, it is rather political stabilisation which can of course never mean ‘never full membership’ but other steps more important now” (EU Observer, 17.03.2006). Associated with deliberations among member states on the EU’s “absorption capacity” and the sustainability of further enlargement, these discourses undermined the rhetorical commitment the EU had expressed toward the inclusion of the western Balkans and weakened the credibility of reform-associated rewards.

However, the divergent evolution of the two countries shows that inconsistencies in the EU’s strategy alone do not determine the trajectory of reform, but domestic political elites also play a role. While the EU’s commitment toward Croatia was much more explicit in comparison to its discourse on Macedonian accession, the former had stalled in its reforms while the latter saw a constant evolution of its democracy scores. In March 2005 negotiation talks with Croatia were, for the first time in EU history, postponed on account of political shortcomings. Political elites remained averse to change unless they saw the immediate benefits of compliance. The intermediate rewards the EU had focused on – such as visa liberalisation regime - did not make up for the perception of a frail EU commitment to enlargement. Elusive EU and member state statements on membership, recycled rhetoric and inconsistency in applying conditionality altered the effectiveness of EU-driven demands for reform in the two countries. As a consequence, the countries’ political elites refrained from politically costly domestic reforms which were not matched by satisfactory EU rewards.

Furthermore, the EU lacked enforcement credibility, as it had refrained from sanctioning the two states for non-compliance. In its 2005 Progress Report, the Commission had reiterated the Union’s unequivocal commitment to accept nothing short of full compliance:
“The EU must remain rigorous in demanding fulfilment of its criteria, but fair in duly rewarding progress. Aspirant countries can only proceed from one stage of the process to the next once they have met the conditions for that stage. Moreover, the Commission is prepared to recommend the suspension of progress in case of a serious and persistent breach of the EU’s fundamental principles, or if a country fails to meet essential requirements at any stage. Such requirements include cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).”

Nevertheless, in instances of non-compliance, the Commission issued nothing more than verbal warnings urging domestic political elites to pursue the required criteria. Domestic political clashes between ethnic Albanian opposition and the ruling parties in Macedonia in 2006 and then in 2007 were only discursively acknowledged by the EU, but in no way reflected in a change in its incentives / constraints response. Similarly, in Croatia’s case, the EU did not follow through on its criticism toward the assassination of a Croatian journalist in October 2008, as this event was not reflected in a more stringent monitoring or sanctioning of the country’s government. Accordingly, one can find no correspondence between changes in democratic indices linked to EU sanctioning mechanisms, which undermines the case of support for the link between conditionality and democratisation.

Not only did the EU not sanction non-compliant behaviour, but it seemed, in Croatia’s case, to overlook the lack of concrete progress across the set criteria and push for moving further with accession negotiations. Some observers have pointed to the strikingly rapid evolution in the relations between Croatia and the EU. One EU official referred to the “rush” in bringing Croatia in, arguing that it was running counter to everything the block had been preaching so far in terms of clean government and rule of law (EU-Observer, 10.06.2011). EU spokespersons had time and again reiterated the EU would not accept any countries which were not “100 per cent” ready for accession in terms of fulfilling political conditionality. Like statements however have proven empty rhetoric. The last three chapters that had been under final negotiations were the country’s most problematic: Judiciary and Fundamental Rights (which would reflect directly in democracy scores), Competition Policy, and finally Security, Foreign and Defence Policy. The Commission had refrained from any predictions on the timetable for closing negotiations, as the “magnitude of closing benchmarks for Chapter 23...makes conclusion of this chapter difficult to predict” (EU diplomat, EU Observer, 30.06.2010). Yet, negotiations were concluded less than a
year later, despite democratisation scores being lower than in 2001 (at the time of signing of the SAA) and that the last progress report on Croatia remarked significant shortcomings, especially so in terms of fighting corruption. EU legislators agreed nevertheless on the signing of the country’s Accession Treaty in 2011, sparking criticism from both external observers and EU official. Representatives for the Adriatic Institute for Public Policy had declared at the time that improvements on the last negotiating chapters was “abysmal” and the corruption cases prosecuted as a response to EU criticism were nothing more than “deceitful cherry-picking” (EU Observer, 10.06.2011). Croatia’s accession thus shows the EU is willing after all to make concessions, although not openly so.

However both strategic and credibility concerns appear to have also played a role in fast-tracking Croatia’s membership process. On the strategic side, it would not be the first instance the EU had used its leverage to secure its long term interests in a region. Anastasakis discusses claims that the EU toned down its criticism on the treatment of the Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia, in order to avoid Russian influences in the region and also prematurely allowed Romania and Bulgaria as members out of considerations for securing the EU’s borders (2008: 373). At the same time, the EU needed a success story in the region – countless times EU officials have referred to Croatia as a model for the countries in the region and an example of the success of the EU strategy in the Balkans. As one EU diplomat declared, “Croatia would increase the credibility of our democratisation process in the whole region” (EUObserver, 9.10.2003). This consideration may explain why the EU did not agree to any form of post-accession verification mechanism for the country, although the final report did underline areas for further reform. Instead the EU “trusted” the Croatian government to continue the reforms it had initiated: “Croatia is a lesson to us all […] the EU door remains open to Western Balkan countries” (Jose Manuel Barosso quoted in EUObserver, 9.12.2011).

Nevertheless, these strategies undermine the credibility of the entire process, especially after the EU had been so vocal on not taking any shortcuts throughout the negotiations and accepting nothing than full commitment from the countries in the region. It sends a worrying message to other western Balkan states, in what is already a politically unstable region, that at the end of the day negotiations are a politics game and progress on reforms is circumstantial. Inconsistencies in the relationship with existing candidate and potential candidate countries run the risk of generating “uneasiness and competitive feelings among the different states in the region” (Anasta-
Countries next in the accession line would be inclined not to take future EU warnings seriously and would lose motivation for continuing with reforms. Contrary to the purpose of political conditionality, the region would risk further political instability, as “conditionality also generates reaction, polarization and a sense of injustice in most Western Balkan countries, especially when it touches upon nationally sensitive matters and unresolved post-conflict issues” (Anastasakis 2008:366).

**Undermining its own efforts? Inconsistencies in the EU’s strategy in the Western Balkans**

The SAAs ensure signatory countries become “potential candidates,” a pool of countries “eligible” for consideration for membership, with which the EU would first develop “enhanced contractual relations.” Still coming to grips with the consequences of the premature accession of Bulgaria and Romania, the EU was not going to make any compromises in the Western Balkans, even more so given their troubled political background. Strict criteria posed difficulties for national elites who were either less prepared or more reluctant than their Central and Eastern counterparts had been to respond to EU claims, even more so when faced with EU-wide enlargement fatigue, the EU’s own political and institutional crisis, and the dualism of the discourse on further enlargement.

In addition, the inconsistencies in progress assessment – the conspicuous advancement of Croatia – critically affects the credibility of EU requirements. The EU has underestimated the willingness of political elites in these countries to compromise on full membership. The intermediate rewards offered – further integration into the EU internal market, visa liberalisation, training programmes, twinning exercises and cultural exchanges – no longer result sufficient to motivate domestic actors to confront domestic veto points and promote reforms. This imbalance, coupled with domestic political troubles, acted as the main impediment of reform in Croatia and Macedonia’s cases.

This paper has looked, by taking Croatia and Macedonia as case studies, at the relationship between EU political conditionality and the consolidation of democracy in the western Balkans. It sought to identify, by process tracing Freedom House democracy scores throughout the countries’ involvement with the EU, whether the latter’s strategy in this region has led to tangible reforms or whether domestic political ambitions and constraints have diluted the scope of EU influence.
The “Balkans belong in the EU” but “reform is more important than the date” has been EU’s leitmotiv throughout the accession process. Unlike the Europe Agreements that were in place for the accession of CEE states in 2004, the SAAs for the Western Balkans made no explicit mention of membership, building on the cautious language of “enhanced partnerships.” By holding back on the main mechanism of controlling conditionality – access to negotiations – the Union (more so the Commission) induced a significant asymmetry between what it demanded from the two countries and what it was willing to concede in return. In consequence, it reduced the overall credibility of its commitment toward these countries’ membership aspirations. Coupled with EU level political clashes about the feasibility of future enlargements, debates about the institutional future of the Union, the financial crisis, and the overall EU political crisis have all signalled to the Balkan countries that their membership perspective was uncertain at best.

In this context, shifts in democracy scores can only very seldom be traced back to EU actions. The EU did not play its reward and penalty cards effectively when granting further access toward the status of membership. Considering Croatia’s rapid progress, one would have expected changes in democratic indices as a direct reflection of EU political requirements, and also the inverse relationship. Croatia however seems fit the old tale of the emperor’s new clothes - Croatia’s readiness to join and the EU’s willingness to prioritise its accession over the one of Macedonia only appear apparent to the EU and the country itself. A link between political conditionality and democratisation can only be noticed in the presence of immediate and categorical EU incentives or threats. EU demands for reform do not translate into modifications of democracy scores, and conversely, the EU did not react to domestic circumstances which determined the low level of commitment to democratisation. Aside from temporarily postponing the start of accession negotiations, one notices no other repercussions of non-compliance (quite the contrary if one considers the incomplete fulfilment of the required criteria in the case of Croatia). The main problems of its strategy rest with downplaying the importance of the ultimate goal of membership (its evasive discourse on enlargement), the inconsistently applied political conditionality and no clear balance between rewards and sanctions. In Grabbe’s (2002) mediating factors terminology: the content of rewards is unclear (if, when and contingent on what factors would they be granted membership) and the credibility of threats and promises is low.

Although the EU presence in the region has had noticeable effects, the
Union has nevertheless poorly adapted its enlargement strategy for the western Balkans. It seems to have built its strategy on the assumption that the appeal of membership would be enough and neglected to adapt its approach to meet the costs of change for the domestic elites, which proved higher that it had been the case of the CEECs due to the region’s history of ethnic conflicts and political instability. The EU’s indeterminate discourse on enlargement, inconsistent progress assessment and EU level clashes on the feasibility on enlargement and the future of the EU, associated with the reluctance of domestic political elites to undertake reforms which were too costly compared to EU rewards have led to a deterioration of the countries’ commitment to reform.

REFERENCES:


Hughes, James, Sasse, Gwendolyn, Gordon, Claire (2003). EU Enlargement and Power Asymmetries: Conditionality and the Commission's Role in Regionalisation in Central and Eastern Europe, ESRC Working Paper, Sussex European Institute, University of Sussex.


Schimmelfennig, Frank et al.(2002): Costs, Commitment and Compliance, the Impact of the EU on Democracy and Human Rights in European Non-Member States. EUI Working Paper, RSC.


Schimmelfennig, Frank, Sedelmeier, Ulrich (2005). The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Eu-


All relevant EU documents for Croatia and Macedonia (SAP, SAA, progress reports, agreements, conclusions, etc.) are available on the Enlargement webpage (last accessed 20.02.2011):


Media overview:

Balkans warned: no EU accession without reform, 29.01.03. Available at: http://euobserver.com/15/9169

Croatian EU membership a step closer, 09.10.03. Available at: http://euobserver.com/15/12982

Croatia heads for EU membership, 12.01.04. Available at: http://euobserver.com/15/14068

Croatia on track for EU membership 21.04.04. Available at: http://euobserver.com/15/15259

Western Balkans given glimmer of hope on EU integration 03.06.10. Available at: http://euobserver.com/9/30201

Merkel moots ‘privileged partnership’ for Balkans 17.03.06. Available at: http://euobserver.com/15/21163

Croatia opens final chapters in EU accession talks 30.06.10. Available at: http://euobserver.com/9/30386

Croatia gets EU green light, despite lack of reforms 10.06.11. Available at: http://euobserver.com/15/32474

Croatian EU membership a step closer 09.10.03. Available at: http://euobserver.com/15/12982

EU and Croatia remind world the Union is still working 09.12.11. Available at: http://euobserver.com/15/114577
ANNEX I

Table 1: Democratisation scores 2001-2010


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>4.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>4.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>4.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>3.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>3.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>3.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>3.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nuclear Energy in Bulgaria: Strategic Implications for the EU and Russia

Elvira Oliva, Paolo Sorbello¹

ABSTRACT
This paper aims at understanding the impact of Bulgarian politics and policy in energy relations between the EU and Russia. Chiefly, our case analysis focuses on the prospective construction of new nuclear facilities and its impact on the Black Sea region, within the European Union, and on the relations between Sofia, Brussels, and Moscow.

The first part of this work is dedicated to outlining the most significant direction of the research: nuclear energy in Bulgaria. In the second part, a brief historical context of the Bulgaria-EU negotiations precedes a section that analyses the current Sofia-Brussels energy dialogue, from accession (2007) onward. The last analytical part delineates Bulgaria as a vertex in the framework of Russia-EU relations. The Bulgarian energy complex is seen as a strategic hub for prospective pipelines, but also an important market that could be used to exert influence in the Black Sea region as well. Bulgaria might be considered a strategic centre for regional and international energy cooperation.

KEYWORDS

INTRODUCTION
When dealing with energy issues, the degree of academic solidity in case analyses is at stake. Few catch-phrases would surely grant a high return on the circulation of Political Science and Economics papers, though under-mining the overall scientific depth of the arguments. In this paper we chose

¹ CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: Elvira Oliva, Paolo Sorbello, Centro per l’Europa Centro-Orientale e Balcanica, via S. Giovanni Bosco 1, 48018, Faenza (RA), Italy. E-mails: paolo.sorbello@gmail.com, elviraoiva@libero.it.
Paper presented at the One-Day Energy Workshop of the EU-Russia Collaborative Research Network (CRN), hosted at the Bulgarian Embassy in London, November 11, 2011.
ISSN 1855-7694 © 2012 European Perspectives, UDK: 327 (4)
to look at the hot topic of “energy security” with respect to the Bulgarian nuclear sector from an institutionalist point of view, with a strong emphasis on the historic relevance of technical and economic data. Through the years, the Bulgarian case has become a paragon for the analysis of EU-Russia energy relations and shows interesting aspects also in Sofia’s interaction with Brussels and Moscow. For this reason, the present paper looks at Bulgaria from a detached point of view, trying to tie history, politics, and economics with technical, legal, and environmental concerns. In our opinion, all of these aspects, must be taken seriously to reach a deep understanding of the salience of today’s Bulgarian nuclear sector. Nuclear energy in Bulgaria is not just a source of electricity for households in Sofia; it bundles together the European Union’s membership (and energy policy) and Russian economic interests. These elements come together on the Bulgarian field to wage an important tug-of-war over energy and beyond.

The analysis is carried through the lens of Neo-Institutionalism. The chief assumption is that institutions matter and they are susceptible to analyze. Energy studies require a cross-sectorial analysis and Historical Institutionalism is the most suitable approach (Pierson, 1993; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Campbell, 2004), especially when taking into consideration the Bulgarian political and economic history not only as a sequence of independent events, but as an explanatory variable. Throughout the paper, energy is considered as a puzzle, in accordance with the definition by Pierson:

Historical institutionalists address big, substantive questions that are inherently of interest to broad publics as well as to fellow scholars. To develop explanatory arguments about important outcomes or puzzles, historical institutionalists take time seriously, specifying sequences and tracing transformations and processes of varying scale and temporality. Historical institutionalists likewise analyze macro contexts and hypothesize about the combined effects of institutions and processes rather than examining just one institution or process at a time. Taken together, these three features – substantive agendas; temporal arguments; and attention to contexts and configurations -- add up to a recognizable historical institutional approach that makes powerful contributions to our discipline’s understandings of government, politics, and public policies.3

---

3 See also: Immergut (1998); Hall and Taylor (1996); Katzenstein (1976); North (1990); Rothstein (1996); Thelen (1999); Pierson (1993).
After the introductory overview on the Bulgarian energy mix and the relevance of nuclear energy, which defines the subject of the research, the paper focuses on the historical role of the nuclear sector in Bulgarian energy policy and politics both during the Soviet era and after 1991. The elaboration of the concept of *path dependency* in its declination as *path dependency*[^4] offers the theoretical explanation.

The second section is dedicated to the negotiations between Brussels and Sofia. Softening the Neorealist (Waltz, 1976) assumption of State as unitary actors (Keohane, 1986; Vasquez, 1998), the analytical focus shifts to national and international institutions. In this respect, *institutions* are defined as “the formal and informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy” (Hall, 1996)[^5].

Taking into account this theoretical choice, the third part investigates the dynamics animating the triangle Moscow-Sofia-Brussels, drawing from the two-level game theory (Putnam, 1989), to study both the international-European pressure and domestic level, considering policy outcomes as the result of “*double edged diplomacy*” (Evans, Jacobson, Putnam 1993).

**Bulgarian Energy Overview**

The Bulgarian energy mix is based on two interrelated pillars: the scarcity of indigenous resources and the dominance of fossil fuels. Bulgaria imports almost all fossil fuels it consumes[^6] and chooses to satisfy domestic energy demand with coal, oil and nuclear energy, using imported gas for exports. The relationship between economic growth and energy demand reveals a great inefficiency. In spite of a low GDP[^7] and a decreasing population, energy consumption increases, contrasting with the general rule about the nexus between the two macro-economic indicators. The current economic crisis negatively affects this feature.

[^4]: “A process is path-dependent if the outcome in any period depends on the set of outcomes and opportunities that arose in a history but not upon their order. A path-dependent process can be written as follows: \( x_{t+1} = G_t(\{h_t\}) \)” (Sage, 2006).
[^5]: See also: Ikenberry, 1988; Steinmo, 2008.
[^6]: Bulgaria imports almost 76.2% of fossil fuels used to satisfy its domestic consumption (IEA, 2010).
[^7]: In 2010, Bulgarians had the lowest GDP in the European Union, with 4,800 € per inhabitant against a EU average of 25,786 € per inhabitant (Eurostat, 2011)
After the dissolution of the USSR, Bulgaria experienced relevant and cyclical economic crises. The worst one took place in 1996-1997 and it involved the banking sector and currency in particular. It represented a first minor

8 Energy intensity measures the ratio of energy use to output. Bulgaria has the highest in EU, both compared with the EU average and other CEECs Member States with similar energy systems.
stage towards lowering the degree of energy intensity in the country, which remains higher than Central Eastern European Countries (CEECs) and EU-27 average (see Figure 1). In 2010, the primary energy consumption was satisfied mainly by fossil fuels: coal (36.1%) and oil (22.8%). Nuclear accounts for 19.2%, more than natural gas (12.5%), mainly used to export. The renewable energy sources covers only the 7.2% (see Figure 2).

With such scenario in mind, our next step is to describe in depth the history of the development of nuclear energy in Bulgaria, from its origins in the Thirties onwards. The subsequent paragraph takes on the issue of the two-level game played by Sofia with Brussels and the EU institutions. The last section analyses the policy triangle that connects the decision-making process in Sofia, Moscow, and Brussels whose actions are mutually influenced.

**The Soviet and Russian Factor in Bulgaria**

1. History and Development of Bulgarian Nuclear Industry

At the beginning of the Cold War, the Soviet Union began introducing economic development programs in the countries that were drawn under its control. In the period between Stalin’s death and Khrushchev’s speech at the XX Congress of the CPSU, Todor Zhivkov rose to power in Bulgaria. The Soviet establishment would work with Zhivkov until the very last days of existence of the Eastern Bloc.

In this political environment, Bulgaria was eyed by Soviet leaders as a key country for the development of the nuclear energy industry. Planned in Bulgaria’s official Energy Strategy documents since 1956, the first research reactors were started in 1961 in Kozloduy. This site by the Danube river on the north-eastern border between Bulgaria and Romania. Based on the agreement between Sofia and Moscow signed in July 1966, the two governments put on the table a detailed development and investment plan for the nuclear industry in Bulgaria (Ginsburgs and Slusser, 1981). Once the feasibility study was completed by a joint team of engineers, the building of the plant’s four main reactors started in 1969.

---

9 In particular, Zhivkov sided with the anti-Stalinist factions and became the Secretary General of the BKP (Bulgarian Communist Party). It is worth noting that Bulgaria was part of the Warsaw Pact, signed in 1955 in response to the birth of NATO.


11 The team is jointly coordinated from the research institutes of Moscow, Toploproekt, and Sofia, Energoproekt http://www.aep.ru/en/activity/projects/abroad/kozloduy
The first two units of the Kozloduy NPP were quickly completed by 1974, running on VVER-440 reactors (their capacity was in fact 440 MW), and their commercial delivery began in July 1974 and November 1975 respectively. This was the first stage of the development of the Kozloduy site. It overlapped with the second stage, as the construction of Unit 3 and 4 started in 1973. These reactors were completed by 1980 and 1982 respectively, and had improved safety and efficiency technology by implementing the enhanced V-230 model.

For the third stage of development, two additional units were commissioned in addition to the existing four. The construction was completed in 1988 and 1993 respectively, employing advanced technology for concrete containing – not present in the V-230 model – and envisioning a waste storage facility, to be considered \textit{ad interim}, before waste was shipped abroad. The newer reactors are VVER-1000\textsuperscript{12}, their model being the V-320\textsuperscript{13}. All of the Kozloduy reactors can therefore be considered of second generation, taking into account the various steps that nuclear technology has undergone worldwide.

Uranium mining in Bulgaria has been carried out since the discovery of a few sites by German and Russian ventures in the late-Thirties and early-Forties. The mines were located along the Balkan Mountains (Eleshnitsa, Buhovo) and in Northern Thrace (Asenovgrad and Senokos, Smitli). However, a governmental decision made in 1992 halted all explorations and mining for uranium in Bulgaria. Following the obsolescence of the Warsaw Pact, the Russian Federation lost interest in bartering Bulgarian \textit{yellow cake} with enhanced fuel rods.

In the years, remodeling work has been applied to the older reactors at Kozloduy NPP. However, not complying with post-Chernobyl security standards, most of the Soviet-style reactors in Eastern Europe were strictly monitored by the European Union. This is particularly true for countries that submitted their application for becoming a member of the EU. Bulgaria was no exception, as it had to comply with dire requirements during the application process as shown below in chapter 3.

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{With a capacity of 1,000 MW.}
\footnote{The Vodo-Vodyanoi Energeticheskii Reaktor, VVER, is a type of reactor that represented the Soviet response to Western-designed Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR). VVERs use water for during fuel processing for both cooling and retrieving thermal energy. For this reason, reactors that use “light water” are built near a source of water, typically a river. In Bulgaria, the Danube has been chosen as the ideal stream for the exploitation of hydroresources, especially with regards to nuclear energy. These types of reactors also require the lowest level of uranium enrichment. Through Soviet technology, uranium was produced to yellow cake levels, which made the reactors sustainable in the long term.}
\end{footnotes}
2. The Second NPP

Studies for the construction of a second NPP were assigned to Energo-proekt in the Seventies. Once these were completed, in 1981 the Bulgarian government headed by Zhivkov decided the construction of a NPP near the town of Belene, 200 km east of Kozloduy, by the Danube banks like the previous one. Construction of the basic features of a nuclear facility were started the same year following the project by Energoproekt. For the construction of the power plant, a joint design by Atomenergoproekt (Ukraine SSR) and its Bulgarian counterpart was laid out. It envisioned the building of a VVER-1000 V-320 reactor, the very same that were being assembled in Kozloduy’s fifth and sixth module.

Politics and science wrote together the ill-fated turning point for the completion of Belene NPP. On the one hand, the Communist Party was removed from power in November 1990 and Bulgaria faced the new challenge of transitioning to a more open, transparent, and democratic state. On the other hand, the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences warned the new government on the safety of Belene NPP from all perspectives. Environmental as well as social, as well as economic concerns were raised in the “white book” published by Bulgarian scientists in 1990. The last concern, the economic one, was shared by the Bulgarian government which, facing a hard financial situation and having to deal with a changing world, decided to put the project on hold. Furthermore, the extended six-module project was downsized to a two-module one. The environmentally-concerned groups that were most active, like Ekoglasnost, regarded this as a victory for the new democratic course.

The Nineties were a decade of adjustment for Bulgarian politics and economics, in light of the prospective accession to the European Union. In order to meet EU security standards, Sofia was forced to dismantle older reactors at Kozloduy before membership could be granted. By doing so, Bulgaria’s primary energy supply dropped, increasing the country’s dependence on foreign resources. This condition prompted the National Movement Simeon II, the governing party led by the monarchic figure of Simeon Borisov Saksoburggotski, to resume the nuclear plan in Belene. Prime Minister Saksoburggotski and Energy Minister Milko Kovachev announced in 2003 that the project was to be restarted.

The governmental announcement was followed by numerous audits by the EU and some supranational nuclear energy institutions (IEA, IAEA). This,
in turn, prompted new legislation and research on the environmental and economic impact of the construction of the NPP. Among other events, the establishment of the Nuclear Regulatory Agency (NRA) and the implementation of the Act for the Safe Use of Nuclear Energy in 2003-04 were the most significant political provisions.

In 2005, just before parliamentary elections, the National Electric Company (NEK) issued a tender to assign the design and the building tasks to the best bidder. As an indication of the direction taken by the new socialist government, the newly nominated Economy and Energy minister was a character closely connected with the Bulgarian nuclear industry, Ruman Ovcharov. Almost one year and a half after the announcement of the tender, at the end of October 2006, the Russian consortium Atomstroyeksport-Areva NP was assigned the job. At the end of the year, the mandatory deadline for shutting down the third and fourth reactor in Kozloduy was met by Bulgaria, complying with European demands before being admitted to the EU in 2007.

