Ukraine-NATO: The Dissonance of Expectations

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ABSTRACT
The main aim of this paper is to examine the Ukraine-NATO problem as an aspect of the EU-Ukraine problem through researching the three waves of the NATO expansion and analyzing the modern geopolitical situation around Europe, particularly on its East. The investigation of factors affecting the NATO-Ukraine relations make clear the complicated relations within NATO, connected with the new U.S. geostrategic visions and the Russian factor as the key point on the North East borders of NATO, influence on Ukraine’s destiny in Europe. On this way the NATO interests are intertwined with the EU interests. This leads to an understanding the NATO expectations with Ukraine are to stimulate Russia to closer engagement with the West. The traditions of Ukrainian political, social, economic and national-cultural life do not make hard neither pro-European, nor pro-Russian choice, but in a contemporary geopolitical context the way to join NATO is the way to get the real independence, the reliable security institutions, the democratic, non-criminalized, non-corrupted society and to join the European Union.

KEYWORDS
NATO expansion, NATO-Ukraine, European integration, European Union, Ukraine

INTRODUCTION
The variety of the relations in the process of European integration of Ukraine in opinion of the leading actors of the world politics is so broad and this diversity has got a room for the Ukraine–NATO storyline. The historical analysis and philosophical comprehension of this process gives an unexpected understanding that European integration is primarily a natural and proper aspiration of the Ukrainian society to be a part of the European world - namely, to be a part of a culture, education, law, economics, freedom in general.

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The modern European world was created by the European society, which has overcome État up to the end of XIX century, has thrown off its yoke and has begun creating not a state political world, but the human political world. That’s why namely Ukrainian society should be seen as a real participant in solving of the Ukraine-EU problem from its side. This is the only condition for the success of this integration, because the aspirations of the educated free person is the constant quality. Within understanding the problem of the Ukrainian-EU relations in this way, it becomes possible to analyze the “Ukraine-NATO” speculative construction.

Examining the Ukraine-NATO problem, and, in a wider sense, the European integration perspectives of Ukraine, some questions should be answered. What experience can Ukraine gain from researching the three waves of the NATO expansion? What does the modern geopolitical situation around Europe require from NATO, particularly on the East? What factors do affect the NATO-Ukraine relations? What does NATO expect from Ukraine? What are Ukraine’s intentions on its way to NATO?

THE WAVES OF NATO EXPANSION IN BRIEF

I. The prospect of the accession of new members was established from the very beginning of the Alliance in the main document - the North Atlantic Treaty (Article 10).

In 1950 with the start of the Korean War the important decisions were done, which created the conditions for the enlargement by accepting new members, despite the fact such actions would envisage amendments to the treaty. The defining decision was done in September 1950 to create Allied Commander in Europe and to accept the “forward strategy”. The essence of the “forward strategy” was any aggression must be resisted as far as possible to ensure the defense of all European NATO members.

Greece and Turkey - the first countries which expressed their wish – joined NATO in 1952. It imposed the strategic obligations on Alliance, which expanded to both the Middle East and the Caucasus. The move provided an opportunity to respond to the Israeli-Egyptian relations. In addition, Turkey had common borders with the USSR and Bulgaria and gave control over the international situation in the socialist camp from South. NATO has got the Black Sea window.
The next, the question of NATO membership of Spain did repeatedly discuss since 1952, when Portugal has put forward such a proposal in connection with the adoption of Turkey and Greece to the ranks of the Alliance. Since 1980 discussions on this issue has become particularly active. The reason was several circumstances.

First, the duration of the agreement on U.S. military bases in Spain has ended. In this respect Spain was necessary to identify - either to get rid of the foreign military presence and to become a neutral country, or to formalize the involvement to the common security structures via NATO membership.

Second, because of France's resistance Spain could not join the European Economic Community and therefore considered NATO membership as a possible mechanism to overcome this resistance. With the support of the United States Spain joined NATO in six months after applying for membership - in May 1982.

Thus, we can now make two conclusions: to 1990 NATO enlargement was already depended on the location of the conflict nearest to Europe and was somehow connected with an accession to the EU.