The result of these rounds of political and diplomatic negotiations over the feasibility of the NPP in Belene was an intricate web of financial transactions and declarations that harmed the overall international performance of Bulgarian markets. Russian banks involved in the investment were known for their ties with Gazprom (Gazprombank) and the Kremlin (Sberbank, Vneshekonombank, and VTB); international rating companies were unhappy with the concentration of assets in the hands of the state-owned consortium headed by NEK and downgraded the rank of Bulgarian financial performance and outlook.

In this respect, it is interesting to note that Bulgaria’s main partner has been and continues to be Russia. The path to diversification and emancipation from Russian hydrocarbons and nuclear fuel seems long and tortuous, as shown in the next paragraph. To date, the Belene project has been halted and the puzzle is far from being solved.14

3. Bulgaria’s Atomic Dependence on Russia

The Russian Federation has had a political and commercial influence in Bulgaria’s atomic energy since the collapse of the Soviet Union. By taking on its shoulders advantages and responsibilities as the ‘successor state’, Russia enjoyed a special relation with the former members of the Warsaw Pact

14 The first draft of this paper considered updates until the first week of January 2012.
through the supply of primary energy resources. Be it oil, natural gas or nuclear fuel, flows of energy commodities have been shipped to Eastern European countries, which have never been self-sufficient in terms of their energy endowment. Bulgaria is no exception to this trend, which has been enhanced after the turn of the century, with the creation of Russian energy conglomerates directly linked with the Kremlin.

In the nuclear industry, Rosatom is the national company that inherited the role of the Ministry for Atomic Energy (MinAtom), established in 1992 and reorganized in 2004. The then-president Vladimir Putin pushed for the ‘state corporation’ in late 2007. Since then, Rosatom has been chaired by Abkhazian-born Sergei Kiriyenko. Rosatom controls the stakes of Atomenergoprom, a nuclear power holding that encompasses the whole Russian energy industry, as far as its civilian use is concerned. In the case of Bulgaria, it seems important to take into account the role of two branches of the holding: the subsidiary OKB Gidropress and the partner company TVEL.

Gidropress is a subsidiary of Rosatom providing infrastructural products for the construction of NPPs. Although its historic foundation goes back to 1946, it has recently been given the role of subsidiary of Rosatom’s activities in the construction and maintenance of several NPPs both in Russia and abroad. The 2006 Russo-Bulgarian deal on the prospective construction of the NPP in Belene envisioned Gidropress as the main contractor for the design, development, and maintenance of the plant. Since then, the Russian company has completed feasibility studies, the investment plan, and the safety provisions for the two VVER-1000 reactors. The project is laid out without a back-up plan in case the plant goes offline. Doubling Kozloduy’s 5.5 GW capacity and adding 1 GW from Varna coal and gas plant would put the whole system under stress, as it would be impossible to match any emergency shut down.

In 2002, TVEL won the bid to supply nuclear fuel to Bulgaria (OECD, 2010:151). The tender assigned TVEL with the task of taking care of the entire life-cycle, from purchase to disposal, of the fuel used in Kozloduy power plant. Each year, the quantities and prices are re-negotiated. How-

---

15 Kirienko had briefly served as acting Prime Minister, during the economic crisis that prompted Yeltsin’s decision to substitute Yevgeni Primakov for Viktor Chernomyrdin. Kirienko worked closely with Putin since 2000 and entered the board of the Federal Atomic Energy Agency in 2005

16 The enterprise implements a complex of design, theoretical, analytical, R&D and production activities in reactor development for nuclear power plants of various purpose with increased safety, reliability and efficiency, competitive both in Russia and abroad.

17 Notably, the Iranian NPP at Bushehr os among Gidropress’ overseas projects.
ever, in order to avoid risk of supply, the Bulgarian government signed an ‘insurance’ with TVEL, which would avoid interruptions of supply until the expiration of the contract in 2020.

The demand for enriched uranium was substantial, provided that the plant in Kozloduy was still two-thirds operational and that the NPP in Belene was under construction. Bulgaria had an important history in uranium mining since the late Fifties. Mines were found in the Thirties and produced a significant amount of average-quality uranium that was purified in the ‘Zvezda’ plant and shipped to other Eastern Bloc countries to be processed before entering the industrial production. With the governmental decree Nr. 163 (August 20, 1992), all uranium production and processing activities were abandoned in Bulgaria and the country preferred to rely on foreign supply. The total cost for decommissioning all existing facilities and for the reconversion of the industrial activity was calculated by the Ministry of Finance to be larger than BGN 35 millions in the period spanning from 1992 to 2008.

Since decommissioning the mines, Bulgaria lost its market power in the bartering of uranium for nuclear fuel, a trend that had slowed down after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Nowadays, Bulgaria imports recycled nuclear fuel from Russian NPPs and ships back Kozloduy’s spent fuel at an additional cost for disposal. Such practice has triggered economic and environmental concern over the long-term sustainability of the costs and externalities related to Russian recycled fuel rods. All in all, it seems of little consolation for Bulgaria’s energy to transfer its dependence on Russian hydrocarbons to Russian nuclear fuel, which defeats the whole purpose of the diversification effort that could lead to the energy emancipation of Sofia.

**Nuclear Energy and the Accession of Bulgaria to the EU**

1. Meeting Brussels’ Requirements

The diplomatic dialogue between Sofia and Brussels began on 30 March 1998, within the process involving all Central and Eastern European countries bidding to access the EU. The formal negotiations for accession were started on 15 February 2000 and were concluded on 15 June 2004. The Treaty of accession was signed on 25 April 2005. Bulgaria joined EU on 1 January 2007, together with Romania. This was the last step of the greater EU enlargement process which involved 12 countries, nine of which for-
merely under the Soviet orbit, thus establishing new Eastern borders for the Union (Smilov, 2006).

The EU approach to the Bulgarian accession was peculiar: membership was delayed and the observer-state status persisted after Sofia’s formal accession (Gatева, 2010), as confirmed by the establishment of the Control and Verification Mechanism (CVM). Because of Bulgaria’s fiscal and budgetary conditions, the requirements for the accession were stricter than for other CEECs newcomers. It could be considered ‘either the last to benefit from the old enlargement policies or the first to experience the novel and more restrictive stance of the EU to the admission of new member States’ (Smilov, 2006). Brussels’ way reinforces the idea of a Bulgarian specificity among Eastern European countries.

Even if, ‘the objective is to welcome Bulgaria and Romania as members of European Union in 2007’\(^{18}\), as declared at the Copenhagen Summit. The main obstacles to full membership regard the lack of a functioning market economy able to afford European pressure and the difficulties to close all the chapters of the *acquis*. In 2002, the Progress Report stated: ‘Bulgaria still needs to make sustained efforts to develop sufficient administrative and judicial capacity to implement and enforce the *acquis*’\(^{19}\). For this reason, the EU Commission prepared a detailed roadmap, indicating the 28 chapters of the *acquis* and the actions to take in order to fulfill every requirement.

*Energy conditions.* The chapter of the *acquis* dedicated to energy distinguishes between short and medium term objectives in order to align Bulgarian energy policy and legislation to EU standards. The short term requests regarded the implementation of necessary reform to liberalise natural gas and electricity markets, following the reform of all EU member States. The nuclear sector was the principal addressee of indications in the ‘Roadmap to EU accession.’ In fact, recommendations reported in the Council Report on Nuclear Safety (June 2001) and confirmed in the Peer Review Status Report (June 2002) regarded the closure of units 1 and 2 of Kozloduy plant, perceived as urgent measure to adopt. The closure of units 3 and 4 of the same plant and the compliance with Euratom requirements and procedure.

*Nuclear issue and two level game.* The conditions posed about nuclear issue could be considered as a two-level game (Putnam, 1988), in order to understand the terms of accession negotiations and taking into account both the International/European dimension and the national one.

\(^{18}\) Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen EU Council.

\(^{19}\) Communication from the Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament
International level. In July 1992, G-7 summit decided Soviet-era nuclear reactor were not safe according to international standards. As consequence, the VVER 440/230 technology was labeled as ‘high risk’ and ‘not upgradable’ at reasonable costs. This attitude was a Chernobyl spill-over effect (Kahn, 2007; Panova, 2010). In 1993, Bulgaria signed a Nuclear Safety Account Agreement (NSAA) with European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) which assured the closure of units 1-2 by 1997 and 3-4 by 1998. The decommissioning operations were supported by a fund of ECU 24 million. A first crisis about nuclear issues emerged in October 1995, when Bulgarian authorities decided to reconnect Kozloduy unit 1, after the periodical shutdown for maintenance. The international community perceived the decision as a temptation to ignore previous agreements. The first reaction arrived from EC Parliament through a resolution appealing for the immediate closure of unit 1, according to NSA Agreement. In the fall of 1995, the two actors reached an agreement to carry further tests of safety standards. The result was quite contradictory. At first it was decided to restart the unit 1 and the EU allocated additional ECU 10.9 million to finance a further upgrade and the eventual conversion into thermal plant. In May 1996, Kozloduy was shut down to allow new tests. The Kurchatov Institute in Moscow declared the unit to comply with safety standards. In January 1997, the unit was reconnected to the grid. Moreover, in its Short Term Programme, Nek planned the life extension of the units. As confirmed by the State Energy Committee the units 1-4 remained in service until 2004 and 2005, when the modernisation of units 5 and 6 was due to be completed.

European level. Since the beginning of negotiations, nuclear energy entered in EU-Bulgaria dialogue. In July 1997, when Agenda 2000 was defined, the Commission stressed the need to obtain a realistic programme for Bulgaria to face nuclear safety issue, including the possibility of closing. After the meeting, Bulgaria didn’t enter into the group of six countries considered ready to access to EU. In this case, nuclear was only a marginal matter, besides economic and budgetary difficulties.

---

20 After the summit, the National representatives declared: ‘While we recognize the important role nuclear power plays in global energy supplies, the safety of Soviet design nuclear power plants gives cause for great concern. Each State, through its safety authorities and plant operators, is itself responsible for the safety of its nuclear power plants. The new States concerned of the former Soviet Union and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe must give high priority to eliminating this danger. These efforts should be part of a market-oriented reform of energy policies encouraging commercial financing for the development of the energy sector’.

21 This fund was added to ECU 11.5 million received within the PHARE programme in 1991.

22 [COM (97), 2000]. ‘Agenda 2000: For a stronger and wider Union’ is a Commission Communication which launched a single complete framework offering a clear and coherent vision of European Union, whose aim was to ready the Union for the reinforcement of its policies and the accession of new members, within a strict financial framework.
Despite this, in 1998 nuclear affair officially entered in the negotiations. The EU-Bulgaria Accession Partnership indicated nuclear safety and Kozloduy closure as short term objectives. After ambiguous debates, the final agreement decided the closure of units 1 and 2 by 2003, in exchange of additional financial support and the closure of units 3 and 4 by 2006. From EU side, the importance of nuclear issue was related to energy security, more than environmental worries: nuclear affairs were included in the Chapter 14 of the *acquis*. As officially stated, the main aims of the requirement were to ‘ensure the safety for nuclear power plants in order that electricity is produced according to a high level of nuclear safety and . . . [to] ensure that nuclear waste is handled in a responsible manner and prepare for the implementation of Euratom safeguards on nuclear material’. Bulgaria closed the Energy chapter with the other candidates, except Romania.

**National level.** The compliance with international and EU requirements was not easy. Only in November 2002, just before the Copenhagen summit, Bulgarian authorities accepted the closure and received the further pre-accession financial aid package of $1.5 billion. However, the acceptance was not total both at European and national level.

The declaration of the Prime Minister, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, provoked a general opposition. At national level, the closure was the object of a referendum request. In early 2002, the fear of economic and energy shutdown pushed to the demand for a referendum about the closure of the units.

One of the most challenging issue was the discussion about the closure of units 3 and 4. The Bulgarian government tried to renegotiate it, due to internal opposition and the risk of spreading anti-European feelings. Before the visit of President Parvanov to Brussels, the Parliament approved the proposal by NDSV and DPS to define the date of closure of units 3 and

---

23 The chapter concerning the alignment between EU energy policy and legislation for the internal market.
25 The historical Summit held in Copenhagen closed the first part of the EU enlargement: ten CEECs closed the negotiations to join European Union by 1 May 2004.
26 Saxe-Coburg Gotha became Prime Minister on 21 July 2001. His government was supported by NMSII, MRF and BSP. In November 2002, this government coalition survived to two “no confidence” votes promoted by UDF and Coalition for Bulgaria, against the signature of the agreement with EU for the decommissioning of Kozloduy.
27 In December 2002, the Socialist Party called for a referendum, whose request was deposited in June 2004. In April 2005, also the Kozloduy Civic Committee announced the intention of a referendum. In April 2005, the Treaty to accession was signed in Luxembourg.
4 upon a few conditions: the date of accession to EU, an equal treatment with Lithuania and Slovakia and advantaged economic treatment. Bulgaria requested a new peer review in order to demonstrate the optimal conditions of nuclear safety for units 3 and 4. According to the national position, from a technological perspective, the two units had been upgraded. In 2003 an inquiry carried out by 18 international inspectors demonstrated that the two units meet all necessary international standards. Bulgaria aimed to obtain a delay until 2011 and 2013 for the permanent shutdown, in order to complete the modernization of the remaining units: 5 and 6 (VVER 1000/320) needed for improvement. As underlined by the President of Council, Juncker, the signature closed the possibility of changing the Treaty contents. In May 2005, the Bulgarian Parliament ratified the Accession Treaty with 231 favorable votes and one contrary. While signing the decree, President Parvanov admitted the Kozloduy closure was the most relevant concession the country had had to make to EU, but the ratification of Treaty closed the issue.

2. Nuclear Energy and the Current Situation

After the Fukushima accident on 11 March 2011, the European Commission has required a re-assessment of all nuclear plants. As decided at the meeting on 23 June 2011 with Energy Commissioner Oettinger all EU countries agreed to undertake voluntary comprehensive risk and safety assessment (stress-test), taking into account the indications released by EC and European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) on 24 May 2011. Consequently, all nuclear plants have been re-assessed, according to EU wide criteria which consider both natural and man-made hazards. Concretely, the re-assessment consisted in an evaluation of the response of a NPP when facing a set of extreme conditions and in a verification of the preventive and mitigation measures, chosen according a ‘defence-in-depth logic’: initiating events, consequential loss of safety functions, and severe accident management. The results were submitted to European Commission, whose aim is to check its fulfillment with EU standards by 31 December 2011.

The Bulgarian report covers both Kozloduy and Belene, even if the Technical design documentation of Belene NPP has not been authorized by Nuclear Regulatory Agency. This choice emerges the willingness of confirm the high safety standards of the new plant against the fear of another nay. As specified by Bulgarian authorities, the reactor type selected for the second Bulgarian NPP in Belene is a pressurized water reactor VVER-1000 model B-466B, equipped with reliable third generation safety systems. In addition,
the design has been furnished with unique systems protecting the RPV from significant external influences, including air crash on the building.

In 2010, nuclear energy accounted for 19% in the Bulgarian energy mix. The only operating power plant is located in Kozloduy and only two of the total installed 6 units are still active. The two operating reactors are licensed until 2017 and 2019 respectively, even if their lifetime is to be extended for another 20 years, after the 2006 upgrade. Originally, nuclear power was to reduce dependency on Moscow hydrocarbon imports. However, as shown in Figure 3, this aim is unlikely to be reached. Despite the fulfillment of international safety standards, the ‘Fukushima effect’, and the new environmental policy, it is possible to forecast a surge in nuclear energy by 2030.

Figure 3-Nuclear Energy scenario (Mtoe)

![Nuclear Energy scenario](image)

Source: Elaboration on BP Statistical Review, IEA and Eurostat, 2011

**Bulgaria’s Energy in the Wider Black Sea Region: Policy Implications**

1. The Policy Triangle: Sofia, Brussels, Moscow

Energy plays a central role in EU-Russia relations. As stated by the Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner ‘the equation is simple: we need Russia’s energy and Russia need the enormous energy market we provide’. It emerges the interdependence between the two actors which pushed to the official Energy
Dialogue, launched at the summit held in Paris in October 2000. According to initial intentions, the main aim of this official instrument is to create a framework to reinforce energy cooperation through discussion mainly about energy efficiency measures and investments in infrastructures. A realistic Energy Dialogue needs to be supported by a more general framework, like a Partnership Agreement, in order to create a wider common economic space. Moreover, the effectiveness of the Energy Dialogue should be guaranteed by common rules. In this direction an essential issue is the ratification of Energy Chart, signed in 1994 by 51 countries except Russia, because of the acceptance of art. 7 about transit rules. The reluctance to ratify the document is explained by Russian President Medvedev, who affirmed: ‘Everyone knows about the so called Energy Charter, which was developed to a large extent with a view to protecting the interests of consumers, which is not a bad thing. One should not forget, though, that sellers are equally parties in any contractual relations and their interests should also be protected to the same extent as interests of transit States.’ Such stand permits Russia to adopt a divide et impera policy towards EU partners. The Sofia- Moscow relation is a typical case study. After the Bulgarian accession to EU, Sofia-Moscow nuclear relations remained unchanged. Furthermore, Bulgaria becomes a new window of opportunity for Russia to enter EU markets, especially due to the unsettled question of the Belene project and the uranium shipments for the Kozloduy plant. As a consequence, after 2007 the EU dependence on Russian energy increased, altering the equation depicted by Ferrero Waldner in favour of Russian interests.

On the one hand, the EU lacks a common energy policy due to the strong national interests of its members. On the other hand, Russia pulls apart its Western customers by enjoying special relations with former Soviet satellites – thanks to the already-in-place pipeline network – and pursuing bilateral negotiations in each energy-related ventures. The resulting scenario with these two distinct poles of attraction is that Bulgaria is the one player with the power to situate itself in the game last. The advantage of the last move allows for a strategic leeway that Sofia could well enjoy amidst such giants pulling her skirt.

Bulgaria lays as a strategic cornerstone between East and West, North and South. Once the Soviet outpost closest to the Balkans, Greece, and Turkey, it now represents a key country in the wider Black Sea region. The accession to the EU has marked an important step towards the positioning of Sofia in the long run within this geopolitical context. The EU membership and the relative communitarian requirements let Bulgaria jump forward in the
context of the Western European bloc. The concept of bloc here is smoother and softer than what has been regarded a secluded and militarized ensemble of sovereign countries prior to the fall of the Berlin wall. The EU bloc sets post-1991 economic, legal, and social norms that aim at creating harmony among member states, possibly building stronger-than-international bonds between a community of sovereign subjects. Bulgaria's choice was ineluctable in that its resistance from a rapprochement with Russia was at the basis of the post-Warsaw Pact world. Unwilling to look East, Sofia chose to come closer to the rising power of Brussels. However, the lack of transparency and the slow socioeconomic transition process rendered the emancipation of Sofia from its strong links to Russia much more problematic. The double-edged connection between Russian and Bulgarian politicians and both countries' corporations, especially in the energy industry, grew just as much as Sofia's declarations of commitment to EU principles. In this last part of the paper, we seek to understand what could be the lesson that history teaches for the Bulgarian energy sector in its implication for the regional and international contexts.

Ameliorating the situation could be easy on Sofia in this desolate environment of energy dependence and inefficiency. However, a necessary effort must be undertaken by the Bulgarian leadership in order to keep decision-making secure against corruption. It is widely felt among Bulgarian and international analysts, environmental activists, members of the academic and research world, that some among the highest ranking figures in the Bulgarian governments are unable to push forward independent actions for the good of the Bulgarian society, without resorting to the pursuit of personal gains in cahoots with Russian peers. To set a distance from the allegations, the best answer from Bulgarian officials would be a shift in policymaking towards more transparent, coherent, and responsible endeavors.

2. Prospects for Bulgaria

The prospective construction of a new nuclear power plant in Belene seems to have little significance in a framework of energy issues that might well yield more stringent implications for Bulgaria. Several pipeline projects are being put in line, built, or studied for both natural gas and oil. Important investments are being channeled to the renewable energy sector, which
is seeing a steady increase in its market share\textsuperscript{28}. However, the costly new technologies might not impact the sector significantly for the next decade. Natural gas, be it from the Caspian, from underground shale rocks, or in its liquified form, could be the healing potion for Bulgaria’s short term energy needs.

For the reasons stated above, energy in Bulgaria is a very rigid segment of the economy. Long term commitments are needed for developing all the different sources that would satisfy the internal demand and would allay the dependency from Russia. Bulgaria finds herself in the position of having a whole set of opportunities at her reach. Low carbon emissions will not be worsened by the new lignite plants that are being built, and might possibly reach lower levels once older coal-fired plants are replaced by gas-fired ones. Bulgaria’s energy intensity is very high, in that every Lev of GDP costs a higher amount of energy than the European average.

However, energy can also be the source of new opportunities for Bulgaria, especially in the regional setting. By exploiting the favorable geopolitical factor, Sofia can become a leading force in the region. Bulgaria is in fact at the cultural, social, and economic centers of the area stretching from the former-Yugoslavian countries, along with Central and Eastern Europe, Greece and Turkey, out to the wider Black Sea region, which includes Slavic and Caucasian former Soviet states. Cooperation in the energy sector can yield favorable results in terms of overall cooperation in the region due to long term binding commitments, a reliable legal frameworks, and the set up of an interdependent web of relations. Such energy spill-over might prove the only compelling force for these countries to come together for a new season of cooperation, especially within the overlapping set of political associations in which the considered countries participate.

**Conclusion**

The present paper provides an analysis of the Bulgarian nuclear energy sector through an innovative and multidisciplinary path. Utilising the historical institutionalism as theoretical framework, we tried to understand the

\textsuperscript{28} In this paper we focused mainly on the nuclear aspect of the ‘policy triangle’ between Sofia, Moscow, and Brussels. However, we kept in mind the relevance of other aspects of Bulgarian energy that are tough to unbundle. At the end of 2011, the Burgas-Alexandroupoulos oil pipeline project was turned down by the Bulgarian administration, creating a rough diplomatic exchange between Moscow and Sofia to determine who had to pay for the missed opportunity. Furthermore, Russia keeps a strong foothold on Bulgarian oil in that Russian companies – chiefly LUKoIL – own all Bulgarian refineries. The little role played by the EU is fundemental in understanding what daily worries policy makers in Sofia.
trend in Bulgaria’s policy choices Bulgaria in order to define its current policy options as part of the triangle with the EU and the Russian Federation. The international and European institutions on the one hand and the Russian foreign political and economic pressure on the other are the strongest forces on the Bulgarian stage. Within this context, the issue of nuclear energy puts at stake the sheer independence of Sofia from such forces and its internal and regional legitimacy.

From a methodological point of view, data analysis on Bulgarian energy mix is combined with the history of the nuclear sector. Such approach allows us to look at the history of Bulgaria’s international relations with Russia and institutional relations with the EU from a more mundane perspective. Through the analysis of Brussels’ requirements and Moscow’s activity in the Bulgarian nuclear sector we could single out political decisions that were driven by energy constraints – such as the delay in the construction of the planned nuclear power plant in Belene. Once such causal relationships were outlined, we went forward displaying the policy options available to Sofia and the likely consequences that each would trigger.

The analysis leads us to conclude that energy informs the political dynamics among countries to a relevant extent, whose comprehension requires a multidisciplinary endeavour.

REFERENCES


Waltz, K. (1979), Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley


Ukraine-NATO: The Dissonance of Expectations

Katerina V. Malshina

ABSTRACT
The main aim of this paper is to examine the Ukraine-NATO problem as an aspect of the EU-Ukraine problem through researching the three waves of the NATO expansion and analyzing the modern geopolitical situation around Europe, particularly on its East. The investigation of factors affecting the NATO-Ukraine relations make clear the complicated relations within NATO, connected with the new U.S. geostrategic visions and the Russian factor as the key point on the North East borders of NATO, influence on Ukraine’s destiny in Europe. On this way the NATO interests are intertwined with the EU interests. This leads to an understanding the NATO expectations with Ukraine are to stimulate Russia to closer engagement with the West. The traditions of Ukrainian political, social, economic and national-cultural life do not make hard neither pro-European, nor pro-Russian choice, but in a contemporary geopolitical context the way to join NATO is the way to get the real independence, the reliable security institutions, the democratic, non-criminalized, non-corrupted society and to join the European Union.

KEYWORDS
NATO expansion, NATO-Ukraine, European integration, European Union, Ukraine

INTRODUCTION
The variety of the relations in the process of European integration of Ukraine in opinion of the leading actors of the world politics is so broad and this diversity has got a room for the Ukraine–NATO storyline. The historical analysis and philosophical comprehension of this process gives an unexpected understanding that European integration is primarily a natural and proper aspiration of the Ukrainian society to be a part of the European world - namely, to be a part of a culture, education, law, economics, freedom in general.

1 CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: Katerina V. Malshina, Ph.D., Ass.Prof., M.S. Hrushevsky Institute of Ukrainian Archaeography and Source Studies, The National Academy of Science of Ukraine, 4 Tryokhsviatytelska Str., 01001 Kyiv, Ukraine, e-mail: kymastro@yahoo.com
ISSN 1855-7694 © 2012 European Perspectives, UDK: 327 (4)
The modern European world was created by the European society, which has overcome État up to the end of XIX century, has thrown off its yoke and has begun creating not a state political world, but the human political world. That’s why namely Ukrainian society should be seen as a real participant in solving of the Ukraine-EU problem from its side. This is the only condition for the success of this integration, because the aspirations of the educated free person is the constant quality. Within understanding the problem of the Ukrainian-EU relations in this way, it becomes possible to analyze the “Ukraine-NATO” speculative construction.

Examining the Ukraine-NATO problem, and, in a wider sense, the European integration perspectives of Ukraine, some questions should be answered. What experience can Ukraine gain from researching the three waves of the NATO expansion? What does the modern geopolitical situation around Europe require from NATO, particularly on the East? What factors do affect the NATO-Ukraine relations? What does NATO expect from Ukraine? What are Ukraine’s intentions on its way to NATO?

**The Waves of NATO Expansion in Brief**

**I.** The prospect of the accession of new members was established from the very beginning of the Alliance in the main document - the North Atlantic Treaty (Article 10).

In 1950 with the start of the Korean War the important decisions were done, which created the conditions for the enlargement by accepting new members, despite the fact such actions would envisage amendments to the treaty. The defining decision was done in September 1950 to create Allied Commander in Europe and to accept the “forward strategy”. The essence of the “forward strategy” was any aggression must be resisted as far as possible to ensure the defense of all European NATO members.

Greece and Turkey - the first countries which expressed their wish – joined NATO in 1952. It imposed the strategic obligations on Alliance, which expanded to both the Middle East and the Caucasus. The move provided an opportunity to respond to the Israeli-Egyptian relations. In addition, Turkey had common borders with the USSR and Bulgaria and gave control over the international situation in the socialist camp from South. NATO has got the Black Sea window.
The next, the question of NATO membership of Spain did repeatedly discuss since 1952, when Portugal has put forward such a proposal in connection with the adoption of Turkey and Greece to the ranks of the Alliance. Since 1980 discussions on this issue has become particularly active. The reason was several circumstances.

First, the duration of the agreement on U.S. military bases in Spain has ended. In this respect Spain was necessary to identify - either to get rid of the foreign military presence and to become a neutral country, or to formalize the involvement to the common security structures via NATO membership.

Second, because of France's resistance Spain could not join the European Economic Community and therefore considered NATO membership as a possible mechanism to overcome this resistance. With the support of the United States Spain joined NATO in six months after applying for membership - in May 1982.

Thus, we can now make two conclusions: to 1990 NATO enlargement was already depended on the location of the conflict nearest to Europe and was somehow connected with an accession to the EU.

After the Cold War, the main problem for NATO was the absence of vision of the continuing role of NATO. However, the Alliance still was the most effective mechanism for European involvement of the U.S. The process of forming of new areas for development of NATO was pushed by the enhance of Germany’s patronage over Central and Eastern Europe, particularly The Visegrád Group countries, and the failure of UN, OSCE and EU efforts to stop the war in the Balkans.

In January 1994 (the time of the culmination of the conflict in the Balkans) the Brussels Summit has confirmed the openness of NATO membership for other European countries. To prevent the military integration of European countries independently from U.S., several mechanisms were involved in, and between them Partnership for Peace (PfP).

During 1995 the process of studying all aspects of future expansion has resulted in “Study on NATO Enlargement”. Thus the main purpose of the further expansion was formed – the improving security and the increasing stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. The study has formulated the first conditions to be completed for a country to receive an invitation. States in-
volved in ethnic conflicts or external territorial disputes had to resolve such conflicts in a peaceful way in accordance to OSCE principles. An important factor was the ability of the countries to make a military contribution to the collective defense, peacekeeping and other missions.²

Between other reasons for initiating the process was to support the “NA-TO-centered” European security system. It required the open expansion of the NATO membership, so it would be perceived as a process, not as an event. First, if NATO has announced the only time expansion, as France was proposing, it would mean a new division of spheres of influence. Partnership for Peace, devoid of the possibility of NATO membership, would lose its effectiveness and would be encouraged to find the geopolitical alternatives. Second, an important element of the expansion of the first “wave” was lobbying the process by the leading Western arms manufacturers. Each new member of NATO would have to spend much of his budget for the technical re-armament and the military equipment of the western production. This provided the necessary pressure for the NATO expansion from the side of military production companies, particularly in the U.S.

Despite the fact the intensive political dialogue on issues of membership took place with many other countries at the Madrid summit in 1997, only Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic were invited to begin accession talks with NATO. The choice was not accidental even in terms of historical contradictions of these countries with the Soviet Union in different periods of the postwar socialist history, when they openly expressed their dissatisfaction of the imposed socialism. They acted according to PfP program. This invitation marked the beginning of the so-called first wave of NATO expansion since the end of the Cold War.

At jubilee 50th anniversary summit in April 1999 the Alliance has met in a larger format. April 1999 was not accidental date also from other side - NATO still needed the support of the Central European countries in connection with NATO’s aggression in the Balkans. NATO accompanied the first step of its expansion by the creation of a new system of international relations that does not allow this organization to give up the next steps.

But on the next phase of an expansion a slightly different (“slow”) approach was used. Basically, it was caused by the vision of the security challenges and risks that were outlined in the new Strategic Concept in 1999. This Concept

was caused by the internal European risk, for which the Milošević’s government was considered. Security of Alliance, as said in Conception, depends on numerous military and non-military risks within and outside of the Atlantic region, which are multivector and hardly provisioned and can quickly acquire the large scale. Some counties in Euro-Atlantic area and beyond it are experiencing severe economic, social and political difficulties, and it can lead to a local or even a regional instability. As a result, a tension appears, which can affect the Euro-Atlantic stability.\(^3\)

Thus, the internal structure of European countries - namely, an advanced democracy and a market economy was considered as the basis for the security and stability in Europe. Therefore, the purpose of NATO as a security organization would be to promote the necessary changes. If the country did not meet Western standards of a democracy and a market economy and didn’t demonstrate a willingness to change, it became a threat to NATO. Here we see again: the entry into the EU only after joining NATO is conceptually justified. The spread of an opinion, that the slower is the enlargement process, the greater transforming effect will be to applicants from Eastern Europe, has led to the adoption of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) on Washington Summit in 1999.

The first “wave” - the accession of Poland, Czechia and Hungary to NATO - was probably very difficult for the countries-candidates. The methods of making the conditions, procedures and tools of the NATO expansion towards the post-Soviet space, existing today, were elaborated on their experience. These countries came out the socialist camp with the minimal losses and the great economic potential, and this caused the main feature of the first expansion wave: the priorities were the political and military-industrial interests, the focus of attention were the political reforms in countries-aspirants and their willingness to purchase new weapons\(^4\)

NATO’s aims at the moment have been quite clear: to protect new markets and the reservation of the relatively cheap labor for Western manufacturers. In addition, it was a successful attempt to break the former European socialist camp finally and to enlist the support of its most populous Central European part anti-Serbian military operation.

---


Now we can identify the following main criteria of the first wave of the NATO expansion: the expansion continued to depend on the location of the nearest conflict to the European Union, and was conceptually related to the accession to it. Also important were the actual neutrality after the release of Warsaw Treaty Organization, the powerful economic potential for conversion of military capabilities to NATO standards and the public opinion of the countries-aspirants related to their former powerful totalitarian ally. In geopolitical terms NATO has entered the common border with Russia due to Poland. Overall, NATO was entered by the countries with a population of more than 55 million people.

II. The second wave of the NATO expansion after the Cold War seemed to be not so certain as the previous one. It was no coincidence - the organization was not ready for the further expansion because the analysis of the situation in Europe and especially in post-socialist countries-aspirants after the aggression in Serbia took a time. Nevertheless after the Washington Summit Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Slovakia, Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania joined the MAP. The development of the MAP has moved the process and has put NATO into conditions in which the non-accession of the new members in 2002 would seriously undermine the credibility of the Alliance.

And clearly, the catalyst for the next major change in NATO’s policy on enlargement and its relations with Russia occurred after the attacks of 11 September 2001.

In broader terms, for the formation of plans of the further enlargement the strategy and military capabilities of the candidates become relevant again, now in the context of the global fight against terrorism. Democracies and market economies remain prerequisites of a membership, but at the moment they lost absolute importance. In November 2002 at Prague summit, the NATO leaders invited seven countries - Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania to join the Alliance.

Along with their invitation NATO has launched a large-scale transformation, whose mission was to respond to the new threats, like a terrorism, asymmetric threats and other. This program was to change the methods of providing of the NATO operations and to increase the effectiveness of NATO. The meaning to invite a large number of new members was, in that number, the creation of the necessary conditions for such a reform.
29 March 2004 that seven countries became NATO members officially. The strategic importance of the Baltic republics is apparent - Russia was practically cut off Kaliningrad region, the main export oil terminals were taken “under the protection” of NATO. Bulgaria and Romania have brought seaports, naval bases and other in the Black Sea region.

Countries of the second “wave”, which joined NATO in April 2004, have operated under the MAP already. Moreover, the second “wave” was the unprecedentedly great: so many countries have never entered NATO before. It has much increased the area of responsibility, which operates on Article 5 of North Atlantic Treaty. This was causing some difficulties and concerns about if it would weaken NATO. There were some questions whether these countries are “suppliers” and not “users” of the security, or it would make the transatlantic unity upset in the process of reaching a consensus in making political decisions.

During the NATO decision-making on the second “wave”, the growing military interests have become more important than the military-industrial ones, and the decisive points were the creation of the military units capable for the new mission and a modernization of a military infrastructure, necessary to sustain the collective actions. Changing priorities have brought to the fore the main motive of the enlargement – the recursive improvement of the Euro-Atlantic security at whole.5

Thus, we may find the following main criteria for the second wave of enlargement: the enlargement has got the Eurasian direction, which has not been clearly tied to close peripherals of the EU. The clear dominance of U.S. interests and the use of NATO as an instrument of intervention in international affairs deep in the Middle East has become clear. Since the entire region from Iran to India was and is traditional zone of Russia’s interests, also important was that NATO actually went to the line of the former border of the Russian Empire. As the total number of people involved, since 2004 under the protection of NATO became more than 43 million of the new European citizens.

III. Since the Alliance has remained door open, the third “wave” of enlargement occurred 1 April 2009 on the eve of the new jubilee 55th summit of the alliance, where Albania and of Croatia were first presented as NATO members.

5 Брежнева, Тетяна (2005), с.9.
Countries of the third “wave” also operated under the MAP. However, the third “wave” was small: first, no significant changes in the global international situation, no significant conflicts within the NATO range as well; only thing was the continuing monitoring of the situation in the Middle East, and here a crucial point seemed to be the forthcoming elections in Afghanistan.

In addition to NATO’s overall objectives to secure the European investments in the Balkans, the stabilization and securing the borders of the Alliance at its South East, the Western Balkans, became apparent. At whole, both countries have slightly less than 8 million people. But both Croatia and Albania have a huge naval superiority in the Mediterranean due to their shoreline. Thus, NATO now has all Adriatic coast as a dump on the way to South and East and maintains control of an unstable Central Balkan region, especially around Kosovo. For the sake of this the Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO (IPAP) was given to Serbia at Strasbourg summit in April 2009 (in addition to Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2008).

To the features of the third wave we can include the revitalization of aspirations of the NATO membership for the Caucasus. The Black Sea-Caspian region was recognized by NATO as one of the particular strategic importance for NATO in June 2004 at Istanbul summit.

From the Caucasus countries Georgia was looked most promising to join NATO, first, in political terms, because of the new democratic regime, which today is essential point. At autumn 2007 the withdrawal of Russian military bases from Georgia was finished. The country has a special geostrategic position. But it has its positive and negative sides.

The positive strategic importance has a few aspects. Militarily and politically, it is the Black Sea, the ability to resolve regional conflicts and to prevent potential terrorist activities in the Middle East from this territory. The economic aspect is an access to Caspian oil and a security of its transporting routes.

The negative side was, first of all, an unresolved conflict between Georgia and its former autonomies South Ossetia and Abkhazia, both self-declared
in 2008. Second, according to Georgian experts, the potential entry of Georgia into NATO would fundamentally change the strategic situation in the Caucasus, in the vicinity of sensitive borders of Russia and in the zone of its vital interests. Therefore, in January 2009 Russia has begun “the formation of military presence” in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Third, Georgia’s joining the MAP could dramatically change the political environment throughout the South Caucasus. This could cause a sharp intensification of Iran in this region, because Iran does not want to let any form of NATO infrastructure be close to its borders.

That’s why the rates of expansion were now restrained. The planned expansion has not affected Georgia and Ukraine yet, which received only vague promises instead of a MAP at that time. The main reason for this were: the contradictions of views on the accession of Ukraine between blocks within NATO, and the advantage of “old Europe” group, as well as the open resistance of Russia to this process. Strong the U.S.’ attempts coupled with a “new Europe” group in lobbying of interests of Ukraine have failed at the time. As for Georgia, in April 2009 on the anniversary summit of NATO in Strasbourg, in its final declaration the NATO members have reaffirmed unequivocal support for Georgia’s territorial integrity and urged the Russian Federation to revoke the decision to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, calling them the regions of Georgia. In fact, this NATO statement has initiated a new round of international legal theoretical discussion of partially recognized states and has directly intervened in the sphere of Russian interests in the Caucasus.

The third “wave” was probably no less difficult than the first one. On the one hand, stereotypes of 1990s of the immunity of the post-Soviet space to outside interference have been overcome. The experience of the bound states have been developed and repeatedly tested in practice. Alliance’s priorities have remained in the field of the military-industrial and anti-terrorism interests: at the strategic views towards the East it would be dangerous to leave the unstable Central Balkan situation in the rear.

---

However, the controversy within the Alliance, provoked by the global eco-
nomic crisis, the consequences of the Eurointegration of the countries of
the second wave of NATO enlargement and the euro zone crisis showed
itself. In addition, NATO suspended its intentions regarding Ukraine and
Georgia under Russian pressure. Both points have actually indicated the
serious crisis inside and outside NATO, and have possibly encouraged to
review its strategic provisions relating to the balance of power on the Euro-
sian continent.

**UKRAINE STUDIES THE CHALLENGES OF BEING ‘IN BETWEEN’**

Expectations of NATO on Ukraine are quite transparent if we consider the
process of the NATO expansion in retrospective, through 3 waves of its
expansion.

The situation with Ukraine at the moment of appearance of the idea to join
NATO (and until 2010) looked very similar to other former socialist coun-
tries: Ukraine has a large army based on an universal conscription, its own
military-industrial complex and rich resources, a democratic government
and the broad nationalist movement, historically directed against the Rus-
sian intervention. The agreement on Russian military base in Sevastopol
ended in 2017, and Ukraine is conveniently located towards the conflicts
close to the EU — the Balkan crisis and the situation around the oil-bearing
Middle East region. In case Ukraine joins NATO the Russian involvement
in these affairs would have been actually isolated from west.

But there were internal features which distinguish Ukraine from those
states. Due to several waves of migrations and assimilations, the Holodo-
mor of 1932-1933, as well as military operations on its territory during of
Ukraine being a part of the Rzeczpospolita, the Russian Empire and the
Soviet Union, Ukraine has the complicated national-cultural, demographic
and socio-economic history. This is reflected on the significant differences
of East and West Ukraine, which are attaining more polarity, especially
bearing in mind the size of a territory and population, when it is going
about the geopolitical interests of the Ukrainian people.

Another important factor was and still is the stay in one state together with
the Russian people from the ancient times that connects people not only
geopolitically but at all levels of communication, including a clannish one.
In addition, the Ukrainians are less prone to a communality, collectivism and authoritarianism in the state system than the Russians, with their own nationally oriented and democratic elite, in religious confessions they are closer to the Russian Orthodoxy (which center was originally in Kiev), but culturally they are closer to Europe than to Russia or Asia. “This is not to say that Ukraine is an unstable state, it suggests neither pro-European nor pro-Russian choice of Ukraine is not rigidly defined”.

And do not forget about the external factor - Ukraine is the sphere of vital interests of Russia.

The Russian factor weakly manifested in the cases of all previous former socialist countries. Now NATO encroached on the space of the CIS. Georgia was the first who left the CIS in August 2008, Ukraine could become the first in the CIS, which doomed it to collapse in case of leaving.

One of the problems concerning the NATO-Ukraine-Russia relations is crystallized in the Black Sea area. Most states in the region (Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania) are already NATO members. Both Georgia and Ukraine’s joining the Alliance would shut a ring.

The second problem - the West’s attention to the Caucasus, as the basis for control of the Middle East from the north, where NATO is trying to replace Russia. “The events in the Caucasus allow one to conclude Russia’s intentions are unambiguous - to prevent the possibility of geopolitical connection of Central Asia with Europe via the Caucasus, which means to achieve a monopoly on the role of an integrator of continental Europe and Asia. Russia is ready to do its best for that”.

In addition, in the cases of Ukraine and Georgia the main irritant for Russia is anti-Russian basis of their desire to join NATO. Ukraine and Georgia really have reasons for a hostility to Russia, both historical and contemporary ones. Russia continued to interfere in their politics since the declarations of their independence in the early 1990s. In both cases it was based on national minorities to impact on elections results. In the case of Georgia it came to the self-declaration of independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in August 2008 and the formation of the Russian military presence

---

13 Вторая волна расширения НАТО и трансформация постсоветского пространства: взгляд из Украины (2005), Національний інститут стратегічних досліджень, Дніпропетровськ, с.107.

there. Ukraine has more than 17% of Russian-speaking population, generally concentrated in its eastern regions bordering Russia, and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, where the Russians are 60%.

It’s impossible to deny that Russia is a good guarantee of the collective security also. But the strong oligarchy and the insufficient development of Russian capitalism and especially in agriculture, a corruption and a criminalization of the political elite as an inheritance of Stalin's times are not that attractive features for Ukraine.

Therefore, Georgia continues its way to NATO. Enrollment of Georgia in the list of NATO Aspirant Countries has been known at the Ministerial in December 2011.\footnote{North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2011): 'Ministerial Communiqué, § 12, Brussels (7 December): available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/events_81545.htm} Georgia was mentioned in a group of states acting MAP, and it gave a hope to the Georgian side to get the MAP program at Chicago NATO summit in spring 2012.\footnote{Джорбенадзе, Ирина (2011): ‘Нападет ли Россия на Грузию?’, Росбalt (13 December): available at http://www.rosbalt.ru/exussr/2011/12/13/923992.html}

But in Ukraine, with the advent of the new presidential administration, the European integration process went quite a different scenario.

NATO's views on Ukraine as a future brother in arms have never been straightforward and one-dimensional, too. Three waves of expansion in parallel with the acquisition of the experience of the European integration of Central and Eastern European countries joined NATO and the economic crisis of recent years have caused the split within NATO and it became apparent.

Ukraine’s accession to NATO was supported - the U.S. and UK, and the group of “new Europe” with them.\footnote{‘Франция против присоединения Украины к ПДЧ в НАТО’ (2008), РБК-Україна (1 April): available at http://www.rbc.ua/rus/top/show/frantsiya_protiv_prisoedineniya_ukrainy_k_pdch_v_nato_010420081.}

The main U.S. strategic intentions are reflected in public speeches and publications of one of the key architects of U.S. strategy during the Cold War Zbigniew Brzezinski. During the last decade he expressed his views on this subject, which summed up in his new book, “Strategic Vision: America and the crisis of global power”. In his speeches and interviews that preceded the publication of this book, Brzezinski outlined the main strategic goals of the
U.S., and towards Ukraine in that number.

As Brzezinski says, the idea of an expanded West with both Russia and Turkey included would be an important element contributing to greater global stability. An enlarged West - in which the U.S. plays the role of balancer in Asia - would be better able to forge constructive policies to cope with global issues.\(^{18}\) So “the US should prod Europe to bring both Russia and Turkey into an enlarged West”.\(^{19}\)

Undoubtedly, in the new concept of the United States Ukraine has not its own role, in Brzezinski’s article it was named one of 8 geopolitically endangered species.\(^{20}\) It has to be involved in European integration and to be a guider of Russia in this process. According to Brzezinski, «a western policy that encourages Ukraine’s closer ties with the EU is the essential precursor to as well as stimulus for Russia’s eventual closer engagement with the West».\(^{21}\)

The U.S. has consistently followed this way.

Supporting of Ukraine for further NATO membership has begun in 2002. The certain decisions of the Prague summit gave hope that Ukraine join the MAP soon. On the eve of the Istanbul summit in June 2004 Ukraine has adopted the Military Doctrine, which contained the ultimate goal – joining NATO. The collaboration went really good during the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko, and Ukraine joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) and met many conditions on the way to NATO. At that time, in 2005-2009, it was clear that the U.S. really lobbies the interests of Ukraine in NATO, despite the strong resistance within NATO.

The question of the accession of Turkey to the EU also have finally started to move. The country formally applied for the EU membership in April 1987, but it took 12 years to obtain candidate status in Helsinki Summit in 1999. After the Brussels summit in October 2005 European Council has begun negotiations for Turkey membership in the EU.


\(^{20}\) Brzezinski Zbigniew (2012): 8 Geopolitically Endangered Species. Foreign Policy (Jan/Feb)

In early March 2009 the “reset” of relations between Russia and the United States was declared, which was partly based on good personal relations between the new presidents of the states-competitors - Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev. Within the “reset” Russia joined the WTO with the assistance of the U.S. In April 2010 in Prague President Barack Obama signed the Treaty between Russia and the United States on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

Apparently, the U.S. do sequentially pursues policies in accordance with its new vision of the situation in the world.

Continental members, that “Old Europe” group, have consistently resisted Ukraine to join the Alliance. Between that countries there are France, Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal. Each country had its own reasons for this attitude.

For France, Belgium and Germany (and Germany has its own position on the issue) this is a Russian factor, because the relations with Russia are more important that’s why Ukraine’s membership in NATO could be sacrificed. Most accurately this view was expressed by the foreign minister of France, Francois Fillon. He noted that France opposed the accession of Ukraine and Georgia to MAP in connection with Russia’s position because it is the wrong answer to the balance of power in Europe, in particular between Russia and Europe. Besides of that, the U.S. support is important for France, however, on its opinion, this support has always looked like a pressure and an obstruction of American position.

For Germany, special economic relations with Russia (Russian gas is 40% in the overall balance of Germany’s consumption of a gas) affects the German position on Ukraine.

For Italy, Portugal and Spain this is creation of an image of Ukraine as a country supplying the illegal immigration, which is perceived as a source of the “soft risk”.

---


23 ‘Франция против присоединения Украины к ПДЧ в НАТО’ (2008), РБК-Україна (1 April): available at http://www.rbc.ua/rus/top/show/frantsiya_protiv_prisoedineniya_ukrainy_k_pdch_v_nato_010420081.

24 Бражнева, Тетяна (2005), с.54.
UKRAINE GOES TO EUROPE PER ASPERA AD ASTRA

For the Ukrainian public joining NATO is still a controversial issue. Like most of the Slavic countries of Central and Eastern Europe, we got the independence only 20 years ago, after about 650 years of dependency. The rich resources of the country, a big population, the high quality education provides hope that the state could develop in an internationally neutral non-block condition. But the geopolitical location of Ukraine and its traditional historical ties avert the possibility in this globalizing world.

Certainly, in the modern polypolar world, in conditions of the existance of the non-military threats of asymmetric nature any state is unable to ensure the security of the state house on its own. NATO is an organization that has proven its ability to guarantee the collective security. NATO could adapt to new realities, introducing a broad transformation of its structures. It does also expand the scope of responsibility of the Euro-Atlantic area by accepting new members and the distribution of this area all over the northern hemisphere. So NATO has transformed from a collective defense organization to a collective security organization.

If to listen to the opinion of the Ukrainians, now more in terms of the Ukrainian-speaking and the “consciously Ukrainian” Ukrainians, for the Orange majority of Ukrainian population joining NATO is not likely to join some military alliance and to participate in the event of war. The main thing for us - an opportunity to get the actual, real independence, from the former USSR in the person of the Russian Federation.

Another reason for the necessity of NATO membership is that the process of integration into the Euro-Atlantic security structure is the fulfillment of certain conditions, initiated by the Membership Action Plan. The fulfillment of these requirements, even without joining NATO, encourage the development of the country’s democratic system, the establishment of reliable security institutions, the rule of law, the spread of democratic values and civil society. It would guarantee the national identity and the unity of the Ukrainian nation, the national culture and the culture of national minorities of Ukraine. An important conclusion is that on this way the democratic changes in Ukraine does not need so much for joining NATO or the EU, as long as they are the choice of Ukraine, of the Ukrainian people which will live in a democratic, economically developed country. Joining NATO and the process of reforming of the certain areas, which precedes the accession, only promote this basic goal of Ukraine.
Furthermore, the NATO membership is still the main condition for joining the European Union. That’s why supporters of European integration, which came to power in Ukraine in late 2004, managed to speed up the process. Ukraine’s aspiration to integration was reflected in the foreign policy of the country with the new president Viktor Yushchenko, who made the program applications for four major tasks: getting a country’s market economy status, the accession to the WTO, an associate EU member status, and the EU member status. During his presidency Ukraine has fulfilled half of these tasks. The recognition of Ukraine as a market economy was 1 December 2005, and 16 May 2008 country became the 152nd member of WTO. Resolution of the European Parliament in January 2005 has urged the country to provide a clear perspective on the possibility of EU membership.