After the Cold War, the main problem for NATO was the absence of vision of the continuing role of NATO. However, the Alliance still was the most effective mechanism for European involvement of the U.S. The process of forming of new areas for development of NATO was pushed by the enhance of Germany's patronage over Central and Eastern Europe, particularly The Visegrád Group countries, and the failure of UN, OSCE and EU efforts to stop the war in the Balkans.

In January 1994 (the time of the culmination of the conflict in the Balkans) the Brussels Summit has confirmed the openness of NATO membership for other European countries. To prevent the military integration of European countries independently from U.S., several mechanisms were involved in, and between them Partnership for Peace (PfP).

During 1995 the process of studying all aspects of future expansion has resulted in “Study on NATO Enlargement”. Thus the main purpose of the further expansion was formed – the improving security and the increasing stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. The study has formulated the first conditions to be completed for a country to receive an invitation. States in-
volved in ethnic conflicts or external territorial disputes had to resolve such conflicts in a peaceful way in accordance to OSCE principles. An important factor was the ability of the countries to make a military contribution to the collective defense, peacekeeping and other missions.²

Between other reasons for initiating the process was to support the “NA- TO-centered” European security system. It required the open expansion of the NATO membership, so it would be perceived as a process, not as an event. First, if NATO has announced the only time expansion, as France was proposing, it would mean a new division of spheres of influence. Partnership for Peace, devoid of the possibility of NATO membership, would lose its effectiveness and would be encouraged to find the geopolitical alternatives. Second, an important element of the expansion of the first “wave” was lobbying the process by the leading Western arms manufacturers. Each new member of NATO would have to spend much of his budget for the technical re-armament and the military equipment of the western production. This provided the necessary pressure for the NATO expansion from the side of military production companies, particularly in the U.S.

Despite the fact the intensive political dialogue on issues of membership took place with many other countries at the Madrid summit in 1997, only Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic were invited to begin accession talks with NATO. The choice was not accidental even in terms of historical contradictions of these countries with the Soviet Union in different periods of the postwar socialist history, when they openly expressed their dissatisfaction of the imposed socialism. They acted according to PfP program. This invitation marked the beginning of the so-called first wave of NATO expansion since the end of the Cold War.

At jubilee 50th anniversary summit in April 1999 the Alliance has met in a larger format. April 1999 was not accidental date also from other side - NATO still needed the support of the Central European countries in connection with NATO’s aggression in the Balkans. NATO accompanied the first step of its expansion by the creation of a new system of international relations that does not allow this organization to give up the next steps.

But on the next phase of an expansion a slightly different (“slow”) approach was used. Basically, it was caused by the vision of the security challenges and risks that were outlined in the new Strategic Concept in 1999. This Concept

was caused by the internal European risk, for which the Milošević’s government was considered. Security of Alliance, as said in Conception, depends on numerous military and non-military risks within and outside of the Atlantic region, which are multivector and hardly provisioned and can quickly acquire the large scale. Some counties in Euro-Atlantic area and beyond it are experiencing severe economic, social and political difficulties, and it can lead to a local or even a regional instability. As a result, a tension appears, which can affect the Euro-Atlantic stability.\(^3\)

Thus, the internal structure of European countries - namely, an advanced democracy and a market economy was considered as the basis for the security and stability in Europe. Therefore, the purpose of NATO as a security organization would be to promote the necessary changes. If the country did not meet Western standards of a democracy and a market economy and didn’t demonstrate a willingness to change, it became a threat to NATO. Here we see again: the entry into the EU only after joining NATO is conceptually justified. The spread of an opinion, that the slower is the enlargement process, the greater transforming effect will be to applicants from Eastern Europe, has led to the adoption of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) on Washington Summit in 1999.

The first “wave” - the accession of Poland, Czechia and Hungary to NATO - was probably very difficult for the countries-candidates. The methods of making the conditions, procedures and tools of the NATO expansion towards the post-Soviet space, existing today, were elaborated on their experience. These countries came out the socialist camp with the minimal losses and the great economic potential, and this caused the main feature of the first expansion wave: the priorities were the political and military-industrial interests, the focus of attention were the political reforms in countries-aspirants and their willingness to purchase new weapons\(^4\)

NATO’s aims at the moment have been quite clear: to protect new markets and the reservation of the relatively cheap labor for Western manufacturers. In addition, it was a successful attempt to break the former European socialist camp finally and to enlist the support of its most populous Central European part of anti-Serbian military operation.