However, despite the continued support for Ukraine's membership of the European parliamentarians, European Parliament resolutions tone reflects the assessment of the political situation and development of democracy in the country with a new president. Back in February 2010, after new presidential elections the European Parliament resolution has proposed to recognize Ukraine's right to apply for the EU membership and to develop an action plan to abolish visa regime for Ukraine. Six months later, 25 November 2010 the resolution criticized the election law changes, problems with the media, violations of human rights and freedoms and the SBU interference in the democratic process. From February 2011 the Head of the EU Delegation to Ukraine, Jose Manuel Teixeira stated many times that at present Ukraine does not meet the minimum requirements to discuss EU membership. The EU - Ukraine Summit worked in Kiev at December 19, 2011, the results were: no signing of association agreements or agreements on Free Trade Area. Discussing these results, Teixeira said the association agreement between Ukraine and the EU might not be initialed if the situation with democracy will not improve.²⁵

The Russian factor plays a crucial role in this. As Zbigniew Brzezinski says, "Kiev’s relationship with Moscow has been as prone to tension as its relationship with the West has been prone to indecision. In 2005, 2007, and 2009, Russia either threatened to or did stop oil and natural gas from flowing to Ukraine. More recently, President Viktor Yanukovych was pressured

to extend Russia’s lease of a naval base at the Ukrainian Black Sea port of Sevastopol for another 25 years in exchange for preferential pricing of Russian energy deliveries to Ukraine. The Kremlin continues to press Ukraine to join a “common economic space” with Russia, while gradually stripping Ukraine of direct control over its major industrial assets through mergers and takeovers by Russian firms. With America in decline, Europe would be less willing and able to reach out and incorporate Ukraine into an expanding Western community, leaving Ukraine more vulnerable to Russian designs.”

As we see the strong pressure on the Yushchenko’s pro-European government did not work, and pro-Russian forces have come to power in Ukraine. Unfortunately, these forces have brought some “bonus” - the unprecedented corruption, a criminalization of power and a progressive economic decline. As we think, Ukraine's driving in reverse from European direction would last as least 2 years, and unless there will be no some internal political turmoils, the processes of European integration of Ukraine will be postponed by at least 20 years.

**Conclusions**

The NATO expansion must go on if some European countries are not yet attached to NATO. If we analyze all the events inflicted in terms of its enlargement and Ukraine's prospects in this direction, we can make some conclusions.

The phases of the NATO expansion had their own characteristics. From the beginning of its existence and to the end of “the Cold War” the accession of new members to NATO was based on strategic considerations if a membership of a country is necessary for NATO, of course, in view of changes in the international situation.

After the Cold War a process has started, that has been called “the expansion”. It was in a form of so-called “waves” of expansion. The first “wave” - the accession of Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary to NATO (the nice reason was the NATO’s 50-year anniversary, the bad one – the NATO aggression against Serbia) - marked the first step, very careful one, of the expansion to the East, to the former Soviets parish, and grounded the conception of the strict connection of joining the EU only by joining NATO.

---

Financial flows from the West were going basically “to promote a democracy”, which has opened a peaceful way to Western capital investments to national economies.

The interests of Western investors in these countries in the mid - late 1990s have fully coincided with the interests of a newborn local bourgeoisie, the democratic intellectuals and many “little” Poles, Czechs and Hungarians, for which the wider (if compared with the socialism) capabilities were suddenly opened.

The second “wave” is the join of Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania (the 55th NATO anniversary and 11 September 2001 in New York): the strategy and military capabilities become relevant again, a democracy and a market economy, an access to even cheaper labor and broader markets remained precursors of a membership, but not the first ones. So, NATO has taken the sufficiently questionable allies, from a military point of view, but now it had a foothold on the shores of the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas.

NATO’s rush to accept new members was clear, - not all commitments have been met by that countries by the scheduled date of joining NATO, and there the process of reforms continued even after the accession. Anyway the second “wave” countries’ experience of action for MAP is worthy to be shared.

The third “wave” - Croatia and Albania joined (the 60th anniversary and elections in Afghanistan), and now NATO has the total control of the Adriatic. Also the intentions to the NATO promotion in the Caspian region were actively manifested. At the moment the problem with Georgia and Ukraine appeared. They are countries not only socialist in the past but, more importantly, the parts of the former Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as its successor, and Russian factor have begun playing the key role.

At all stages the direct dependence on large-scale conflicts that would affect the U.S. interests in Europe and its surroundings is observed - as a cause of every wave of expansion; and investments, new markets and a reservation of even cheaper labor for Western manufacturers - as a goal.

We see the Ukrainian way to the NATO membership also has its own characteristics. Ukraine was close to join the MAP. In early 2009 the NATO-Ukraine relations were at a stage of development, the level of cooperation
has already left behind the intensified dialogue and, according to expert estimates, largely met the level of MAP.

But as noted above, we can see there are many negative factors of the geopolitical and internal political nature concerning the The Grand Chessboard in general and the USA-Europe-Russia-Muslim East line in particular, where Ukraine was used as a bargaining chip in early 2010.

From the geopolitical point of view, the U.S. lobby the European integration efforts of Ukraine as a “train” to the European Union with Russian coaches. In practical terms, Ukraine is really a country with a cheap labor and requires large investments in modernizing its economy, which would give some impetus to the depressive European economy. Ukraine has the important geopolitical position, the experience in cooperation with NATO in the use of troops and disarmament. This is something to attract.

But something is to repel.

First, Ukraine is a huge country in Europe, which population reaches to 45 million people, and joining NATO (and after that EU) - threatens the stability of the EU labor market, which now is already in crisis. It inhibits the process of European integration of Ukraine by the continental NATO members.

Second, we have a military-industrial complex, which, of course, requires modernization, but it has a very good market at cheaper prices; we have an economy which increasingly subjects to Russia at various levels and in different ways, but within the last 2 years this process takes an aircraft speed. It inhibits the Ukraine-EU integration process of by the modern Ukrainian international politics.

Third, Ukraine with the new president and his foreign policy do not put the NATO membership and any form of the European integration even in the agenda. The new government has actually withdrawn Ukraine’s application to join NATO and signed a treaty about Sevastopol strengthening the non-aligned, pro-Russian status of a country. It inhibits the European integration process of by Russia.

Fourth, the traditions of Ukrainian political, social, economic and national-cultural life do not make hard neither pro-European, nor pro-Russian choice of Ukraine. But Ukraine is not a chess board player, and this process
is, unfortunately, dependent on the situation would go on in the global balance of power.

Nevertheless let us not forget the free choice of the people of Ukraine, who will tell their word during upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections.

In fact, now Ukraine is at a threshold to return to the European Community, which part Ukraine was since its origin, to which it gave sophisticated and highly educated queens, and with which it was plucked up in the XIV century, being dismembered, long once ruled by other countries. The conscious European choice of the Ukrainians is an implementation of their civilization interests in the contemporary regional and global situation.

REFERENCES


Вторая волна расширения НАТО и трансформация постсоветского пространства: взгляд из Украины (2005), Національний інститут стратегічних досліджень, Дніпропетровськ.


‘Франция против присоединения Украины к ПДЧ в НАТО’ (2008), РБК-Україна (1 April): available at http://www.rbc.ua/rus/top/show/frantsiya_protiv_prisoedineniya_ukrainy_k_pdoch_v_nato_010420081.


Brzezinski Zbigniew (2012): 8 Geopolitically Endangered Species. Foreign Policy (Jan/Feb).


Geopolitics & Organized Crime and Corruption in the Early 21st Century with Reference to the Balkans

Blagoje Grahovac

ABSTRACT
States, like most people, are becoming poorer and all the more indebted. Mankind is confronted with the surpluses of politics, religion, armaments, social frustration and ruthless competition of all kinds. Citizens and their national policies are finding it difficult to cope with all these surpluses, but mafia is coping with them just fine.

In order to prevent possible catastrophic events, it is necessary to redefine as soon as possible the policies of the integration processes, as is offered in the text. Accordingly, it is necessary to redefine the theories and policies of capitalism which has become state-criminal, vulgar, brutal and unsustainable.

Western Balkans have for a long time been the cause of many European problems. By redefining the policy towards ex-Yugoslav territory one should move towards the constitution of the Yugo region. This space could be converted into a significant opportunity for the EU. In this area, a significant amount of water resources, energy resources, agricultural and raw material resources are still state owned. Many politicians in the Western Balkans are in network of organized crime and corruption of the Asian-Balkan-South American transversal. They have developed a very strong intelligence network and are noisily lobbying on behalf of Euro-Atlantic integration, while obstructing the same very skillfully. Their goal is to perform, jointly with Russian tycoons, a classical occupation of economic resources in the region. The U.S. and the EU administrations, are either slowly or insufficiently noticing this. That is the greatest threat to national interests of local countries, the EU and the USA.

KEY WORDS
organized criminal, corruption, intelligence, globalization, states, geopolitics, Western Balkans

1 CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: Blagoje Grahovac, a retired general of aviation and geopolitical analyst. E-mail: blagoje.grahovac@yahoo.com
ISSN 1855-7694 © 2012 European Perspectives, UDK: 327 (4)
INTRODUCTION

Let's summarize the main determinants of political and social developments of the Northern Hemisphere (and beyond) over the last two centuries. In short, national states were built in the 19th and civic states in the 20th century. Political jargon for all socio-political processes has established an original term – the new world order. If we simply relied on this term, then the main determinant of the «new world order» for the 21st century would be contained in the formula: with democratization into integration until globalization.

It is less important whether the new socio-political processes are scientifically elaborated or are just superficially grasped. What matters is that the speed of these processes is much higher than the highly referenced theorists have predicted. On the world as a global village one can draw today various conclusions. I single out four that may have high importance in considering geopolitical processes. First, the new technologies have made accessible to almost all humanity the civilisation’s achievements in all areas. Second, various achievements in the field of democracy are inspiring and intriguing to all, whatever the actual value of the given democracy. Third, the side effects of globalization expand and network faster than anything else. Typical side effects of globalization are organized crime and corruption. Fourth, once we had role models that were somewhere in our area or field of vision. Role models today (positive or negative) are increasingly becoming those at large distances, even though we cannot hear or see them. In detecting processes, this becomes a parameter of strategic importance.

Based on the aforementioned, I post the thesis of the article: Organized crime and corruption are becoming the top geopolitical factors, and will more often be used as a geopolitical tool.

EVOLUTION OF SOME POLITICAL STRATEGIES AND DOCTRINES

Public policies of states (whatever they may be) in fact, have never been a big problem. The problem is the degree of secrecy in those policies. Experience shows that the secrecy of a country’s policy is easiest to discover through military strategies and military doctrines. For the simple reason that armies (from a political and sociological aspect) are slow and easily recognizable systems. Let’s recall some basic features of military strategies and doctrines of the leading forces during the period of bloc divisions.
The main characteristic of the military strategies of the United States was contained in the formula: Global power - Global reach. One feature of these strategies (among others) has been to penetrate, in different ways, into the army corps of non-democratic states. The task was to achieve a strong influence on these armies, and through them to exert influence on political change in these countries. The formula is simple and logical - in non-democratic countries the armies have largest power, and through this power it is possible to change the situation in the country. This formula has been very effective for decades.

The main characteristic of the military doctrines of the former USSR was the arming of friendly countries through aid or arms sales and, along with weapons to export, as much as possible, the ideology. These doctrines have always been resisted by the subjects of international politics, and by organizations and movements that have fought for greater democracy and human rights. Former KGB was the force that paved the way to the final destination. The disintegration of the USSR, in fact, brought the biggest change that, unfortunately, has not been sufficiently analysed. In fact, hundreds of thousands disciples of robust and brutal KGB remained both stateless and unemployed. They were prepared to cause trouble of any kind. At the same time, in the Russian Federation, numerous tycoons emerged who had an objective fear of the ruthless KGB. The formula was found. Timid and rich tycoons were connected with the cruel and impoverished KGB operatives. Thus, the oligarchy was created. Instead of exporting ideology and weapons, they expanded the exports of suspicious and dirty capital. And did not encounter opposition anywhere. Domestic tycoons (especially in transition countries) opened and expanded them the space. Networks of organized crime and corruption multiplied. Armies (as rigid, and easily recognizable systems) have become a burden to the new authorities of these countries. At first, the armies’ assets were sucked, and then they became insignificant empty shells.

The former ideological and political Russian-Balkan-South American transversal has grown into the organized crime and corruption transversal. It has merged with the link which leads from Afghanistan through Iran to the Balkans and transformed into an Asian-Balkan-South American transversal of organized crime and corruption. In order for the mafia (as an army of organized crime and corruption) to survive in this area, they have built for themselves a suitable political environment. Dirty and suspicious capital goes aggressively to the Western Europe and North America, where it registers itself in various ways, and then returns as «western capital» to
the Balkans. Mostly to the states with a majority Orthodox population. The organized crime and corruption from the aforementioned transversal has developed a very strong lobbying network. This lobbying network currently represents the most dangerous corruptive network on the planet. It lobbies for the majority of political figures in the Balkans which have evolved from organized crime and corruption. These new politicians very skillfully promote a new political doctrine whose main attribute is loud push for Euro-Atlantic integration, but under which the owners of dirty capital are busy occupying the Balkan economic resources. During all this time, the US and EU policies have been overstretching themselves trying to reform the military in transitional countries which, in essence, are worthless and of no use. Except for corruption.

It is safe to conclude that the US and the EU policy in the Balkans, in a geopolitical sense, have been outwitted.

**Socio-economic context**

The prophets of globalization who used to say: «Privatize, privatize, privatize» (Seul 2009) have now recognized to have made mistakes. The world economy is clearly turning towards the religious truth. The sudden rise of management schools and their inter-linking with the large corporations have had the disturbing effect of confusing between management and leadership. Market capitalism from half a century ago was first transformed into a neo-liberal one and is now turning into its antipode. For centuries, money has been a comparative measure of the value of goods, and today the same has become the most valuable and sought after commodity. This has prompted the development of financial engineering which, in turn, has generated the speculating. Daily turnover in foreign exchange markets in 1973 was 15 billion dollars. Today it is over 1.5 trillion dollars (Ibid.). Banks have for centuries been supporting the economy, while the aforementioned has converted them into the majority stakeholders and monopolists of the economy. In the last forty years, over one billion jobs have been automated or become robotic, and the number of majority shareholders in the economy is steadily decreasing. This has resulted in an enormous reduction in the number of manufacturing jobs and in the concentration of ownership of capital. Estimates indicate that 47 global corporations own 40% of the global capital, while the majority ownership of this capital belongs to less than 1% of the respective owners. The alarm is switched on. Corporate gigantism has become a reality, but it ignores the old saying that «the colonies
cost more than they are worth.» When banks or corporations are profitable, then most of the belongs to a small number of majority shareholders, and when banks are incurring losses or go bankrupt, the bill paid by all taxpayers. The current capitalism has moved the capital from production to consumption, which leads to a general impoverishment of the state and population. According to the World Bank’s data, population living on less than a dollar a day for the past twenty years has declined from 1.5 billion to 1.1 billion, but the number of people living on two dollars a day has increased from 1 to 1.6 billion, so their total has increased from 2.5 billion to 2.7 billion. One billion people every night go hungry to sleep. It is a reliable indicator of the trend of impoverishment of the population. By means of various corruptive practices (including lobbying), the corporate capital brings its favorites to high positions of state and political power. Such authorities, as a rule, rather than on national, are more focused on international policy, thus diverting public attention from domestic problems to the international ones.

The trend of automation and robotization of jobs is accelerating, leading to mass unemployment and general discontent of workers. This makes most of the population irresistent to populism. Throughout history, fascism has penetrated the states precisely through populism, and this was always done in the name of freedom and democracy. All this has turned classic capitalism into a state-criminal capitalism, which has become brutal, vulgar, and therefore unsustainable. This opens the door for some of the totalitarian systems of the 20th century to reappear again somewhere.

**Geopolitical Intersection**

Let us accept that all types of freedom (just like democracy) in the classical understanding of these concepts, are a relative proposition. Let us accept that the theories of civilizations are also relative. But any analyzis where in the planet people have the highest standard of living (in all aspects of the term), will indicate that this is Western Europe and North America. We must accept one more fact. Namely, since globalization has blended the cards of the political game (and is still blending them), it is however evident that these two areas are the most inspiring to the majority of the world’s population.

---

2 Statement of the UN Secretary General, 31 October 2011
I will continue to be persistent in explaining that, in planetary relations, organized crime and corruption are becoming the key geopolitical tool. It is ahead of the nuclear one, although the nuclear assets have become a burden for those who have them, and a challenge for those who do not. Lobbying has become the most dangerous corrupt practice of non-democratic regimes and their exponents. Pressed by competition, the representatives of big business have entered into all this, which directly impacts on the foundations of classical capitalism. The all-embracing privatization in the context of an uncontrolled globalization is a threat to both states and nations. Non-democratic regimes, organized crime and corruption and big businesses are coming together and are increasingly overtaking geopolitics from the official states, including those of the great powers. Mafia, as the army of organized crime and corruption, will in the future (because of their «business») be the biggest manufacturer of both wars and terrorism. It is committed to the political confrontation of the U.S. and the EU. This is becoming more and more apparent. But even if we postpone the final judgment on this, we can already talk about some of paradoxes.

United States of America, as representatives of North American civilization, by most parameters are still the desired and promised land. They are all this to its citizens as well. If one seriously analyzes US foreign policy in more recent history, one can confidently conclude that it was the inspirer and creator of many democratic changes on the planet. The west-east direction was the barycentric geographic direction of this policy, and its reach was the whole planet. Such policy also had a favorable reflection on the internal politics of the United States. And what did globalization bring to its current policy? Organized crime and corruption, as one of the side effects of globalization, is not bypassing the United States. On the contrary, from all over the planet it very much impacts on vital national interests of the United States. The speed of change in globalization is such that U.S. foreign policy no longer has enough power and resources to follow the chain of revolutionary processes. US today is often the scapegoat for many things. Some accuse it (for their own interests) of producing new crises, and others that it does not provide sufficient support to the democratization processes. For the first time in its history, due to rapid process of globalization, internal U.S. policy has begun to suffer more visibly from the consequences of international processes. For the United States, one can say (in a strategic sense) that it has a democracy, but that it will soon lack important natural resources.

South American civilization was shaped by millennia. It is safe to conclude
(strategically assess) that the continent has natural resources, but underdeveloped democracy. Organized crime and corruption from this area are increasingly transnationally networking the planet.

I have no doubt that, in spite of all difficulties, European Union (along with NATO) is the best product of civilization. If U.S. policy is sometimes accused for having elements of imperialism and hegemony, something similar cannot be said for the EU policy. The EU is doing its best to democratize the old continent, to develop it, to make it safer for people and to integrate it in accordance with best democratic standards. Despite problems, the results are already there. But, although organized crime and corruption are a common product of non-democratic states and their regimes (where the rule of law and efficiency of institutions have yet to be achieved), we can safely say that no one is more threatened from organized crime and corruption than the EU. European politicians have not realized that the organized crime and corruption (coupled with big capital) have become the top geopolitical tool, that even small and undemocratic countries dispose of such tool, and that some non-European political circles use the same tool for geopolitical purposes. The «business» interest of these circles will prompt these circles to produce in the future terrorism and wars, which is a first-class menace for the EU. In a strategic sense, for the EU one can say that, generally speaking, it has a democracy but that in the future it will be lacking resources.

For Russia, one can say that its territory never had a democracy beffiting the humans. Her policy was equally wicked for their own people, just as it was for others outside its territory. It is has not been established yet whether there were more human casualties in all Russian state led wars put together or through historical processes of disciplining its own people. I do not exclude the possibility that the highest price for globalisation might be paid by the citizens of Russia. When these (traditionally closed) systems begin to open, this usually happens through civil wars. And that, of the most brutal type. I do not exclude that Russia could face this soon. Russia has a great scarcity of democracy, but its resources are abundant. For the ruling power (in transitional societies), this abundance of resources in the initial period may have a beneficial effect. Until the moment when the poor and disenfranchised begin to notice the impact of organized crime and corruption, and all kinds of injustice. The coping with that reality is always revolutionary.

Very rare are areas which have so much diversity and controversies as is the case with the Eastern Hemisphere. Japan, South Korea, Australia and New
Zealand are, by level of development and democracy, the desired lands for many. But the Eastern Hemisphere, as a whole, can be assessed as a space with abundant natural resources, but lacking democracy.

Indochinese space has always progressed through history in a specific evolutionary way. This will be the case in the near future, as well.

Due to its rich natural resources and the scarcity of democracy, the African continent will undergo globalization through chain revolutions. And organized crime and corruption in the African region will be a geopolitical factor and geopolitical tool which will be used to resolve many things.

In a strategic sense, the Arctic and Antarctica (due to global warming) will become very important areas.

POSSIBLE RECOMMENDATIONS

From the above, it can be concluded that the relations and geopolitical changes on the planet in this century (and probably longer) will depend on the balance of power in the triangle: democracy, resources and organized crime and corruption. The lack of only one of the first two of these, or the excess of the third, can destroy any country and any people, I am convinced. In order to prevent a global threat, it is necessary to start redefining the (now current) political theories of international relations. Accordingly, it is evident that we should redefine the theory of geopolitics. Regional inter-linkages, with maximum preservation of the achievements of civilization, will no longer be just a condition for regional development, but will be a condition for survival of both peoples and states of the region. And every continent individually will be only one (not so large) region.

It is of strategic importance to have successful regional association of North American democracy and Latin American resources. By joint struggle against organized crime and corruption it is necessary to preserve at all cost the Euro-Atlantic partnership. Staying out of this formula, not only will slow down development, but can potentially endanger (in civilizational, political, social and economic sense) all three continents.

Of a millennium importance for development of humanity would be regional association of Europe and Russia. Up to Vladivostok. The integration of western democracies (while preserving Euro-Atlantic Partnership) and
Russia’s resources, coupled with a resolute fight against organized crime and corruption, would have a gigantic significance. And that, for the whole globe. I have no dilemma that the persistence on formulae outside this one would completely undermine Europe and Russia, and would significantly slow down the rest of the planet.

Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand have all what is necessary to integrate the Eastern Hemisphere on the basis of a similar formula. All this can be inspiring for a specific (but significantly calmer) civilizational transition of the indochinese area.

It is inevitable that the African space will have a multi-layered chain of revolutionary transitions. But that will not endanger the mankind, unlike all of the afore-mentioned, which can do that.

By preserving state sovereignties, sufficient statism and national specificities, and through creation of regional associations (in the previously explained method), preconditions would be established for the mastering of Arctic and Antarctic area as a common good. Otherwise, the global warming (as a future geopolitical factor) could lead to cataclysmic changes for humanity. On which, any (now valid) policy or geopolitics, would have no effect.

**Yugo Region in the Globalism Turmoil**

There is no more doubt that the globalization and integration are the essential features of social and political processes of the 21st century. Many scholars and analysts have claimed, or still claim, that this will remain the core characteristic of this century. I dare say that this form of globalization and integration will be finalised by the end of the second decade of this century. Integrations of all good things are carried out in accordance with accepted norms and standards, and these require and actually absorb significant time. Organized crime and corruption use this time interval as a strategic advantage.

Undemocratic and autocratic regimes of small states know that, through transnational organized crime, their countries can become a geopolitical factor. They are not much concerned about the fact that this might last only for a limited time, after which a high price might be paid. For them, the
most important thing is to preserve the power and to feel powerful, even at the risk that this will not last very long.

The above mentioned leads to the emergence of new revolutionary processes. How to recognize the same? When somewhere, instead of institutions, power is concentrated in an individual, a particular clan or family, it is inevitable that we can expect the overthrow. And it will happen very quickly and without the classic forewarnings. And each overthrow is always undertaken by means of revolutionary methods.

It is often said that organized crime and corruption can last only as long as it is enough for the government policy to say «STOP». Organised crime has solved this problem in its favor, or is on the way to solve it, and this in two ways. Mafia, as an operational army of the organized crime, tends to place under its influence a large number of politicians prior to their coming to power. They certainly affect the composition of the political scene in the Western Balkans, primarily in the states of the ex-Yu area. This is the first way of addressing their problem. Another way is the most dangerous, and is reflected in the fact that mafia knows that it must not leave the political space to national authorities to say «STOP» to corruption and organized crime. So mafia can very skillfully stun the state with the most serious political problem for any government, which is terrorism.