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Now we can identify the following main criteria of the first wave of the NATO expansion: the expansion continued to depend on the location of the nearest conflict to the European Union, and was conceptually related to the accession to it. Also important were the actual neutrality after the release of Warsaw Treaty Organization, the powerful economic potential for conversion of military capabilities to NATO standards and the public opinion of the countries-aspirants related to their former powerful totalitari-rist ally. In geopolitical terms NATO has entered the common border with Russia due to Poland. Overall, NATO was entered by the countries with a population of more than 55 million people.

II. The second wave of the NATO expansion after the Cold War seemed to be not so certain as the previous one. It was no coincidence - the organization was not ready for the further expansion because the analysis of the situation in Europe and especially in post-socialist countries-aspirants after the aggression in Serbia took a time. Nevertheless after the Washington Summit Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Slovakia, Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania joined the MAP. The development of the MAP has moved the process and has put NATO into conditions in which the non-accession of the new members in 2002 would seriously undermine the credibility of the Alliance.

And clearly, the catalyst for the next major change in NATO’s policy on enlargement and its relations with Russia occurred after the attacks of 11 September 2001.

In broader terms, for the formation of plans of the further enlargement the strategy and military capabilities of the candidates become relevant again, now in the context of the global fight against terrorism. Democracies and market economies remain prerequisites of a membership, but at the moment they lost absolute importance. In November 2002 at Prague summit, the NATO leaders invited seven countries - Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania to join the Alliance.

Along with their invitation NATO has launched a large-scale transforma-
tion, whose mission was to respond to the new threats, like a terrorism, asymmetric threats and other. This program was to change the methods of providing of the NATO operations and to increase the effectiveness of NATO. The meaning to invite a large number of new members was, in that number, the creation of the necessary conditions for such a reform.
29 March 2004 that seven countries became NATO members officially. The strategic importance of the Baltic republics is apparent - Russia was practically cut off Kaliningrad region, the main export oil terminals were taken “under the protection” of NATO. Bulgaria and Romania have brought seaports, naval bases and other in the Black Sea region.

Countries of the second “wave”, which joined NATO in April 2004, have operated under the MAP already. Moreover, the second “wave” was the unprecedentedly great: so many countries have never entered NATO before. It has much increased the area of responsibility, which operates on Article 5 of North Atlantic Treaty. This was causing some difficulties and concerns about if it would weaken NATO. There were some questions whether these countries are “suppliers” and not “users” of the security, or it would make the transatlantic unity upset in the process of reaching a consensus in making political decisions.

During the NATO decision-making on the second “wave”, the growing military interests have become more important than the military-industrial ones, and the decisive points were the creation of the military units capable for the new mission and a modernization of a military infrastructure, necessary to sustain the collective actions. Changing priorities have brought to the fore the main motive of the enlargement – the recursive improvement of the Euro-Atlantic security at whole.5

Thus, we may find the following main criteria for the second wave of enlargement: the enlargement has got the Eurasian direction, which has not been clearly tied to close peripherals of the EU. The clear dominance of U.S. interests and the use of NATO as an instrument of intervention in international affairs deep in the Middle East has become clear. Since the entire region from Iran to India was and is traditional zone of Russia’s interests, also important was that NATO actually went to the line of the former border of the Russian Empire. As the total number of people involved, since 2004 under the protection of NATO became more than 43 million of the new European citizens.

III. Since the Alliance has remained door open, the third “wave” of enlargement occurred 1 April 2009 on the eve of the new jubilee 55th summit of the alliance, where Albania and of Croatia were first presented as NATO members.

5 Брежнева, Тетяна (2005), с.9.
Countries of the third “wave” also operated under the MAP. However, the third “wave” was small: first, no significant changes in the global international situation, no significant conflicts within the NATO range as well; only thing was the continuing monitoring of the situation in the Middle East, and here a crucial point seemed to be the forthcoming elections in Afghanistan.