The common perception is that terrorism is the punishment of a different political opinion. It is necessary to redefine this. In addition to the traditional concept of terrorism, in the future it will primarily be in the service of the organized crime. When the government tames organized crime, terrorism is stripped down and is easier to fight. And when terrorism is wrapped in the organized crime, the occurrence of the same confuses the government, frightens the people, and the outcome is uncertain. One should not forget that war is the best environment for corruption and organized crime. Because of this fact, over here one must be vigilant. We, in the Western Balkans, for decades have been a bad example. It is true that we had several hegemonistic projects on a national basis, as well as promoters of such ideas. It is true that the holders of these ideas have recruited their mafia to help realize these ideas. It is true that the ex-Yu area produced several wars. It is also true that the idea of large national projects and their agents have already left the political and social scene of the Western Balkans. But it is also true that all their mafia have survived. Moreover, they have developed strong linkages, and are expanding their activities in the transnational arena.
Let’s analyze yet another dimension of this problem. I believe we shall all agree that organized crime and mafia profited most in the period when Serbs and Serbia on one side, and Croats and Croatia on the other, argued to the highest degree of human outrage. Since cooperation and friendship between Serbia and Croatia have been re-established, nervousness, and even panic started to reign in the mafia ranks. Cooperation between Croatia and Serbia in the fight against organized crime and corruption is causing anxiety in some high political circles of their neighboring countries. To offset this and re-establish their advantage, mafia would find it very profitable to produce or stir in Serbia a political problem. By an act of terrorism, for example. And why would they do this? Simply put, they know that Serbia, for decades, has not adequately addressed political problems,. And why is Serbia not coping well? Because, for centuries Serbia has a systemic state-political failure, which is reflected in the fact that the public consciousness in Serbia has always preferred and still prefers the civilization to which it geographically belongs - Europe, while the state-political leadership has directed the same, as a rule, in the opposite, ie. the eastern direction.

Asian-Balkan-South American transversal of organized crime can still overheat the Western Balkans. And other areas, as well.

**Yugo region as part of a European solution**

By term Yugo region I comprise the state-political space of seven states formed from the former SFRY.

I know of no space on the planet which in its history has had so many peace negotiations, peace conferences and peace treaties as is the case with the Balkans. After all of them, has secure peace prevailed in the Western Balkans? Not at all.

Is this problem a geopolitical story? Could be. Balkans is an area where geopolitical lines are crossed. Is this problem a religious story? Could be. In the Balkans, all three great religions are mixed up. Could this problem be a nationalistic story? Could be. Because of mutual perpetual warfare, the nations in the Western Balkans (by their own conviction) have not shaped up in a civilized manner.

What is the longest period in recent history in which there was no inter-conflicts in the Western Balkans? This is the period during the existence of

It is a real fortune that Slovenes have a state and that they have built the same as an example to others. But, in Slovenia the resistance to the above transversal is lessening. In Slovenia, there are feelings towards the Yugo region, but also a strong interest for connecting with that area.

Few people wanted their own state as did Croats. Historically and politically, they deserve it. I have no doubt that it will be more of a civic state, and that all what is needed in the national sense will be preserved. In Croatia, there is not enough resistance to the above transversal. Historical, cultural, religious, ethnic, customary, and many other economic links of Croats and Croatia with the Yugo region have never, nor will ever be broken.

Serbs and Serbia in their history have been very clear and very strict as to what they do not want and what is not accepted. From the official policy of Serbs and Serbia one could hardly guess what they want and what they are fighting for. Such a policy has for centuries led Serbs and Serbia into quarrels with others. In the Balkan wars in the 20th century, only Serbs and Serbia participated in all of them. The longest period of Serbian peace was the one during the rule of Josip Broz Tito, vis a vis whom many Serbs still express animosity. Although not by the merit of Serbian state policy, it is good that Serbia finally has its state borders, but it is not good that the current government still does not accept this reality. The strategic formula for survival of Serbs and Serbia is the building of friendships with neighbors, primarily with Croats and Albanians. In recent history of relations between Serbs and Albanians, so far everything was tried and nothing has brought a favorable result. Friendship has never been tried. It is worth trying. Serbia is in a high risk of the previously mentioned transversal. Feelings toward the Yugo region are largely determined by the political aspiration of unifying the ethnic Serbs.

Few people throughout their history have suffered so much to preserve their national and state identity, as is the case with the Macedonians. Historical injustice has been corrected. They have a state, but it can be affected by the transversal. In Macedonia, they still have strong feelings for the Yugo region.

The decades-long injustice has been corrected, and the Montenegrins, successfully and without war, have restored the civic state of Montenegro. There is an ever present burden that it was in Montenegro, on the 20th August
1988, that the violent destruction of Yugoslavia has began through the so-called anti-bureaucratic revolution, an essentially nationalistic movement. The added burden is that this same political elite is in power for so long. The anatomy of the so-called small corruption is the modus vivendi of the Montenegrin society, while high level corruption is the genezis of the new Montenegrin elite. This has become the biggest security risk for Montenegro (Popović 2010). No country in the Western Balkans is as endangered by the afore mentioned transversal as is Montenegro. In Montenegro, there are strong and sincere feelings towards the Yugo region.

Bosnia and Herzegovina has been stable throughout its history as long as it was in a sort of a Yugo community. I have no doubt that this will be the case in the future as well. Bosnia and Herzegovina is threatened from the earlier-mentioned, but also from some other transversals, which, due to its internal divisions, are not so visible. Bosnia’s future depends solely on the Yugo region. Otherwise, it will hardly be able to preserve itself. In Bosnia and Herzegovina are visible strong feelings for the Yugo region.

It is less important whether Kosovo is the result of historical processes, or the result of many years of problematic Serbian policy. What is important that Kosovo today is a state-political reality. If this is not accepted, primarily from Serbia, Kosovo could turn into a Balkan tragedy. In order to prevent possible damage, and preserve the reality, a proper diagnosis should be established, which is that Kosovo is completely compromised by the earlier mentioned, but also from some other transversals. In Kosovo, among the Albanian population (except for the part of intellectuals) there are few emotions towards the Yugo region, but there is plenty of interest.

Strong emotions towards the Yugo region exist among the non-Albanian population. This fact the state policy of Kosovo should accept as a reality, but also as a political opportunity to defuse the situation in Kosovo and for better cooperation with its neighbors. In this direction, mechanisms should be sought to establish reconciliation with the Serbs and Serbia. It should be clear that today the most powerful mechanisms are those that hold Kosovo and Serbia in the «bound» state, and these mechanisms are held by the mafia. They dominate the whole area of both Serbia and Kosovo. Northern Kosovo is their open ground, and both states (Kosovo and Serbia) are held hostage by this formation. Their operations are fully integrated into the mafia activities on the above mentioned transversal. This is the strongest indicator that organized crime and corruption are here at the service of geopolitics. The formula of success for the Kosovo authorities may be in
the doctrine that implies giving. What does that mean? Being generous and
give non-Albanians all that is in line with today’s democratic achievements,
except the sovereignty of the state. Different forms of autonomy might be
a good solution.

It is of historical importance that some states have been restored, or that
new ones have been created in the ex-Yugoslavian region, because the his-
toric aspirations of the people who live in this area have been met.

A historical legacy is a high degree of common culture, sports and customs of
the people ex-Yugoslavian region. Familiarity with each other, from living to-
gether in over decades, contributes to the rapid establishment of mutual trust.

There is an immense richness in the language of communication, regard-
less of the name of the language.

There is a huge geographical advantage, yet unique natural area, as as an
economic resource, which by all its parameters can be considered as one of
the healthiest. The common economic space is of great interest to the crea-
tive business based on sound foundations.

National, family and friendly cross-border links are a great force in the de-
velopment of friendly neighborly relations.

Reconstruction of Yugoslavia, in any form, would be a historical mistake,
but formation of a Yugo region within the EU would, in my deep convic-
tion, be the most significant EU project since its inception. After all, the
stabilization of the Western Balkans is in her best interest, one which would
have historical relevance, and the realization of this project would be far
easier than implementation of many other projects in the EU.

Three-entity Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Yugo region is the only for-
formula for its survival. Yugo region within the EU, is the best barrier to the
re-opening of big nation-state projects in the Balkans. The formation of
a joint military brigade of ex-Yugoslavian states and its inclusion in the
composition of KFOR in Kosovo, and joint control of the airspace could be
inspirational projects.

Let’s do it as quickly as possible, so that the Balkans will never again be
either a geopolitical, religious or national story. This proposition will cer-
tainly not please members of local and other mafia, the most loyal soldiers
of the above-mentioned transversal of organized crime and corruption.

Yugo region can be the basis for the constitution of the Balkan region in the EU.

**Conclusion**

Some principles of ethics and the spirit of capitalism emphasized by Max Weber, such as persistence, diligence and frugality have been significantly endangered (Weber 1963). The current experience of globalization is that civilization should be observed through the economy only. This has now become a civilizational problem.

Most states now have huge financial debt. Only a small number of them have favorable financial balance sheets. There is a huge nominal imbalance between the deficit and surplus. Where is that money? The answer is simple - in possession of a small number of owners of that capital. Instead of a balanced investment in production and consumption, the capital is mostly used for consumption. Money has become the glue and lubricant for all machines. Market competition has been replaced by lobbying, which has become the most dangerous act of corruption. Corporate giants are increasingly engaged in competitive showdowns. These showdowns can produce wars and terrorism.

Social stratification is growing into a mass social frustration of the population of the planet. Mankind is encountered with the surplus of politics, surplus of religion, surplus of armaments, surplus of social frustration, and the surplus of ruthless competition of all kinds. The citizens have difficulty coping with all these surpluses, but the mafia is doing just fine under the circumstances.

The possibility of terrorism should not be viewed merely as a product of globalization; it should be seen partly as a form of response to globalization. Therefore, the etymology of the so-called independent terrorism, which can be exerted in the form of rebellion or accidental guerrilla, should be viewed in that context. Mafia, as an army of organized crime and corruption, can very effectively coordinate them.

Without a complete integration of the Western Balkans in their structures, the EU will be a living being that stands on one leg only. Due to this, it will always be in an unstable condition and in a geopolitical risk.
There is no more doubt that the majority of the countries are highly impoverished, and that capital is in the hands of multinational companies and individuals. Because of this, the space of Yugo region should be viewed through a special prism. Namely, the emerging countries have inherited from the previous a significant part of the energy resources, agricultural resources, water resources, mineral resources and other raw material resources in state ownership. This fact may make the Yugo region more resilient to the waves of economic crises, but also more promising for foreign direct investment. Yugo region will be inter-connecting much faster than can be concluded at first glance.

However, it should be noted that some politicians in the Western Balkans, which are in the network of organized crime and corruption, are very trained to noisily advocate Euro-Atlantic integration. At the same time, beneath that story, together with Russian tycoons, they are actively working to take over economic resources of the Western Balkans. For this, they have developed a very strong intelligence and lobbying network in the U.S. and the EU, which are successfully spreading the story that political integrations should not be rushed, and that it is only important to achieve the standards. While in reality, they are not interested at all to reach those same standards, but are deliberately obstructing the process.

Because of all this, organized crime and corruption are becoming a more dangerous geopolitical tool than the nuclear one. U.S and EU officials should be aware of that.

REFERENCES

1987/1988, National Security Strategy of the United States
1992, USA, America's strategy in a changing world
1974, U.S. Nuclear Strategy
1988, USSR, New Soviet Military Doctrine
1986, USSR, Soviet Military Strategy


Euro Balkan Brotherhood in New Millennium - Foreign Policy Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia towards the Republic of Serbia (2000-2011)

Petra Bregant

ABSTRACT
This paper aims to analyze the Foreign Policy strategy of the Republic of Slovenia towards the Republic of Serbia from 2000 to 2011, focusing on Slovenian interests and based on the theory of foreign policy of small states. Slovenia’s independence from former SFRY in 1991 was not only a political, but an ideological departure from the Balkans. By joining the EU in 2004, the small state of Slovenia fulfilled one of its most important foreign policy goals. By strategically focusing back to the region where most of Slovenia’s advantages (political, economic, historical, etc) lay, enabled Slovenia to achieve its foreign policy goals of a new millennium: obtaining credibility in the EU by building a ‘bridge’ between the EU and Serbia, while consolidating its position in the area. This article addresses the development of the Slovenian Foreign Policy priorities from the former SFRY to the EU and back to the Western Balkans and Serbia as a part of it. The actions regarding Serbia’s EU bid, preventive diplomacy during Kosovo declaration of independence, intense development cooperation and thus enabling Slovenian economy to develop even more in Serbia, proved Slovenian foreign policy towards Serbia as a success.

KEYWORDS
Small states, Slovenia, Serbia, foreign policy, strategy

INTRODUCTION
The Post-Cold War era set new rules and stimulate new (European) small states to search for niches in the field of international relations.
Slovenia’s independence from former SFRY in 1991 was not only a political, but an ideological departure from the Balkans as well, which even nowadays recalls images of barbarism, corruption, backwardness and other structural struggles that face states in transition from the socialistic to the capitalistic system. Ever since then, the former SRFY citizens of the Western Balkans countries saw Slovenia as a role model, because its political and economic progress, which only solidified with Slovenian membership in the EU. Good reputation and favorable historic, political, economic, geographical position, etc. were all factors that provided Slovenia with a niche in the context of international relations – as a bridge between the Western Balkans and the EU. The Western Balkans soon became Slovenia’s foreign policy priority, which culminated with the adoption of the Strategy for the Western Balkans, the document in which the priorities and measures needed to consolidate Slovenia’s position in the Western Balkans were defined.

The goal of this paper is to analyze and evaluate Slovenian foreign policy towards Serbia from the year 2000, mainly focusing on the objectives of the Strategy for the Western Balkans, based on the achieved goals of the Slovenian foreign policy.

The article proceeds as follows: (1) short overview of small states’ scope of foreign policy strategies in the international relations field and the criteria for the effectiveness of foreign policy of a small state will be identified; (2) socio-historical context – evolution of Slovenian foreign policy agenda – from Europe towards the Western Balkans, including analysis of bilateral dynamics of Slovenia and Serbia from 2000; (3) detailed analysis of Slovenian Strategy for the Western Balkans.

The methodological approach applied in this paper will be a literary review of the possibilities and formulation of a small state’s foreign policy strategies and a case study, with the latter being done by content analysis of primary sources. The foreign policy strategies of the Slovenian government will be analyzed.
FOREIGN POLICY OF SMALL STATES

Slovenia is a country which, according to most definitions\(^2\), falls under the category of small states. After global and structural changes in the late 80s and early 90s of the 20th century, brought by the end of the Cold War, small states were able to shake off the bipolar system constraints. A radically changed security environment, affected the nature of the nation state by pooling part of its sovereignty both to the sub-national regions and to supranational entities (Kennedy in Jazbec 2010: 71). International relations had changed much in form and substance during the last two decades, providing small states to play more active role in the international relations, with new strategies that enabled smaller states to gain influence, mostly in the context of multinational organizations (Jazbec 2010: 66). In the latter, they find themselves in a structurally new environment, which basically offers them new approaches, possibilities and tools for their positioning. (Thorhallsson 2000: 12-21).

By joining the EU in 2004, small states of Central and Eastern Europe (including Slovenia) fulfilled one of their most important foreign policy goals and are nowadays trying to find a new raison d'être in their foreign policies, aiming to show that they have turned from 'policy recipients' into 'policy shapers' (R. Zupančič 2011: 63). Smaller states are due to limited resources of its own not in position to cover wide range of international relations issues therefor they have to choose carefully their primary fields of cooperation where they try to turn their existing resources and capabilities to their advantage,” (Šabić, 2002: 1,6) in the form of knowledge, experience, expertise, tradition and successful national policies, etc. in comparison to compared to other states.

This can be a foreign policy strategy that is especially appealing to new small (European) states which are still entering international fora and want to shape their proper foreign policy profile in international organization(s), while achieving their foreign policy goals (M. M. Zupančič 2003). Some au-

thors (Benko, 1992; Petrič, 1996; Mouritzen, 1998; Bojinović 2005) extend the presented range of proposed small states’ foreign policy strategies to the possibility of acting in a field of cooperation where a small state can use its capabilities deriving from its (strategic) geographical position and historical experience as a basis for small state’s active foreign policy strategy. Furthermore, Benko (1992: 6) points out a small state pursuing an active foreign policy strategy have to make use of the advantages arising from security geographical facts.

So what makes foreign policy of a small successful? As it usually is in social sciences, there is not a single answer to this question. Many goals can be realized by influencing, maintaining and improving of the conditions in other countries (Holsti 1995: 117).

For Deutsch (1988: 97) primary goal is maintaining independence and state security, followed by pursuing and protecting their economic interests. Diplomacy is the main instrument and necessary a tool for a small state to carry out its foreign policy and to be present as well as active in globalized international politics (Jazbec 2010: 66) or as Petrič explains: the small countries fulfill their foreign policy goals by adapting to developments and processes in the international arena as they do not have enough power of their own to direct and design these processes, therefore the commonly used tool in achieving foreign policy goals is diplomacy (Petrič 1996: 880-885). The relation between the nation state and its diplomacy is of fundamental importance for carrying out foreign policy and shaping the appearance in international relations (Benko 1997: 257). Russet and Star (1996: 245) upgrade definition explaining, diplomacy is not the only method (a political technique) of foreign policy, but it is essential and the only truly direct method. It represents an instrument that allows other methods to effectively influence on the goals of the state. Russett, Star (1996: 10,12) and Simpson (1987: 29) see understanding of the past experiences and differences and similarities (strategy, tactics, techniques, personal quality, applied skills, etc.) as a prerequisite to a proper understanding and effective management of foreign policy and diplomacy.

For the purpose of our study we will mainly use Benko’s theoretical assumption, which is also the most commonly used in the administration’s evaluation of foreign policy effectiveness – following the national interest and fulfilling foreign policy goals. Author defines national interest as ensuring of independence and territorial integrity of the state, political system and political values as well as national culture and national values (Benko 1997:
Realistic theory also stresses the great role of national interest in determining state’s actions (Russett, Starr 1996: 288).

In achieving foreign policy goals it is crucial that the proper foreign policy strategy is developed. In the case of merely reacting to the circumstances in the environment, capability of influencing the other states quickly shrinks while the reputation of improviser and ‘bluffer’. Same can happen if the government does not have support in society and therefore cannot use specific capacity. As a consequence, legitimacy of the government diminishes in the eyes of other states (Simoniti and Russett and Starr in Šuster 2002: 9).

Most main values and goals are universal: security, autonomy, prosperity, status and reputation. In this light, Slovenia does not differ much from other (democratic) states. In this context the Declaration on Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia (1999) is probably most relevant source. In general parts of the Declaration, goals, targets and guidelines of Slovenian foreign policy are defined. In implementing its foreign policy priorities, the Republic of Slovenia follows the basic values, interests and aims of the Slovenian people and the Slovenian state. Among the most important values, which determine Slovenia’s position in the international community - deriving from the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia following should be stressed: peace and security for its citizens; territorial integrity and sovereignty; democratic state governed by the rule of law; protection of human rights and minorities; prosperity of individuals and the society at large. Some very general provisions that are connected to the foreign policy can be found in the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, state of citizens; self-determination of Slovenian nation; tripartite political system; secularity; nondiscrimination; economic, social and environmental function of property; compliance with international law (The Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia 1991; Brglez in Videtič 2002: 17).

In light of these fundamental values and long-term interests, the aims of the foreign policy of Slovenia include in particular: full membership in the EU and NATO; active role in the UN, OSCE, WTO, CEFTA, EFTA; stable and good relations with the neighboring countries; close cooperation with the countries of Central Europe; active role in the endeavors to stabilize and develop the region of South Eastern Europe, especially in the cooperation with the EU and through the participation in the Stability Pact; regulating the issue of succession in accordance with international law, taking into account the disintegration of the former state, equal treatment of all the
new successor states and the adoption of proportionate inheritance rights and obligations; enhanced economic cooperation (Declaration on Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia 1999).

Declaration on Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia was adopted in 1999. Some goals have been achieved, some goal ‘produced’ another goals (as we will see in upcoming chapters) but most goals remain in the changed international arena with Slovenian full membership of the EU and NATO in 2004. It is foremost important that the goals have been defined, making clear what is and what is not in national interest; the answer to this question can serve as a criteria of efficiency of the foreign policy (Benko and Russet and Starr in Šuster 2002: 25-26).

**Socio-historical context of the Serbo-Slovenian relations**

Slovenia shares the largest portion of its borders with the region of the Western Balkans. History (between 1918–1991, Slovenia was a part of Yugoslavia), geographical proximity, political instability, business networks, and Slovenia’s knowledge of the market and local habits of the Western Balkans are listed as factors that stimulate a proactive policy towards that region (Bunič and Šabič 2011:166) and place the Western Balkans region among priorities of Slovenian foreign policy. However, there was some time needed for Slovenia to turn towards Serbia and the region. After the break-up of SFRY, Slovenia did not use links to the Western Balkans, it used its links to (Western and Central) Europe to formulate its pro-European integrations foreign policy strategy. During turbulent 1980s and early 1990s, the waves of nationalism spread through the countries of former SFRY. Serbian nationalism was aggressive and expansionary, while Slovenian nationalism was, in contrast to Serbian, protective and isolationist (Jović 2003: 430) and had consequently driven both countries even further apart. There was a dissemination of idea in which independent Slovenian state was presented as an essential step in development of the Slovenian nation: salvation, final emancipation and liberation, the fulfillment of the long awaited dreams. Balkan chaos would ultimately be replaced by a European law and a systematic approach« (Velikonja 1996: 182). Slovenian elites saw greater development opportunities outside Yugoslavia, with the EU integration. They reinvented Slovenian traditions, reviving and adapting old myths to promote ‘Slovenian self-esteem’. Thus, new and old Slovenian elite alike assured for themselves a national base support towards the process for independence, a transition to liberal democracy and capitalist market economy.
When wars erupted in the area in 1991, Slovenia has engaged in a strategy to run away from the Balkans, not to be linked to the area in the eyes of the international community (Bučar 1994: 1065, Patterson 2003). Goldsworthy (2002: 33–34) believes this was a common strategy of many East European states at that time, not only due to their own perception but also because of the long-term symbolism of geography and historical misrepresentations of the region, which resulted in seeing the Balkans only as a metaphor for conflict, barbarism and violence.

With Slovenia's independence from SFRY, followed by the 10-day war in June 1991, the relations between Serbia and Slovenia cooled. Common impression in Serbia was that Slovenia was the cause of the breakup of SFRY (Economist 2008). Early years of Slovenia's independence Slovenia had practically no foreign policy strategy on which all domestic political actors would agree, “since political parties, at least most of them, seem to have been confusing their party interests with foreign policy national interest” (Bučar in Neuhold et all. 1995: 288). It took some time for the countries to revive positive relations. Slovenia recognized Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1995 and proposed diplomatic relations but Milošević was opposed, since he considered the secession to be illegal (internal documents MFA Slovenia 2011). After the fall of Milošević’s regime and after democratic revolution in Serbia in October 2000, the countries renewed their relations, a year later they opened their embassies.

The relations between Slovenia and Serbia have been very productive on various levels fields. Economy continues to be the prevailing reason for relations in both countries; although integration in the international community is a very important factor (Embassy of the Republic of Slovenia in Belgrade 2011a). After two decades of wars and isolation, Serbia is trying to return to international scene with the European integration as a basic strategic-political orientation. Serbian president Tadić in January 2012 stressed: «The area of foreign policy is governed by the imperative of everlasting interests and in this light, Serbia is trying to find its place and seek possibilities for achieving its interests as regards foreign policy, economy and security.” (Tanjug 2012). These are the aims of Slovenia as well. Economists and political scientists in Slovenia agree that Slovenia’s orientation towards the Western Balkans and Serbia in particular is driven not by sentiments or solidarity, but primarily by pragmatic and strategic motives (Bunič and Šabić 2011: 166), though Serbian analyst Orlović (2011) claims that even though Slovenia and Serbia were the first to part ways, their bilateral relations are probably the best of all former Yugoslav republics. Slo-
venian recognition of the newly formed Yugoslavia in 1995 was a sign of foreign policy change. The years 1997-1999 were a turning point in Slovenian foreign policy. In 1997 Slovenia joined the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe in 1999. The same year the government produced the Declaration on Foreign Policy where Slovenia’s previous foreign policy action was turned around by the state’s use of historical context and geographical proximity to the Western Balkans into an active one. The document concludes that “on the basis of its geographical, political, economic and historical predispositions, Slovenia can offer “Good Offices” in solving complicated situations in its neighborhood as elsewhere.” (Bojinović 2005: 22), i.e. Slovenia intends to become a mediator in solving the Balkan issues. This strategy was resumed in an even more intensive way in The Appropriate Foreign Policy of October 2002 and consolidated with the Strategy for the Western Balkans in 2010 (MFA Slovenia 2002; MFA Slovenia 2010).

When Slovenia asserted its Central European identity and made the perception of its historical and geographical link to the Western Balkans positive, it started to formulate this as a foreign policy opportunity and chose the area as its primary field of cooperation within the EU too. Slovenia used the historical experience and geographical proximity to formulate its new foreign policy strategy where its previously negative perception was turned into an advantage and even an opportunity; Slovenia could become a bridge-builder between the EU and Western Balkans. In this regard, it could be claimed that the European integration process and the role of the EU as an organization also proved to be an important external foreign policy factor determining the use of historical experience and geographical proximity to the Western Balkans as the basis for foreign policy strategies and the choice of a field of cooperation (Bojinović 2005: 23-25).

Even though Slovenia and Serbia passed many bilateral agreements since 2000, Pahor was the first Slovenian Prime Minister to pay official visit to Serbia in 2010. Serbia’s President Tadić and Pahor have officially met five times in 2010 alone (Embassy of the Republic of Slovenia in Belgrade 2011a). Hyperactivity in bilateral relations in 2010 coincided with the passing of the Strategy for the Western Balkans in 2010.
The Strategy for the Western Balkans

The Strategy for the Western Balkans is the continuation of the Declaration on Foreign Policy from 1999, the document that officially confirmed the Western Balkans as a priority of Slovenian foreign policy. It is an overall and detailed regional approach to the Western Balkans, in which the priorities and measures needed to consolidate Slovenia’s position in the Western Balkans were defined. The ultimate goal is to create a favorable environment in the region, to represent Slovenian national interests including; security, stability and development in the region of the Western Balkans, which is without a doubt, a priority of the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovenian economy, as well as contributing to development and sustainable stability in the region. This approach was confirmed by the Slovenian Parliament in a declaration in July 2010. The Government established a Coordination Committee to function as an informal body to exchange views and develop initiatives for the national coordinator regarding activity in the Western Balkans. Comprised of representatives of ministries and government offices, the Committee also invites representatives of the Slovenian economy, academia and NGOs to attend sessions (MFA Slovenia 2010).

The strategy is pursuing three objectives:

1. Stability in the region;
2. The EU accession;
3. A positive climate for doing business in the region (Bunič and Šabič 2011: 166).

1. Stability in the region and The EU, NATO and other international organizations accession

In specific guidelines for Serbia, the Republic of Slovenia will strive for a prompt consensus from the EU member states regarding Serbian application for membership, start the process of preparing a positive opinion within the European Commission and begin membership negotiations. The Republic of Slovenia will continue offer assistance to Serbia in implementing the reforms necessary for its early progress towards the Euro-Atlantic integration. Slovenia firmly believes in the future of the Western Balkans, where Serbia will be factor of peace, stability and progress in the region (MFA Slovenia 2010.).
Issues of independence of Kosovo are tightly connected to stability in the region and the Serbian EU bid. They are also connected to the specific guidelines for Serbia as a part of the Strategy for the Western Balkans. Even though Serbia’s official foreign policy priorities include regional cooperation, reconciliation in the region, resolution of conflicts, strengthening of foreign economic cooperation (MFA Serbia 2012), apparently the most important priority is getting closer to EU membership while trying to preserve interests in Kosovo and Metohija.

European integration has been the strategic-political orientation of Serbian politics since 2000, when the first democratically elected prime minister of Serbia, Đinđić set the goal for Serbia to become a member of the EU within ten years (Orlović 2008: 165).

Official Serbian European path began in 2008, during the time of Slovenian presidency of the EU Council, when The Stabilization and Association Agreement was signed but ratified only in 2010. The question of The Stabilization and Association Agreement for Serbia was perhaps the most important priority of the Slovenian EU presidency regarding The Western Balkans. Slovenian Prime Minister Janša wrote a letter to Javier Solana and The European Council in 2007, advocating for the faster EU accession of Serbia. Ambitious act was received cold in Brussels and perceived as clumsy (Kajnč 2008:7). Serbian EU bid was mostly impeded by Holland and Belgium, which in combination with upcoming declaration of independence of Kosovo destabilized Serbian government, gave rise to the Serbian nationalism and brought about instability in region. Pushing for The Stabilization and Association Agreement was in Slovenian politics perceived as a means of bringing Serbia closer to EU and away from the nationalism and instability (Marn in Cerjak 2010: 90-91) In December 2009 the EU removed restrictions against the Interim Trade Agreement with Serbia and Schengen countries relaxed its visa regime for Serbian citizens. Slovenia was among those members of the EU who strove most strongly that Serbian request for the EU membership would come to the European Commission’s agenda (Embassy of the Republic of Slovenia in Belgrade 2010).

Serbia was waiting for the decision on formal EU candidate status in December 2011 but the decision was pushed back by the EU. The official statement of EU states: « Belgrade must show readiness to implement deals it has made in the EU-sponsored dialogue with Kosovo, the need to cooperate over the two states’ common border and to work more closely with the EU’s police force, EULEX, and the NATO soldiers belonging to the KFOR
mission in order to get the candidate status next year.« (Vogel 2011). After unsuccessful EU bid in December, the EU leaders announced they had delayed their decision on Serbian EU candidacy status until March, while Serbian First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior Dačić believes: “chances were slim for Serbia to become candidate in March, if the same conditions were put before the country, since “it will hardly change its position and wondered whether the EU really wished to see stability in the region, “considering its treatment of Serbia.” (Politika 2011).

Following the latest events, European Parliament’s rapporteur on Serbia, Jelko Kacin (Slovenian), criticized Serbia on insufficient dynamics, delaying reforms that halt at any barriers. He claims Kosovo is not the core problem, rather it is Serbia’s attitude towards the EU which includes blackmailing and pressuring. For political or pragmatic reasons, Serbia usually reacts at the last minute and with minimum effort. Serbia creates the impression and feeling of sacrificing to the demands of the EU while manipulating the domestic public with the help of those media under their control. Kacin concludes that these kinds of actions are completely unacceptable to EU members. Serbian leaders have lost touch with reality and confuse the facts. It is as if the EU would like to join Serbia, and not vice versa (Kacin 2011).

Kacin’s position in EU Parliament protects him from sharp diplomatic reactions from Serbia although many think he is interfering in Serbian internal politics. While the Serbian public acknowledges positive actions of the Slovenian EU Parliament Members regarding the Serbian EU bid, Kacin is an extremely unpopular Slovenian politician who has earned labels such as ‘war monger’, and ‘Serbophobe’. Serbian analysts Simić and Jovanović (in Miladinović 2011) argue his actions towards Serbia are hostile, because of him the West perceives Serbs as savages, he allegedly used media fabrications a la Göbbels during war in Slovenia, while his appointment as the European Parliament’s rapporteur on Serbia was nothing less than an insult for Serbia. One may speculate whether Kacin’s statements contributed to the Serbian public opinion of Slovenia as a hostile state. Namely, survey data of the Gallup Balkan Monitor from 2010 shows, of all the countries of the Western Balkans only Croats had worse opinion of Slovenia than Serbs.

Slovenia is the first and only country from the former Yugoslavia that is currently a member of the EU. With its knowledge of the region, Slovenia proved itself in the EU during its Presidency in 2008 Zupančič 2011, 66). One of the Slovenian priorities during the presidency of EU was Strength-
ening of the European perception of the Western Balkans, including also
the issue of Kosovo independence. Peaceful resolution of conflicts is a Slo-
venian foreign policy goal as well as preventing armed conflicts. Preventive
diplomacy is one of the priorities of international organizations of which
Slovenia is a member. Slovenia is convinced that building the European
perception of the Western Balkans countries should remain a major item
on the EU agenda and therefore supports dialogue between Serbia and Ko-
sovo under the auspices of the EU (Slovenian Presidency of the EU 2008)
as regional conflict can easily spill across the borders while having negative
(economic, political, etc.) consequences for the whole region. At the end of
2010 329 Slovenian soldiers were part of the peace corps in units of Kfor in
Kosovo, while in headquarters of NATO in Serbia, there were 3 members
of Slovenian army (MFA Slovenia 2011a, 16).”

Ever since diplomatic relations between Slovenia and Serbia have been es-
established in 2000, there were no major problems between the states, the
tragic events of the past seemed to be forgotten and both countries prac-
ticed bilateral relations with diplomatic approaches similar to other mod-
tern democracies.

Udovič and R. Zupančič (2011:13-14) claim the documents from MFA Slo-
venia in 2007 show, despite the fact that Slovenia presided over the EU at
the time of the Kosovo declaration of independence, that it had little to do
with it. Slovenian diplomats were informed upon the exact date of declara-
tion of independence 2-3 weeks before while the date of declaration was set
by the USA in concordance with Great Britain, Germany, Italy and France,
while Russia was informed of every step. A month before the declaration of
independence, confidential dispatches from The Embassy of The Republic
of Slovenia in Washington leaked, in which the USA asked Slovenia to be
the first to recognize independent Kosovo. That obviously showed the new
country not only was created far from Kosovo itself but from Europe as
well. Vodovnik (2008) in the spear of the moment wrote that Slovenia left
the impression of being servant of modern American imperial interest in
the Balkans even though Fink- Hafner and Lajh (2008:52) claims the dis-
patch did not raise much attention abroad. Kajnč (2008: 7) wrote Slovenian
leadership was aware of the fact Kosovo’s independence must be maneu-
vered apart from the traditional support for Kosovo and economic interests
in Serbia if it wished to remain credibility in European politics. Despite the
Washington dispatch, Slovenia was not the first to recognize Kosovo but
when it did, Serbia recalled its ambassador from Slovenia and sent a protest
note to the Slovenian National Assembly (Delo 2008).
Before and after Kosovo declared its independence, Slovenia engaged in preventive diplomacy with the feuding sides. Slovenia enjoys a relatively good reputation among feuding entities and was thus able to act as an impartial mediator in the conflict. Serbia, Kosovo and the EU as well, perceived Slovenia as a political actor whose actions were, in the given context, least partial. Slovenia, based on its normative power, advocated politics of a balanced approach by influencing actions of both sides. This was a process which on one hand would lead to the independence of Kosovo, and on the other hand, to Serbia's acceptance of the independence of Kosovo or/ and minimize the risk of (economic, political, etc.) damages caused by independence of Kosovo (Udovič and R. Zupančič 2011: 11-12,18). Slovenia was promoting the policy of the EU, promising Serbia a faster process towards the EU in the form of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (MFA Slovenia 2007), economic investments and assistance for development of the Serbian economy and visa liberalization, encouraging a pro-European line in Serbia during the upcoming parliament election; if Serbia agrees to the Kosovo independence; while persuading Kosovo not to commit any unpredictable action (MFA Slovenia 2007). At the same time Slovenian diplomacy emphasized the EU perspective for both feuding sides.

Success of Slovenia’s preventive diplomacy and striving for stability in the region can be proven in the following three points:

1. Intensity of relations between Slovenia (presiding EU at the time) and Serbia in first couple of months after most EU member recognized independent Kosovo;

2. Visa liberalization for citizens of Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro on 19 of December 2009. Although liberalization was predicted for January 2010, Slovenia persuaded other EU members (due to the holidays) to speed up the process. This act strengthened Slovenia’s reputation and position in the Western Balkans states, that after many years got the possibility of visa-free travel within the Schengen area;

3. A Pro-European coalition won 2008 parliamentary elections which meant symbolically that the EU is a greater priority to Serbia than Kosovo (R. Zupančič and Udovič 2011: 12-16).

At the highest level, Koštunica’s government more or less ignored the Slovenian side until the end of its mandate. Relations recovered only when Democratic political party came to power (internal document MFA Slo-
venia 2010) but the Kosovo issue, even with the new faces in Serbian government, didn’t quite fade away. The Serbian president boycotted The EU-Balkans summit organized at Bled, by Slovenia and Croatia in 2010, where Slovenia tried to position itself as a link between the EU and the Western Balkans, because of the presence, on equal terms, of Kosovo (Economist 2010). However, in a long term, different views regarding Kosovo did not have a great impact on bilateral interaction as simple calculation showed that remaining good relations with Slovenia is in Serbian interest.

Some critics argue that Slovenia is acting too independently, and that it lacks coordination with other EU countries. At first glance it seemed that the EU recognized aspirations of a small country, since it was also in the interest of the EU to have another contributing actor in the stabilization processes of the troubled region. In the later period it became obvious that, when Slovenia wanted to act independently, using its own diplomatic initiatives (and at the same time the label of the EU!) and trying to influence the agenda-setting disproportionately. Subsequently, strong signals came from the EU that a small country, though pursuing the general will of the EU, had better coordinate policies towards the region with the EU (R. Zupančič 2011: 72)

In light of development and cooperation, the Action plan 2011 for the Strategy for the Western Balkans reveals hyperactivity in bilateral cooperation between the states at all levels of public administration; meetings, visits, consultations, projects, trainings, technical help, scholarships, exchange programs, etc. (MFA Slovenia 2011: 88-95). As Corgan (2008) explains: “The ability to focus on key goals, better knowledge of the issues than larger powers, exquisite sense of when to act, provided Slovenia with the successes against the agendas of larger states.” Slovenia used its existing resources and capabilities to its advantage, drawing from its geographical position, historical experience, and never the less, similarity of the language. At this point it must be emphasized that many Slovenians speak Serbian fluently as a result of once having a common country, where the Serbian language was mandatory in Slovenian curricula, which makes cooperation even more productive. Moreover, Slovenian companies have been present in Serbia since the former SFRY, providing jobs for thousands of Serbs, but we will focus on that part in the next chapter. Of course Slovenia would not be able to pursue its goals and activities if Serbia were not interested in cooperation. As one of the officials from MFA Slovenia in 2012 explained: “Some people working in counterpart sectors from both countries had been working together in the SFRY, so they already know each other.” Connections are
very important. Moreover, Serbs are more interested in our system, in our path from socialism to international community. We draw on the same system, and many aspects of transition were the same. We are the first and the only country of the former Yugoslavia that is a member of the EU, which is the Serbian foreign policy priority. Our cooperation is probably more productive than cooperation with other EU members, due to our history, geographical proximity and language. We have a large Serbian community and they have a Slovenian minority. There are many factors that provide us with a comparative advantage.”

In the light of strengthening of political cooperation with the Western Balkans we must not forget bilateral official development assistance (ODA). Slovenia has been an ODA donor since 2004 and this is part of the Slovenian foreign policy therefore, its goals (Reducing poverty; provision of peace and security in the international environment, with particular emphasis on political stability in our immediate region; support for the Slovenian economy in the markets of developing countries) are consistent with foreign policy guidelines (MFA Slovenia 2011b).

In accordance with the priorities, the majority of bilateral ODA is directed toward the countries of the Western Balkans. In 2005 Slovenia created a national platform for ODA and humanitarian aid, and the International Development Co-operation of the Republic of Slovenia Act was adopted in June 2006. In 2008 the National Assembly adopted the Resolution on international ODA for the period ending in 2015, which defines the geographical and content priorities of Slovenia’s ODA and determines the mechanisms for its implementation (Okorn Virant 2010). Slovenia has concluded agreements on bilateral ODA with individual countries of the Western Balkans, including Serbia. Moreover, Serbia meets the criteria for allocation of funds to a particular geographical area: the level of historical, cultural and economic ties between Slovenia and this region is high, as well as a raise in democratic standards and gradual prevention of corruption. The degree of harmonization with other donors is important (Mavko 2006: 68).

Bilateral ODA between Slovenia and Serbia is, above all, oriented towards transferring the experiences gained through its own transition and accession to the EU. Technical help is one of the priorities of cooperation. Slovenia allocates a major part of its bilateral assistance for programs and projects carried out by Slovenian institutions and NGOs (Okorn Virant 2010). Some 74% of Slovenian bilateral ODA is allocated to the region. In 2011, the MFA Slovenia planned to allocate EUR 357.000 to Serbia; EUR 200.000
for public infrastructure, EUR 109,000 for technical help, EUR 43,000 for co-financing of NGO’s activities (EUR 13,000 for completion in 2010 approved two-year project) and EUR 5,000 for support of local NGOs for projects for empowering women (through diplomat-consular missions) (MFA Slovenia 2011a, 89). In non-official information, Slovenia in 2011 allocated to Serbia approximately EUR 500,000 OR 6% of bilateral ODA for the Western Balkans (Mavko 2011). In the official data for 2010, the program of professional-technical assistance in the field of accession to the EU between The MFA Slovenia in collaboration with Serbian counterpart, the Serbian embassy in Slovenia and the Office for European Integration of Serbia, was financially most supported program – EUR 200 000 (MFA 2011c, 17).

Greater recognition of Slovenia in the recipient states is also supported by the onset of a larger number of Slovenian companies on the markets of aid recipient states, so the intention is that the Slovenian economy is largely involved in the development of Slovenian ODA programs. Economic interest can be asserted through bilateral and multilateral channels of ODA, but the bilateral canal is more important for economic interests (Hopkins 2000).

2. A positive climate for doing business in the region

Striving for sustainable poverty reduction and political stability in the context of ODA also shows a clear economic interest. All donor countries in the allocation of ODA in addition to its external political and humanitarian objectives take into account the clear economic interests (Laatikainen in Hook 1996: 109). Economic interest in official development assistance is first reflected in increasing international trade. Development aid should serve the development of new markets, which facilitates the growth of exports of developed countries (Leisinger 1999: 4). By doing that developing countries can get a cheap labor force and lower production costs which leads to a growing relocation of production to developing countries. Serbia represents a geographical area, which ranks first among the less developed Slovenian foreign trade partners, who are also eligible for ODA. Therefore Slovenia needs to strive to create conditions that will increase economic growth rates in the region. Allocating ODA to Serbia fulfills economic and sector priorities and business interest of Slovenian companies. Most of Slovenian export investments are concentrated in the region as well as the great financial risks (Mavko 2006: 14, 65-67).
Specific guidelines for Serbia in the context of the Strategy for the Western Balkans are increased presence of Slovenian products, services and direct investments. To evaluate possibility of joint onset of Slovenian and Serbian companies on third markets An agreement was reached that the Slovenian Public Agency for Entrepreneurship and Foreign Investments (JAPTI) and Serbian Agency for Foreign Investments and Export Promotion signed a memorandum on strengthening cooperation and investment activities. Both institutions help investitures with information from of both markets. In 2011 joint industries (wood, metal, agriculture, etc.) had participated in several trade fairs and exhibitions in Serbia (MFA 2010, 89).

There are 71,52% of direct investments of Slovenian companies in The Western Balkans, most in Serbia therefore reasons for striving for peace and stability are more than obvious. The region of the Western Balkans is of great importance for the internationalization of the Slovenian economy. Slovenian economic growth and development are, to a considerable extent, associated with the development of foreign trade and outward direct investment abroad in these markets (Miković 2006: 39). The first years of independence Slovenian companies lost much of their profit in the region which consequently led to negative economic growth in Slovenia. The economic relations between the countries are thus the most important aspect of bilateral relations. Serbia is among the most popular investment destinations for Slovenian business and also priority region for Slovenian investments. Investments reached a total of EUR 1.696bn by the end of 2011. There are almost 1,500 Slovenian companies currently registered in Serbia (The embassy if the Republic of Slovenia in Belgrade 2011). On the other hand, according to Chamber of Commerce of Serbia (2012), the balance of Serbian investments in Slovenia is relatively low (EUR 100 million worth of investments) and Serbian companies are there are under-represented.

Slovenia is one of five top investitures in Serbia, while Serbia was 10th most important trade partner in 2011(Chamber of Commerce of Serbia 2012). According to the Slovenian Statistics Office (2011), the trade amounted in first 11 months of 2011 was $ 976,8 million, 14,4 % more than in 2010, with $ 3,4 million surpluses for Serbia. Serbia's export to Slovenia accounted for $ 490,1 million (25,7 % more that 2010), while import from Slovenia was $ 486,7million (4,9 % more than 2010).

By joining the EU, Slovenia assumed the EU’s external trade policy and customs tariffs of the EU. As a consequence, Slovenia had to give up some of the more favorable trade agreements with countries of the former SFRY
(Miković 2006: 39). However, Slovenian-Serbian trade cooperation have been on rise until the economic crisis in 2008 and Slovenian business is showing interest in further investment. Knowing local business practices and the environment has been as well as the great reputation of Slovenian companies and their brands in the former SFRY (Slovenian business club Belgrade 2011).

Slovenia pushed for Schengen visa liberalization in the December of 2009, which has among other advantages, positive effects on economic cooperation between the states in a sense of facilitating business contacts between the countries. Moreover, visa liberalization influenced a significant increase of Serbian tourists primarily as a result of liberalization of visa regime (MFA Slovenia 2011c, 105).

**Conclusion**

There are certain conclusions that could be drawn from the analysis. Drawing from its geographic and historical advantages, combined with its foreign policy actions with other relevant figures of the EU, Slovenia has proved a success in its foreign policy towards Serbia, regarding it foreign policy goals. By striving for security and stability in Serbia/Kosovo issue, exercising normative power, while supporting Serbia’s EU bid, Slovenia has proven itself as a relatively reliable partner for Serbia and the EU. Development programs (good governance trainings, promotion of human rights, ODA, implementing the EU reforms, scholarships, etc.) comply with all three objectives of The Strategy for the Western Balkans, moreover, they provide Slovenia with further comparative advantage in sense of a Serbian ‘bridge’ to the EU. The Strategy was simply a new, detailed document that confirmed old goals and included more competent people to consolidate Slovenia’s position in the Western Balkans. Visa liberation, The Stabilization and Association Agreement, providing jobs for thousands of Serbs in Slovenian companies, also help further another foreign policy goal (some say the most important): facilitating Slovenian business in Serbia and attract more Serbian tourists to Slovenia. Political capital and political actions have strong impact on business including that of the Slovenian economy.

Slovenian-Serbian relations can be a good example of two states that separated violently and had not had bilateral relations for almost a decade. To prove itself as a relevant partner in international arena, Slovenia can use Serbia as a good example of its bid for security, stability and development
in the region (of its interests), while further consolidating its position in the region and facilitating its economy in the strategically important Serbian market. One the other hand, Serbia can use Slovenia’s aspiration to prove itself in the international arena, for its development, pursuit of foreign policy priorities, while attracting desperately needed foreign capital to the country.

REFERENCES


Bojinović, Ana (2005): Geographical Proximity and Historical Experience as a Basis for Active Foreign Policy Strategy of Small European States – the Case of Austria and Slovenia regarding the Western Balkans. The Journal of the Central European Political Science Association 1 (1): 8-29.


115


Moving Beyond the Crisis: Contrasting Ambitions and Future Challenges in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Erhan Türbedar
Moving Beyond the Crisis: Contrasting Ambitions and Future Challenges in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Erhan Türbedar

ABSTRACT
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is undergoing its most serious crisis of the post-war era. Despite the 17 years since the end of the Bosnia war, the dividedness, distrust, anxiety and competition among the different ethnic groups of the country still persist. Existing political system in the country is an important source of long-standing crisis. On the other hand, instead of being focused on everyday problems of its people, current political leadership of BiH spreads distrust among citizens. While for some citizens of BiH changing the borders of this country is still among possible options, for the others the most important thing is to develop a just, lasting and sustainable national framework for functioning of the state. However, such a national framework could be only developed by amendments of the constitution, which require the consent of all three nations. And that means that there is not much room for radical reform of state structures. In addition, achieving membership of BiH into NATO and the EU would provide not only basis for successful socio-economic development and democratic consolidation of country, but would also create a security framework for a unquestioning peace in BiH.

KEYWORDS
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dayton Peace Agreement, ethnic relations, politics, European Union.

INTRODUCTION
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is a country with a long, rich history and tradition. Despite many historical misfortunes and the bloody war from 1990s, Bosnia has been able to maintain its existence since the Middle Ages.
However, even after 17 years of peace, BiH continues to suffer from deep divisions in the country. Therefore, the future of the BiH remains to be subject of various researches and discussions.

Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) from 1995 had to main objectives. In the short-term its aim was to stop the war and prevent further deaths and destruction. In long-term, however, intent was to create the conditions for lasting peace and stability in the country. When one take into account the seriousness of the war experienced by BiH, no matter from which point it is viewed, it should be concluded that this country went better in years after war. Furthermore, DPA has laid the ground for reintegration of BiH and its society. Unfortunately, the lack of political goodwill that has been actualized after 2006, has practically stopped the state building process in BiH.

The international community has played an important role for peace to be restored, the country to be re-structured and the state apparatus to be re-instated in BiH. The role of the international community has also been pivotal in transferring some of the powers enjoyed by the country’s two entities to the central state institutions in a bid to transform BiH into a more functional state. The thing is that the lingering fear and distrust in ethnic relations have recently been couched in nationalistic rhetoric paralleling the western countries’ waning interest in BiH. The leaders of BiH have come to the point where they are incapable of reaching a compromise even on matters serving the interests of everyone. For example, the price of the 15 month crisis in BiH that emerged after October 2010 elections have been rather hefty. It not only dragged the country to a political and economic malaise but also blocked its way to EU membership.

Main attempt of this article is to explain the factors that push BiH into situation of permanent crisis. The first part of the article aims to explain the structural problems of state of BiH. The second part evaluates ethnic and political relations in this country, where October 2010 elections have been used as the case study. The third part is devoted to the discussion of how signatory countries of the DPA -Serbia and Croatia are affecting BiH. And last part questions if possible are for BiH steps forward for a better future.

**Structural problems of BiH**

Territorial integrity of BiH has been preserved owing to DPA. It is paradox, but a major source of the structural problems of BiH is the DPA itself,
which created a country based on two entities where the Republic of Srpska (RS) has a centralist system whereas Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) adheres to a federalist model and is structured in cantons. Apart from this, there is Brcko District with its special status in the country. BiH is probably the only country in the world governed by such a complex system. According to Bosniaks, with recognizing ethnic division created at the war years, DPA brought about serious and persistent threat to country’s sovereignty and its territorial integrity.

BiH’s two entities, with their own political systems, police, judicial mechanisms, trading systems, media and other institutions specific to independent states, remind as two small states within one state. Because of such administrative structure, more than 40 percent of public budget goes to the financing of state bureaucracy (Dnevni Avaz, 2006). Entity institutions are in general more powerful than the central institutions. In past years especially RS, who struggles against authority of Bosnian state, was working on preventing transfer of competences from entities to the state, with arguments that central institutions are costly and inefficient (Divjak, 2006: 49).

As constitutional lawyer Omer Ibrahimagic draws attention, Bosnian constitution which is annex-4 of DPA, treats citizens more like entity citizens, rather than citizens of BiH (Ibrahimagic, 2001: 40). On the other hand, articles 4 and 5 of constitution that regulates election of members of parliament and presidency of BiH are violating the basic human rights, since they are not allowing all citizens to be elected to these positions (The General Framework Agreement, 1995). Moreover in constitution especially other citizens (minorities or those citizens who do not identify with any of the three dominant nations) have been enabled from protection of their collective rights in the decision making process.

State parliament is not just less important than parliaments of entities, but the process of it decision making is difficult and complicated because right to veto and quota regulations. For Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats right to veto and quota regulations (entity voting)² are guarantee against possibility of being outvoted by others, or in other words being dominated via institutional means. In reality, these regulations for RS provides means of preventing more centralization of state, by permitting only legislation consistent with RS’s vision, and in this way stay autonomous as possible is. That’s why calls by Bosniaks for abolish entity voting for making state more

² Accord IV/3 of Constitution of BiH permits the veto of legislation in parliament if two thirds of the delegates elected from each entity so vote.
But it is obvious that entity voting obstructs agreements for more fundamental reforms, since representatives of three constitutional people of BiH shows little compromise on many issues. Together with problem of the functionality of existing institutions, policies such as social policies, macroeconomic policies and education policies cannot be executed enough state-wide.

In the previous years establishment of common state institutions was mostly made under the supervision and leading role of the international community. In the first post war year focus of international community was to establish the minimum elements of Bosnian statehood. After that policy of gradually weakening of the power of entities has been initiated. Decisions of High Representative, informal pressure on political actors, policy of conditionality and decisions of Constitutional court of BiH were main tools of international community for building of state structures (Bieber, 2009: 11-12).

State building and process of strengthening BiH’s central institutions has been stopped with a failure of constitutional reform process from 2006 and with coming to power of RS leader Milorad Dodik. Together with leadership of Dodik, RS started with more serious political and financial obstructions towards central institutions. Furthermore, together with insisting on minimal interference from Sarajevo, rhetoric on erasing of all state level institutions created after 1995 has became popular in RS. Dodik claims that many decisions of High Representative that gave power to the state were unconstitutional. The National Assembly of the RS in the session held on 14 May 2009 passed the resolution where it is stated that in the last 13 years RS has transferred its 68 competences to the central institutions. Further it is stated that the National Assembly requires taking actions before domestic and international judicial institutions for these “unconstitutionally transferred competences” (Narodna Skupstina Republike Srpske, 2009). Most of competences have been transferred in the period from 2000 to 2006 and among them is control of public procurement, defense, telecommunications, intelligence and security affairs, indirect taxes, searching for missing persons etc. It is interesting to notice that parallel with attacks to central institutions, Dodik also encourages Bosnian Croats to renew their demand for separate entity within territory of FBiH.
Considerable improvements have been observed in ethnic relations in BiH in the years after war. Ethnic relations have been so much improved that the citizens of this country, who earlier fought against each other, today are serving in the armed forces of BiH, without causing any incident. However, there are still serious problems both in ethnic relations and in the way different ethnic groups view the past and how the future of the country should be. It can be said that the ethnic division and distrust is stronger than the desire for democratization and economic prosperity. And in various Internet forums, part of the citizens of BiH never did stop their “verbal war”.

According to one research conducted by Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Banja Luka, key problems that burden the ethnic relations in BiH are the absence of common goals, the lack of consensus about the war, unresolved national issues and the lack of trust among nations (Skoko, 2010). Indeed, there is no consensus about the construction of a common state that would be acceptable to everyone. The society of BiH shaped along ethnic lines has no consensus on the common values too. Rhetoric based on slogan “sacrifice today for a better tomorrow” is utopia for BiH.

What happened in Bosnia during the 1992-1995 period constitutes part of the darkest pages of human history. For one thing, so many people lost their lives, homes, and their happiness. The people of BiH would prefer that war crimes had not been committed, but they did, and now the big problem is how to forget the atrocities and how to forgive them. Since criminal has no ethnic or religious identity, all crimes committed in BiH must be brought to the justice. The problem is that different parties from the Bosnian war believe to “different realities”. Before cases from International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have revealed facts on Bosnian war, parties from that war have produced their “own facts”, and placed them to their people as “absolute truths”. Parallel to this each side raises only monuments of its victims.

However, when talking about war crimes in BiH, language used should be language of facts. Today, a significant amount of information exists on prisoner camps, mass murder cases, mass graves and brutal acts of torture. Corpses exhumed from mass graves subject to autopsies and identification, also provide the basis for a fair appraisal of the situation. On the other hand, especially at the archives of ICTY there is a huge amount of documents, photographs, audio-video tapes, and other findings which are
testifying about the events in the Bosnian war. These materials are allowing future generations to view war events clearly and without the doubt, and to understand who did what to whom.

When it comes to unresolved national issues, the most troubling problems have until recently been experienced between Bosniaks and Serbs. While Bosniaks are supporting reintegration of country by means of strengthening of central authority, Serbs struggle for maximum autonomy from Sarajevo. Moreover, majority of Serbs do not accept Sarajevo as their capital and wishes independence for RS in the long-term. For all Serbian nationalists RS is one separate state which is temporarily within territory of BiH. They, including some top authorities, are openly saying that are unwillingly living in BiH, and that this state is imposed to them (Radoncic, 2008). Therefore, for majority of Bosniaks the presence of strong RS constitutes a constant threat to the territorial integrity of BiH. That’s why Bosniaks are pushing for strengthening of central state institutions, what among Serbs generates “threat from Sarajevo”.

However, the latest political developments have also cooled the relations of Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats. What is worse is that two leading Croat parties, Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ BiH) and Croatian Democratic Union 1990 (HDZ 1990) have embarked upon solidarity with Serbs in producing pressure against Sarajevo. Croats believe that they have been left under domination of Bosniaks within FBiH. Therefore, a part of them dreams of establishing of “state within state” in the regions they control. Even if majority of Serbs and a smaller share of Croats have continuously supported secession from Bosnia (Bieber, 2006: 147; Lyon, 2006: 50), recent political developments have really dragged BiH to a crucial point and have even more downgrade lack of trust among nations. That’s why even 17 years after the end of war, for some parts of BiH society future is still marked by uncertainties.

On account of the propagation of intolerance and hatred, it looks like the politicians are hugely responsible for the situation in BiH. Because of geographical segmentation and abusing of democratic structures of power-sharing model, political leaders are mostly fighting for votes within their own ethnic groups. Unfortunately DPA was not successful in means of ensuring the creation of multi-ethnic party pluralism in BiH. When the programs of leading political parties are examined, one can see that, exceptions excluded, they seem to focus on one of the two entities. That’s why politics in BiH has been privatized, in way that everyone wants to be a leader of
its own people and rule in their own backyard. Generally politicians are being accusing with promoting nationalism and creating a general climate of intolerance, hatred and fear in order to ensure benefits from the situation (Fischer, 2006: 446; Kukic, 2009: 30). Especially on the eve of elections usually nationalist rhetoric accelerates. Slogans used in election campaigns seem to have been selected meticulously with the purpose of whipping up the ethnic awareness of the electorate. The interesting thing is that the clergymen in the country are also aspiring to make an impact in the election process either directly or indirectly by channeling their support to certain political parties.

Since constitution of BiH provides for the equal representation of the three founder nations in the council of ministers, coalition governments arise from a necessity rather than a democratic preference. Such coalitions usually are not developing a serious work program. On the other hand, within the framework of the government agreements, the leaders made their peoples high level appointments to government offices without taking into consideration professional eligibility. This enables the ruling parties to intervene in all domains of social life, and keeping under control almost all public employment opportunities.

The media are among the most important means by which politicians influence the public in BiH. According to the Freedom House, BiH is country with partly free media (Freedom House, 2012: 14). This means that there is still significant presence of the impact of political, economic and other lobbies on media. It is for long been known that in BiH many media are under political control or pressure. In particular public services are completely under the influence of political leaders (Huseinovic, 2011; Sadikovic, 2012). The Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) led by Milorad Dodik controls the majority of the media sources in the RS. And in the FBiH, many of the media organs are subscribed to certain political parties.

Similar to separation along ethnic lines that exist in BiH media, contents of school textbooks of this country also encourage national division, prejudice and stereotypes against others. The main sources of division in the education system are the three separated curriculums - Bosnian, Serbian and Croatian, which are based on ethnic identity and are preventing learning about the others in correct way. That’s why attitudes of young people are being shaping with language of
nationalism, rather than language of shared history and culture. The fact is that even 17 years after the war ended, schools where children are separated and divided according to their ethnicity are still working in FBiH (Popovic, 2007; Skuletic, 2006). Politicians carry a huge responsibility for such state of the education system.

Besides all these criticism of politicians, it would be wrong to say that the people had never been a problem, but just their leaders. The fact is that politics of obstruction and rhetoric of separation always finds its audience in BiH. Probably this is the main reason why international community’s strategy of supporting moderate multi-ethnic parties (Belloni, 2007: 73) had limited success.

a. RS and Inflammatory Rhetoric of Milorad Dodik

The President of the RS, Milorad Dodik is the political leader who has in recent years most widely sabotaged the process of building the BiH and worsened the already thorny ethnic relations. Dodik’s practically only message is that BiH is moving towards its destruction. Almost every week it is possible to hear one of Dodik’s statements how BiH is going to disintegrate.

Dodik, former moderate politician who was once applauded by West, has totally been changed and shifted from left to the radical right. He is no more able even to condemn war crimes committed by Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, both charged with genocide. Dodik has simply realized that his voting base supports the aggressive Serbian nationalism, and started playing on that political card. Dodik maintains his secessionist rhetoric during every election campaign and stubbornly defies the existence of BiH as a state. He calls for abolition of central institutions, demands the demarcation of the border lines between the two entities, threatens with referendums, and argues that it is about time the status of the RS – which he uses as his personal political toy, will be changed to independent state. From the very beginning, Dodik has been opposing all changes in the constitution that would help BiH gain power as a state. And during Butmir negotiations from 2009 headed by the EU and the US, Dodik was threatening to block BiH’s NATO and EU integration process.

Dodik did not only take sharper nationalist stance, but he also stood more vigorously against the international community. While Dodik is challenging the west and destroying the image of international presence in BiH,
whatever the topic is, what remains behind the RS is Russia, defying the west. Frankly speaking, the west is almost powerless, standing on the opposite side of Dodik’s unyielding and tension-provoking ways. In one debate organized by the Tanjug news agency on February 1, 2012 Cedomir Jovanovic, president of the Liberal Democratic Party from Serbia has warned Dodik that the language he uses belongs to 1991 (Muric, 2012). Indeed, Dodik has been instrumental in the inflammatory Serbian nationalism of the 1990s rapidly blossoming among the Bosnian Serbs again. And, in the hope of getting the votes of the most radical Bosnian Serbs, he does not miss the opportunities for rejection of the Srebrenica genocide.

Dodik’s main strategy is to demonstrate to the world that Serbs and Bosniaks are incompatible with each other and that they cannot share the same state. In other worlds, he has been doing his best to convince the international community that BiH is an unsuccessful state and that its disintegration will be the longest lasting solution. Parallel to this he has also been reiterating his appeals for the peaceful disintegration of BiH. In one sense, strategy of Dodik has paid off, since international community do not seriously questions any more the entity powers of RS.

Some analysts believe that main goal of Dodik is not secession, but achieving greatest degree of autonomy, by preventing further transfer of competences from entities to state. And some others suspect that what pushes Dodik to aggressive stand towards Sarajevo and Organization of High Representative (OHR) are fears that state prosecutors might indict him for corruption or misuse of office (ICG, 2011: 8). Indeed, in recent years media of BiH and some reports of international institutions were full with allegations on corruption affairs of Dodik. According to the former finance minister of RS, Svetlana Cenic, RS is most corrupt part of Europe, a kind of dictatorship with no human freedoms (Beaumont, 2009).

b. Struggle of the Croats for Restructuring of FBiH

To make things more interesting, Dodik is gradually starting to enjoy more and more respect amongst Bosnian Croats, who have been under the sway of Dodik for the past two-three years and have even gotten into solidarity with him. Convinced that they are not at the same standing as the two other founder nations, Croats have been trying to have FBiH restructured and eventually create a separate entity for them. During his speech from November 2011 in UN Security Council, High Representative Valentin Inzko did not just accuse government of RS for calling into question the
central BiH institutions, but he also mentioned establishment of the Croat National Council (HNS) as a proof that two main Croat parties -HDZ BiH and HDZ 1990 are trying to impose talks on creating of third entity (OHR, 2011).

As a reaction to speech of Inzko, these Croat parties have declared that their aim is not division of BiH, but to achieve the constitutional provision of equality of the Croats with the other two constituent peoples. Still, the main source of the political discord during 2011 can easily be said to be the Croatian issue within FBiH. Especially president of HDZ BiH Dragan Covic has tried to remind the international community of a Croatian issue through demanding the formation of a separate Croat entity. Fewer in number, Croats believe that within FBiH they have been treated by Bosniaks like a “younger brother”. What is more, the main Croatian political parties failed to have their candidate elected to the BiH presidency in the last two terms. On the other side, since FBiH government functions largely by majority vote, problem of outvoting (winning a vote) is possible. In practice, it is conventional that party leaders negotiate until they arrive at a position acceptable by all, and in this way avoid a vote. But when consensus could not be reached then some groups could be outvoted. Being the smallest ethnic community in FBiH, Croats tend to complain of outvoting most (ICG, 2010: 5-7).

It should be underlined that problem of outvoting did not cause demands for establishing of third entity for Croats. In fact, outvoting has been a chronic issue since 2002, because of constitutional amendments imposed to entities by High Representative. And demands for creating of third entity were present much before 2002. To remind, High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch has used his Bonn powers to remove from his position Ante Jelavic, Croatian member of presidency of BiH with accusation that he was trying to build third Croatian entity.

According to Dragan Covic, today in BiH about half a million of Croats are living, the number that is thought to be exaggerated. Representatives of the Croat parties often claim that in the FBiH is at work policy which encourages the Croat to leave the country. But emigration of one part of Croats from FBiH did not take place because of pressures, but because of privileges that Croatian citizenship offers. Huge number of Bosnian Croats possess Croatian passport, which is providing to them certain privileges, such as the right to work in Croatia, social compensation, child support, health insurance, etc. On the other hand, with Croatian passports it was
easier to reach western countries such as Germany, Austria and Switzerland for working and living there. As a result of Croat emigrations, and returns of Bosniak and Serb refugees to their prewar homes, Croats started to lose their dominant position at local level, in places such as Central Bosnia canton. This situation, together with problem of outvoting creates dissatisfaction among Croats.

c. The Struggle of Bosniaks for Strengthening of Central Institutions

Among one part of Bosniak intellectuals prevails the notion of BiH as a country where Bosniaks are the basic people. In contrast to the nationalism of the Serbs, which is limited to the RS, Bosniaks nationalism relies on preserving the territorial integrity of BiH. On the other hand, Bosniaks are the ones who would like to transform BiH into some kind of state of citizens, or the state where entities would be less competent than central institutions. Still Bosniaks continue to see the strengthening of the central Bosnian state as their main political goal. And Bosniaks would like to see both from Serbs and Croats more responsibility towards BiH, and stop with abusing and sabotaging state institutions (Zulfikarpasic, 2006).

Some Bosniak politicians have tried to benefit from rhetoric of transforming BiH into more unilateral state, as it was the case with leader of Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH) Haris Silajdzic, who has frequently questioned RS and in reciprocal way provoked Dodik. That’s why Brussels was concerned the two basic culprits of the political tension in BiH were Dodik and Silajdzic. However, despite the setback Silajdzic suffered in the October 2010 elections and his fall from grace, political tensions in the country did not ease because for Dodik, did not turn out to be difficult to choose new persons from among Bosniaks through whom he could continue with the tightening of relations.

Generally, Bosniaks have a negative opinion toward Serbs for the war, massive destruction and suffering caused by Serbian side. Bosniaks expects from Serbs to become conscious of their guilt for the war and to apologize for it. When it comes to Croats, Bosniaks are worried because besides the Dodik factor, the Croatian issue is also being reactivated in the country.

After being elected as new Bosniak member of BiH presidency, Bakir Izetbegovic has announced that he will work on the improving country’s ethnic relations. However, due to the fact that he is a son of Alija Izetbegovic, the Serbs chose to approach with great prejudice against him. On the
other hand, unlike Bakir Izetbegovic, after proclaiming victory in elections of October 2010 Dodik has continued to escalate political tensions in the country.

Bosniaks are aware that some cycles will try to downgrade and further destabilize BiH in upcoming period, and that some will come with new plans of dividing it. However, they believe no one can divide BiH again and that world will not allow such a thing (Lagumdzija, 2006). It can be said that Bosniaks in NATO and EU membership recognize a guarantee for better future of BiH, because disagreements then should be solved under European rules, which are not giving place to the new conflicts.

d. Political Solidarity of the Serbs and Croats

What was expected in BiH following the elections in October 2010 was an easing in political tensions and an increased pace in the reforms process. However, BiH was swept in just the opposite direction. RS, having an ethnically homogenous population had a new government pretty soon. But FBiH became the scene of political turmoil in the post-election period. At the source of all this tumult lay HDZ and HDZ 1990, who captured a large part of the votes among Croats.

These two Croatian parties entered the election process with three expectations. The first was that they expected their candidate will be elected as Croatian member of Presidency of BiH. The second was that they believed the post of chairman of council of ministers should belong to Croats. The third was that they expected discussions to be started for setting up of the distinct Croatian entity. But when the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the most vote-getter in the FBiH, declared its victory on the night of elections, it announced it is going to be the founder of the new government. On the other hand Zeljko Komsic, presidential candidate of SDP has been elected as Croatian member of Presidency of BiH.

Alliances were set up right after the elections between the SDP and Party of Democratic Action (SDA) in the Bosniak fold, between the SNSD and the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) from among the Serbian parties and between the HDZ BiH and the HDZ 1990 among the Croatian parties. This followed the three alliances were trying to entice smaller parties to their sides. SDP, as the victor of the elections in the FBiH has negotiated with both HDZs for five months and made proposals which hardly any politician could snub. However, the HDZs never gravitated towards an agree-
ment. This led the SDP to set up the FBiH government on March 17, 2011 with the other small parties that it reached a compromise with on a common work platform. Thus, after losing presidential post, this time to leading Croatian parties were left out of the FBiH government. This has created big disappointment among two HDZs. On one hand they have declared newly set up government of FBiH illegal and on the other both parties started giving messages that they can pour the Bosnian Croats into the streets and take some radical decisions. This prompted some Bosnian columnists to come up with warnings that the FBiH could fall apart. At a time when the FBiH was heating up, Dodik has been sending out messages from Banja Luka that BiH is going to disintegrate just like Yugoslavia. Once again the crisis in BiH was deepening.

In order to fight against the Sarajevo, two HDZs have joined forces with the Serbian political alliance in a bid to spearhead the formation of a new government at central level, thus political balance has tipped against the Bosniak alliance. As a result, Bosniaks who attach the most importance to existence of BiH were seen for the first time in history as a stumbling block to the setting up of the new government.

Surprisingly the six leading parties of the country had agreement on the structure of the new government on December 28, 2011 and announced the chairman of council of ministers would be from the party which ranked sixth in terms of election results. And on January 12, 2012 ethnic Croat Vjekoslav Bevanda became new chairman of council of ministers, and thus ended the 15-month political crisis in the country.

The two leading parties of Bosnian Croats, HDZ and HDZ 1990, thinking that injustice were done to them regarding the presidency and the FBiH government, have displayed a tough attitude in the negotiating central government for a long time. Therefore, it was very important to have the leader of HDZ Dragan Covic soften his stand about a compromise. It is interesting to note that two HDZs have softened their positions after change of government in Croatia that took place after December 4, 2011 elections. The left-leaning government in Croatia may have encouraged the Bosnian Croats to act more constructively at the request of both Washington and Brussels. On the other hand, Brussels may have asked Belgrade who was hoping to get EU candidacy status, to talk the Bosnian Serbs for negotiat-
ing more constructively on formation of new government. All this leads to thinking about the possible roles of Croatia and Serbia on the current situation of BiH.

**Lack of trust of Sarajevo towards the neighboring countries**

According to Bosniaks, until the first half of the 1990s Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman were both, biggest enemies and good “colleagues”, because they were secretly negotiating the division of BiH. Former Croatian president Stjepan Mesic has openly witnessed many times, that during the war between Serbia and Croatia, delegations from these two countries have exchanged visits where they have negotiating territory of BiH (Mesic, 2001). And the fact that DPA has been signed as international agreement between the presidents of BiH, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia clearly contradicts the claims that the Bosnian War was only domestic issue.

Actually, Bosniaks believe that all evil things which happened to them were plotted in neighboring Serbia and that the Milosevic regime in Belgrade orchestrated all the wars in the geography of former Yugoslavia. That is why the verdict passed by the International Court of Justice in The Hague on February 26, 2007 in the lawsuit opened by BiH against Serbia was found insufficient and falling short of fulfilling their demands. On the other hand, as a result of the fabrications of the Milosevic regime, even today the majority of Serbs believe that Serbs fought both in Croatia and BiH for their freedom, waging a kind of war of liberation. This is the reason of the consideration by the Serbs of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, who even massacred women and children, as national heroes.

The Serbian parliament’s decision to condemn the killing of 8 thousand Bosniaks in Srebrenica in July 1995 was an important step for Serbia to confront its past. But while the Bosnian Serbs have opposed the Serbian parliament’s Srebrenica decision, Bosniaks were disappointed because Serbian parliament stopped short of calling the incidents in Srebenica as genocide.

3 However, Dodik may have also given some other safeguards. First and foremost, it seems like some western diplomats have renewed their assurance to Dodik that the existence of RS will never be questioned. On the other hand, the Bosnian people learned on the day the parties agreed to set up a central coalition government that the investigation against Dodik and some of his colleagues based on accusations of corruption and abuse of duty were halted because of lack of evidence.
Almost all intellectuals from Sarajevo believe that Serbia never abated in its efforts to interfere in internal affairs of BiH, what Belgrade constantly refutes. But, during October 2010 elections in BiH, President of Serbia Boris Tadic and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Serbia Vuk Jeremic have participated at rallies of SNSD and openly call the citizens to vote for Dodik and its party, despite the fact that Dodik has long been synonymous with Serbian separatist activities in BiH (B92, 2010; Beta, 2010). Tadic and Dodik are known to be close friends.

Belgrade is opposing any form of restriction regarding the RS’s authority. In addition, influenced by Montenegro and Kosovo’s declarations of independence, the first one to yet again fuel the RS’s controversy was the former Serbian government of Vojislav Kostunica. In fact from the beginning Belgrade has tried to use RS as a trump card against the international community with the aim of keeping Kosovo under its territory (For more information on this issue see Türbedar, 2008).

Unlike Belgrade, since 2000 Croatia has been constantly reminding Bosnian Croats that their homeland is BiH, and that their capital isn’t Zagreb but Sarajevo. With this attitude, Croatia has proven that it could be a country of key importance in providing a peaceful and safe environment in the Western Balkans. Croatia was also been careful not to interfere into internal matters of BiH. However, it is also a fact that Croatia has not exerted serious efforts in the last decade for the problems in BiH to be sorted out and stability to be established. On the other hand, on January 12, 2011 Zagreb hosted leaders of HDZ BiH and the HDZ 1990, thus partially has break its silence regarding the Croats of BiH. Both the Croatian President, Ivo Josipovic and the former Croatian Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor gave support for these two parties to be part of the new government in BiH. In addition, Croatian officials have started to speak about the structural inequalities of the Croats in FBiH. Zagreb does not insist on the third entity for Croats, but also does not refuse requests for it. According to Ivo Banac, a Croatian historian, Zagreb is creating the impression that it started to accept the policy of Banja Luka as a reality, and he fears that Croatian policy at this time is collaborating with the project, which is extremely dangerous (Karabeg, 2012).

**What should be done?**

Last few years were lost years for BiH. Due to the lack of necessary advances in reforms, in terms of Euro-Atlantic integration this country started to lag
behind other countries in the region. Since last negotiations for constitutional amendments have come to a deadlock in 2009, the nationalist movement have gain more strength in the country. Still, there is not a consensus among citizens of BiH on what their country should look like as a state in the future, except for vague commitments to European integration. That’s why Washington and Brussels, including all other friendly countries of BiH, should insist more profoundly on plan to carry out constitutional changes in the country. This time, however, international community should be more focused on reaching an agreement on minimally acceptable parts. And getting agreement on the more comprehensive constitutional reform package should be left to the future generations, which hopefully will not be too much burdened with the consequences of the Bosnian War. But with the eventual amendments, reforms achieved since 2000 should also be incorporated into the constitution of BiH.

Instead of simultaneously bringing together three constitutional ethnic groups for negotiations, international community could perhaps first help in overcoming the existing issues between Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats. Whole BiH could benefit from transforming FBiH into the more functional entity. But before attempting this, international community should guarantee that after securing “new reconciliation” between Bosniaks and Croats and a common stand for the FBiH, that it will continue to act as a mediator or facilitator so as to broaden the reconciliation that would include Bosnian Serbs. Establishing of one independent Commission could be useful in terms of identifying which institutional arrangement can best accommodate both to the functionality of state and its economic development, and the different needs of the main Bosnian communities. But for getting success in this process, the Bosnian politicians have to stop with acting egoistically and defending just their ethnic interests, and try to be more constructive. As a matter of fact, the key problem of today’s Bosnia lies in the lack of willingness for taking seriously interests and the fears of others.

It would be beneficial if Belgrade and Zagreb put more efforts towards improving the political dialogue in the BiH. In particular, Serbia has to be aware that definitely will not become EU member as long as she says to Bosnian Serbs that their capital city is Sarajevo, and not Belgrade. In this respect, EU should develop more unique strategy with regard to BiH. Otherwise under existing conditions, with its policy of conditionality the EU couldn’t obtain sufficient results in at least one part of BiH. On the other hand, international community should not think about leaving from BiH in a short-term. Departure of foreigners would not mean dissolution of BiH,
but would under present conditions most likely further impede internal functioning of the country.

After reaching of a possible agreement on constitutional changes, more serious efforts should be done for changing the minds at least of the future generations. This can be partly achieved with the more control over media and with the reform in education system, in way that these two sources would be prevented of generating dividedness within society.

**CONCLUSION**

DPA has preserved territorial integration of BiH, but has created a dysfunctional state. Unfortunately, many Bosnian citizens are not worried about this. While some are using dysfunction of state as prove to demonstrate that BiH is failed country, others cite the need for the weakening of the entities in order to form more functional state. At the same time the ethnic politics continues to imperil the country, where main communities are not trying to understand demands from other sides.

While Bosnian Serbs are creating barriers to the functionality of the state and its institutions through legal and political tools, Bosnian Croats who believe that they were marginalized and that they cannot express themselves enough within the FBiH, feel gratitude for Dodik who supports forming a third entity for the Croats. Bosniaks do not support structuring according to ethnic lines, and are the ones who would like to transform BiH into the state where entities would be less competent then central institutions.

DPA does not provide right for a referendum on secession, nor right for creating new entity. Those who believe that the borders of BiH can be redrawn are mistaken. First and foremost, such a change cannot take place without a new war. However, no one in the region wants new wars. On the other hand, the influential countries of the world do not favor the idea of a disintegrated BiH.

Since the partitioning of BiH is not a good choice, politicians should focus on trying to find fair and lasting solutions without resorting to radical reforms. The basic challenge of nation building in BiH lies in establishing a basic consensus and framework that will give greater legitimacy and greater functionality to the state. The models which could be conducive to the emergence of separatist demands in the future must be kept at a distance.
The measures clearing the way for and speeding up BiH’s EU accession should constitute a minimum frame for having a consensus on.

Since Serbia and Croatia are among the guarantors of the DPA, their main role should be contributing to the stabilization of BiH. It would be good if Belgrade and Zagreb, when substantially improve their relations and raise them to a higher level, move to talk about how to stabilize BiH.

REFERENCES


Lagumdžija, Zlatko. Sarajevo, November 15, 2006, personal interview.


Zulfikarpašić, Adil. Sarajevo, November 14, 2006, personal interview.
Regional Security and Intelligence Cooperation in the Western Balkans and Global Asymmetric Threats
Di Rienzo, Stephen R., Damir Črnčec, Liliana Brožič
Nika Posavec

Democracy, Islam & Secularism in Turkey
Ahmet T. Kuru, Alfred Stepan
Marija Đorđeska
Di Rienzo (2011: 5) finds that the articles included “offer a glimpse at the depth and scope of the effect of globalization on nation-state security.” The contributions are based on four levels of analysis: individual, group, state and international. According to Di Rienzo (ibid.) “acknowledging the realities of non-traditional security challenges, nation-states are utilizing new opportunities for cooperation and exchanges.” The readers are thus encouraged to assess each article “with the intention of recognizing either an opportunity to view topics already influencing the course of their nation or to vigorously engage with them in counter-debate fashion” (ibid.).

The ten articles cover a wide range of issues relating to intelligence, terrorism, regional cooperation in Afghanistan, child soldiering and biological weapons, which are of great interest for those dealing with complex regional and global security issues. What the book amounts to is largely a collection of hypotheses, in which the authors strive to present and back with arguments the complexity of intelligence cooperation and the global asymmetric threats. Finally, it addresses a topic that concerns us all, notably individual, international and global security.

The book is good value for money. It is a turning point in a specific research field, mainly because it brings together in one single publication all aspects of security issues in the Western Balkans and global threats. The volume is thus an important and useful contribution for the target audience.

Fourteen different authors contribute to the variety of the volume. Karen Laino, Director of Intelligence NATO International Military Staff, focuses on the new intelligence paradigm, which is determined with at least seven key trends, as defined by Črnčec. Her conclusion is “that theoretic premises of the new intelligence paradigm are manifested through everyday experience in its specific area of work, and represent
new challenges” that need new solutions (Brožić 2011: 8).

Yili Zyla analyses the intelligence reform process in Albania since the change of the internal political regime. “The difficult transition to democracy and political crisis in 1997, together with the need to deepen the democratic reforms, especially in the intelligence service, deepened upon continuous interest of Albania to join NATO and the EU” (Zyla 2011: 19), and the reform of intelligence service has been an important part of the Security Sector Reform.

Ferdinand Odzakov emphasizes the importance of cooperation between intelligence experts in the field with a view to combating terrorism. Since 11 September 2001, intelligence services have been forced to adapt to the new modus operandi of terrorist groups. Terrorism is a threat that poses the greatest danger to human security, which is why the fight against terrorism has become the top priority in all intelligence services (Odzakov 2011: 31). He argues that “the intelligence can justify its existence only if it succeeds in collecting the information in order to prevent the execution of a terrorist act” (Odzakov 2011: 27).

National Security Agency of Montenegro (2011: 46) spotlights the problem relating to the definition of the concept of terrorism and the efforts invested by the international community to counter terrorism. The Agency differentiates among fourteen different types of terrorism (religious extremist, religious fundamentalist, political, sub national terrorism, etc.), defines the organizations of terrorist groups and tactics, and profiles terrorists. It also addresses the link between the media, religion and terrorism.

Nikola Božić focuses on general characteristics of security threats in South-East Europe. “The region is currently in a relatively stable phase of interstate relations regulation”; however, at the turn of the 20th century, the situation was quite different. The region was plagued by armed conflicts, post-conflict crises and inter-state disputes. Lack of economic security of the population, corruption, organized crime and weakness of state institutions present a risk of growing regional threats (Božić 2011: 60–63).

Uroš Svete, Faculty of Social Sciences, Damijan Guštin, Director of Institute of Contemporary History, and Damir Črnčec, Faculty for State and European Studies, examine two cases of contemporary conflicts, namely Afghanistan and Iraq, which are the focus of attention both in the global context and in Slovenia. According to them, the “supremacy of asymmetric conflicts in the contemporary period is both, a challenge and opportunity for Slovenia, to win recognition within the in-
ternational community” (Svete – Guštin – Črnčec 2011: 87).

John A. Wahlquist, Faculty of the National Defense Intelligence College, deals with the problem of interrogation of detainees in counterterrorism and the difference between Obama’s and Bush’s attitude towards different kinds of techniques of collecting information (Wahlquist 2011: 104–7).

Špela Boc, Ministry of Defense, writes about the activities of Slovenian service members and the engagement of Western Balkan countries in Afghanistan. “While Slovenia is dealing mainly with the question of its withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Western Balkans countries are discussing the issue of how to upgrade their participation and presence” and thus gaining more recognition (Boc 2011: 139).

Jennifer A. Davis zooms in on child soldiering in different countries of the world (Columbia, Rwanda, Uganda, etc.), which represents a critical human security issue. She finds (2011: 162) that “the issue impacts over 500,000 children worldwide and continues to occur in conflicts in over twenty-four countries around the world.”

Shannon M. Allan and Peter M. Leitner analyze the problem of publishing on synthetic biology without posing a threat to national security and without a risk of potential bioterrorism. They also address the societal issue of ethical responsibility to society and morale of scientists (Allan – Leitner 2011: 183–4).

The authors use different sources to back their arguments, citing mainly secondary but also a fair share of primary literature. Footnotes provide additional information that could prove useful to the reader. Some authors explain in more detail certain issues with the help of illustrations and charts.

The target audience of this book is the academic sphere whose field of interest consists of issues of regional security and global threats as well as the more general public concerned with the questions of security and specific threats such as terrorism, child soldiering and bioterrorism and the effects on their lives.

The book is an interesting conglom erate of different views on regional security, intelligence cooperation and more general global asymmetric threats. It presents a new way of dealing with the security sector cooperation in the Western Balkans and Afghanistan. It also offers a new way of assessing Slovenia’s engagement in Afghanistan. Overall, a book worth reading.
Democracy, Islam and Secularism in Turkey, by the editors Ahmet T. Kuru and Alfred Stepan, and sponsored by the Institute for Religion, Culture and Public Life, and Columbia University Press, comes to our aid in deciphering the complex Turkish reality which is further entrenched by the EU accession process. This work is a part of the series devoted to the investigation of the role of religion in society and culture today edited by Alfred Stepan and Mark C. Taylor.

Ahmet T. Kuru, also the author of Secularism and State Policies Toward religion: the United States, France and Turkeys (Cambridge University Press, 2009), and Alfred Stepan gathered the contributions of leading experts on the field that aimed to provide a more general discussion on Islam, secularism and democracy in the light of the fear of prevalence of AKP during the drafting of the new democratic constitution.

The book starts with the introduction of the editors and eight chapters follow. First chapter starts with the very roots of the evolution in the Ottoman Empire. In “Rethinking Ottoman Management of Diversity: What Can we Learn from Modern Turkey,” Karen Barkey, professor of Sociology and History at Columbia University and author of Empire of Difference (Cambridge UP, 2008), tackles the critical period and the relationship between Turkey’s and European history. Ottomans succeeded in creating a pre-modern form of religious accommodation. Is Turkey, as a successor of the Ottoman Empire, capable of reviving the heritage of the multicultural Ottoman Empire?

The authority on the political history of the late Ottoman era, M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, also a professor of Ottoman history at the department of Near Eastern studies at Princeton University and author of “Atatürk, An Intellectual Biography” (Princeton University Press, 2011), explains in the “Historical Roots of Kemalism” the heritage of the Young Turks within Kemalism, and the contem-
porary context of the Kemalist ideology. Thought the analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of Kemalism and with the same stubbornness as Kemalism tries to claim there is only one secularism. He, on the other hand, tries to understand why the contemporary notion of “multisecularisms,” is being constantly rejected.

Ergun Özbudun has the privilege to author two of the chapters in the book, the first being “Turkey – Plural Society and Monolithic State.” Putting at the center of the discussion the six principles of Kemalism, Özbudun is not afraid to expose the pluralistic nature of a unitary country, where the population of Alevi and Kurds constitutes at least one quarter of society, in a unitary country. He accuses the founders of Turkey of building a monolithic society according to their own image, not reflecting the reality and urges that there is a genuine need for reforms, which would take into account the pluralism at hand. Özbudun is also the president of an academic committee drafting a new constitution and author of The Constitutional System of Turkey: 1876 to the Present (Middle East Today, 2011), a work closely connected to his second contribution in chapter six.

The editors Ahmet T. Kuru and Alfred Stepan are starring in the fourth chapter. In “Laicité as an “Ideal Type” and Continuum: Comparing Turkey, France and Senegal,” they explain the notion of laicité as a continuum of a rainbow state policies toward religion and draw a comparison with other democracies in Muslim majority societies such as Indonesia and Senegal. There is a stark contrast between Senegal’s most religion-friendly policies and Turkish controlling and exclusionary practice called by the authors an “almost secular fundamentalism,” while France, where laicité has democratic root, state policies take the middle road.

Ümit Cizre was publicly criticized by the Turkey’s chief of general staff for editing a pioneering almanac on Turkey’s security sector and the lack of democratic control over it. But that didn’t stop her in contributing the fifth chapter “A New Politics of Engagement: The Turkish Military, Society and the AKP.” As a leading expert on Turkish military, she follows closely the transformation and the decline of the Turkey’s military (guardian) role in politic. For further reading, see her Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party (Routledge 2008).

Ergun Özbudun presents his point of view again in “The Turkish Constitutional Court and Political Crisis” in chapter number six. Özbudun is a harsh critic of the current constitution, which is the main legacy of the 1980 military coup. Mildly states, he is not a fan of the military. Accord-
ing to him, the Constitutional Court was designed to protect the ideology of the state against its citizens, and not the other way around as it should be. The constitutional crisis, started in 2007, already lead to many reforms, including the drafting of the new (sixth) civilian constitution. Can this development lead us to the full democracy of a majority-Muslim population? His opinion sheds light on the AKP view of the Constitutional Court – the only conservative party with religious roots, which survived the scrutiny of the Constitutional Court.

If the reader is interested in a unique and objective explanation of the EU accession process and the current situation, Joost Lagendijk and his article “Turkey’s Accession to the European Union and the Role of the Justice and Development Party” is the right answer. Lagendijk elaborates in the seventh chapter the topic in detail and puts on the table all the important facts, everyone should know. For him 2003-2004 was the period of the golden years, as the crucial timing for initializing reforms in Turkey. New reforms on minority rights, which do not fully satisfy yet the EU standards, do now escape his critical eye. Joost Lagendijk served as the joint chairman of the Turkey-EU Parliamentarians delegation from 2002 to 2009 and is also a Senior Advisor at the Istanbul Policy Center of Sabancı University.

The last, eight chapter of the book is a contribution by Stathis N. Kalyvas, an Arnold Wolfers Professor of Political Science and Director of the Program on Order, Conflict, and Violence at Yale University. In “The “Turkish Model” in the Matrix of Political Catholicism” Kalyvas boldly compares the AKP with the Christian Democrats in Germany on the ground of the peculiar combination typical for both. Turkey as a “model” has been one of the most cliché phrases in the politics after the Arab uprisings began, but Kalyvas does not fail to make a lively discourse on the contemporary experience of AKP in Turkey with the Catholic mobilization in the second half of the 19th Century Europe. Turkey is a model after all – a model of states that allow religion political activism in democratic context.

Democracy, Islam and Secularism is a useful contribution to the understanding of Turkey in the light of its evolvement in the last hundred years, with the emphasis on the new role of secularism, which enables a greater role of religion in public space. With all the elements at hand we are able to asses ourselves whether there is a new Turkey reemerging from the Kemalisitic vision of the state. The fundamental message where Turkey is heading can be understood by the overlapping of all of the eight articles. There are many great ideas on further reading and (re)discovering what Turkey symbolizes today.
Albania is a country of rich cultural-historic heritage, home to many archaeological sites from various periods – Greek, Roman, Venetian, Albanian, etc. Apollonia Archaeological Park is one of Albania’s sites with a significant value; the ancient Illyrian city was the biggest and most important one amongst 30 cities in the whole ancient world, which were named in honor of the God Apollo, originally founded in the territories of Illyrians Taulantis about 620 BC. The monuments of this city have 1000 years of history. These monuments are scattered around the park, making Apollonia the largest archaeological park in Albania.

The famous Roman orator Cicero, astonished by the beauty of Apollonia named it in his Philippics, *magna urbs et gravis* - a great and important city. Established in the 7th century B.C., by Greek settlers from Corinth and Corcyra, the ancient city is located 11 km to the west of the modern city of Fier.

Archaeological excavations have revealed that Apollonia achieved its zenith in the 4th – 3rd centuries B.C. In the first century B.C., Octavian Augustus studied philosophy there until he heard news of Caesar’s murder in the Senate and went on to become the next Roman emperor.

The city had a 4 km long surrounding wall encircling an area of 137 hectares. It has been estimated that during the developed stages of the city, 60,000 inhabitants lived inside its imposing walls. Among the most interesting monuments worth visiting are the Bouleterion (city council), the library, the triumphal arch, the temple of Artemis, the Odeon built in the 2nd century B.C., the two-storey 77 m long Stoa, a theatre with a capacity of ca. 10,000 spectators, and the Nymphaeum (a monumental water fountain covering an area of 2.000m2), which has been visited by the Roman emperor Sulla, as ancient sources indicate.
The city seems to have sunk with the rise of Vlora (Aoos) river, but already before suffered great destruction from several earthquakes and Gothic invasions. It was “rediscovered” by European classicists in the 18th century, though it was not until the Austrian occupation of 1916–1918 that the site was investigated by archaeologists. Their work was continued by a French team during 1924–1938. Parts of the site were damaged in the course of the Second World War. After the war, an Albanian team undertook further work from 1948 onwards, although much of the site remains unexcavated to this day. Unfortunately, during the anarchy that followed the collapse of the communist regime in 1990, the archeological collection was plundered and the museum was closed. The ruins were also frequently dug up by plunderers for relics to be sold to collectors abroad.

In December 2011 the Archaeological Museum of Apollonia National Park has reopened the doors after 20 years. 688 important objects and the large number of ancient coins make it among the richest museums in the country. The project of restoration of the archaeological museum has launched 3 years ago with a fund of 140 thousand dollars of UNESCO funding.

As the city was originally dedicated to Apollo, “God of music and poetry” the quote of John Keats would easily invite us to visit and be part of the magnificent park of Apollonia: »Much have I travelled in the realms of gold, / And many goodly states and kingdoms seen; / Round many western islands have I been / Which bards in fealty to Apollo hold.«

The creation of art spans over time is the lesson, which is to be heard time and again. The Balkans richness should be among the main sources of inspiration for the regions future perspective.

Anja Fabiani
GENERAL SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

ARTICLES
European Perspectives is a scientific journal that publishes original, peer-reviewed manuscripts that provide scientific articles focusing on relevant political, sociological, social, security, economic and legal as well as ethnic, cross-cultural, minority and cross-ethnical issues related to European and Euro-Atlantic integrations and South-Eastern Europe.

Manuscripts should be written in English, normally not exceed 8,000 words in length (including footnotes) and submitted in electronic version via e-mail to info@europeanperspectives.si, in the .doc format.

The journal reviews received manuscripts on the assumption of an exclusive submission: by submitting a manuscript for consideration, the author(s) warrant(s) that it is not simultaneously being considered by any other publication and that it shall not be sent to another publication until a response is received from the journal.

All texts submitted to the journal must be original works of the author(s). By submitting a manuscript, the author(s) warrant(s) to the journal that it does not infringe the copyright or any other rights of third parties.

When submitting the manuscript, please also attach:
- an abstract of 150–200 words, in English, stating precisely the topic under consideration, the method of argument used in addressing the topic, and the conclusions reached
- a list of up to six keywords suitable for indexing and abstracting purposes
- a full postal and e-mail address of the author. If the manuscript is co-authored, then please provide the requested information about all the authors.

PEER REVIEW
All manuscripts are checked by referees by means of a double-blind peer review. Two external referees review each manuscript. European Perspectives reserves the right to reject any manuscript as being unsuitable in topic, style or form without requesting an external review.

REFERENCES
In the text, refer to the name(s) of the author(s) (without initials, unless there are two authors with the same name) and year of publication. Unpublished data and personal communications (interviews etc.) should include initials and year. For example: Since Bull (1977) has shown that ... This is in results attained later (Buzan - Jones - Little 1993: 117). As contemporary research shows (Wendt 1992), states are the ...
Publications by the same author(s) in the same year should be identified with a, b, c (2005a, 2005b) closed up to the year and separated by commas. Publications in references that include different authors should be separated by a semicolon: (Miller 1994a: 32, 1994b; Gordon 1976). If the year of first publication by a particular author is important, use the form: (e.g. Bull 1977/2002: 34). If there are two authors of a publication, separate the names by ‘-’ (not ‘and’ or ‘&’). If there are more than two authors, put the name of the first author followed by ‘et al.’, or write all names separated with ‘-’ (four authors maximum).

References to unauthorized data from periodicals may be given in brackets in the text together with the exact page(s). For example: '(quoted in International Security (Summer 1990): 5). ' If such a reference is included in the reference list, the title of the contribution referred to must be provided, and a short title without inverted commas and a year of publication is used for in-text-referencing (e.g. short title year). As a general rule, an exact web address of a particular article can be substituted for its exact page(s).

List of References should appear at the end of the manuscript, listed alphabetically by author’s surname.

**Book Reviews**

European Perspectives welcomes reviews of recently published books (i.e. those published in the year in which the current issue of European Perspectives was published or in the previous year). Authors should submit reviews of works relating to political science and other social sciences with the themes focused on (East) Central European issues.

When submitting a book review, authors should abide by the following requirements:

- A book review should not exceed 1,500 words.
- State clearly the name of the author(s), the title of the book (the subtitle, if any, should also be included), the place of publication, the publishing house, the year of publication and the number of pages.
- If the reviewed book is the result of a particular event (a conference, workshop, etc.), then this should be mentioned in the introductory part of the review.
- Review authors should describe the topic of the book under consideration, but not at the expense of providing an evaluation of the book and its potential contribution to the relevant field of research. In other words, the review should provide a balance between description and critical evaluation. The potential audience of the reviewed work should also be identified.
- An exact page reference should be provided for all direct quotations used in reviewing the book.

For further instructions on submission of manuscripts, please visit the journal website at http://www.europeanperspectives.si.
Ernest Petrič et al.
**Slovenski diplomati v slovanskem svetu (Slovene Diplomats in Slavic Countries)**
Price: € 40

This is an excellent and rare book which analyses and reflects the role of Slovene diplomats in the Slavic countries up till 1990. The main message of the book is that Slavic component is part of the Slovene diplomatic experience. It has contributed to enhanced diplomatic relations between the Republic of Slovenia and several Slavic countries. Contributions are published in Slovene, Czech and Russian languages. The book was published as part of the *Personae* series of the *Studia diplomatica Slovenica* collection.

Andrej Rahten
**Izidor Cankar – diplomat dveh Jugoslavij (Izidor Cankar – A Diplomat of Two Yugoslavias)**
Price: € 40

The biography *Izidor Cankar – A Diplomat of Two Yugoslavias* is an account of the diplomatic career of Izidor Cankar in the first and second Yugoslav states. The book outlines Slovenia’s progress from the end of the 19th century to the late 1950s in broad social terms as part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the monarchist and communist Yugoslavias. Special attention is given to the international point of view – debates on the Slovenian issue in correspondence involving Slovenian diplomats serving at Yugoslav missions. The book was published as part of the *Personae* series of the *Studia diplomatica Slovenica* collection.
Franc Rozman

**Baron Josef Schwegel – spomini in pisma (Baron Josef Schwegel – Memories and Letters)**

Price: € 34

The book *Baron Josef Schwegel – Memories and Letters* contains an autobiography of Baron Josef Schwegel and his notes from the Congress of Berlin. The book sheds light on Schwegel’s work in diplomacy and foreign affairs based on his memoirs and the letters he wrote his wife when he was a member of the Austro-Hungarian delegation at the Congress of Berlin. The book was published as part of the *Personae* series of the *Studia diplomatica Slovenica* collection.

Ernest Petrič

**Slovenci v očeh Imperija - Priročniki britanskih diplomatov na Pariški mirovni konferenci leta 1919**

(*Slovenes in the Eyes of an Empire – Handbooks of the British Diplomats Attending the Paris Peace Conference of 1919*)

Price: € 35

The book *Slovenes in the Eyes of an Empire – Handbooks of the British Diplomats Attending the Paris Peace Conference of 1919* includes a collection of handbooks prepared by the Historical Section at the British Foreign Office for the Versailles peace conference in 1919. Political analyses, texts containing historical and general information (Slovenes, the Yugoslav movement, the Austrian Primorska (Littoral) and Kansan (Carniola) regions, Koroška (Carinthia), Štajerska (Styria)) that were intended to help shape British policy on Central and Southern Europe following World War I. The book was published as part of the *Fontes* series of the *Studia diplomatica Slovenica* collection.
Ernest Petrič

Zunanja politika – Osnove teorije in praksa (Foreign Policy - Basic Theory and Practice)

Price: € 45

The author, an experienced professor of international law, ambassador with remarkable career and currently the president of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia, presents in this book a comprehensive overview of foreign policy. He combines in-depth theoretical expertise and long year experience both in foreign policy decision-making process and in its exercising through diplomatic means. This monograph is the first of its kind in Slovene language and represents a pioneering contribution to science.

Andrej Rahten, Janez Šumrada (ed.)

Velikih pet in nastanek Kraljevine Srbov, Hrvatov in Slovencev (Les Grands Cinq et la création du Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes)

Price: € 35

Book is based on the research in the archives of the Great Powers for the period 1918–1920, with a focus on the Slovenian role in re-defining the borders of Europe at the Paris Peace Conference. For the first time in one place and on the basis of primary sources, the research describes the policy of the “Big Five” – the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan – towards the establishment of the Yugoslav state.
ARTICLES

EUROPEANISATION FACES balkanisation: 
Political Conditionality and Democreatisation - 
CROATIA AND MACEDONIA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE - 
Roxana Mihaila

NUCLEAR ENERGY IN BULGARIA: 
Strategic Implications for the EU and Russia 
Elvira Oliva, Paolo Sorbello

UKRAINE-NATO: THE DISSONANCE OF EXPECTATIONS 
Katerina V. Malshina

GEOPOLITICS & ORGANIZED CRIME AND CORRUPTION IN THE EARLY 21ST CENTURY WITH REFERENCE TO THE BALKANS 
Blageje Grahovac

EURO BALKAN BROTHERHOOD IN NEW MILLENNIUM 
(Foreign Policy Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia towards the Republic of Serbia (2000-2011)) 
Petra Bregant