In addition to NATO’s overall objectives to secure the European investments in the Balkans, the stabilization and securing the borders of the Alliance at its South East, the Western Balkans, became apparent. At whole, both countries have slightly less than 8 million people. But both Croatia and Albania have a huge naval superiority in the Mediterranean due to their shoreline. Thus, NATO now has all Adriatic coast as a dump on the way to South and East and maintains control of an unstable Central Balkan region, especially around Kosovo. For the sake of this the Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO (IPAP) was given to Serbia at Strasbourg summit in April 2009 (in addition to Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2008).

To the features of the third wave we can include the revitalization of aspirations of the NATO membership for the Caucasus. The Black Sea-Caspian region was recognized by NATO as one of the particular strategic importance for NATO in June 2004 at Istanbul summit.

From the Caucasus countries Georgia was looked most promising to join NATO, first, in political terms, because of the new democratic regime, which today is essential point. At autumn 2007 the withdrawal of Russian military bases from Georgia was finished. The country has a special geostrategic position. But it has its positive and negative sides.

The positive strategic importance has a few aspects. Militarily and politically, it is the Black Sea, the ability to resolve regional conflicts and to prevent potential terrorist activities in the Middle East from this territory. The economic aspect is an access to Caspian oil and a security of its transporting routes.

The negative side was, first of all, an unresolved conflict between Georgia and its former autonomies South Ossetia and Abkhazia, both self-declared
in 2008. Second, according to Georgian experts, the potential entry of Georgia into NATO would fundamentally change the strategic situation in the Caucasus, in the vicinity of sensitive borders of Russia and in the zone of its vital interests. Therefore, in January 2009 Russia has begun “the formation of military presence” in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Third, Georgia’s joining the MAP could dramatically change the political environment throughout the South Caucasus. This could cause a sharp intensification of Iran in this region, because Iran does not want to let any form of NATO infrastructure be close to its borders.

That’s why the rates of expansion were now restrained. The planned expansion has not affected Georgia and Ukraine yet, which received only vague promises instead of a MAP at that time. The main reason for this were: the contradictions of views on the accession of Ukraine between blocks within NATO, and the advantage of “old Europe” group, as well as the open resistance of Russia to this process. Strong the U.S.’ attempts coupled with a “new Europe” group in lobbying of interests of Ukraine have failed at the time. As for Georgia, in April 2009 on the anniversary summit of NATO in Strasbourg, in its final declaration the NATO members have reaffirmed unequivocal support for Georgia’s territorial integrity and urged the Russian Federation to revoke the decision to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, calling them the regions of Georgia. In fact, this NATO statement has initiated a new round of international legal theoretical discussion of partially recognized states and has directly intervened in the sphere of Russian interests in the Caucasus.

The third “wave” was probably no less difficult than the first one. On the one hand, stereotypes of 1990s of the immunity of the post-Soviet space to outside interference have been overcome. The experience of the bound states have been developed and repeatedly tested in practice. Alliance’s priorities have remained in the field of the military-industrial and anti-terrorism interests: at the strategic views towards the East it would be dangerous to leave the unstable Central Balkan situation in the rear.

However, the controversy within the Alliance, provoked by the global economic crisis, the consequences of the Eurointegration of the countries of the second wave of NATO enlargement and the euro zone crisis showed itself. In addition, NATO suspended its intentions regarding Ukraine and Georgia under Russian pressure. Both points have actually indicated the serious crisis inside and outside NATO, and have possibly encouraged to review its strategic provisions relating to the balance of power on the Eurasian continent.

Ukraine Studies The Challenges of Being ‘In Between’

Expectations of NATO on Ukraine are quite transparent if we consider the process of the NATO expansion in retrospective, through 3 waves of its expansion.

The situation with Ukraine at the moment of appearance of the idea to join NATO (and until 2010) looked very similar to other former socialist countries: Ukraine has a large army based on an universal conscription, its own military-industrial complex and rich resources, a democratic government and the broad nationalist movement, historically directed against the Russian intervention. The agreement on Russian military base in Sevastopol ended in 2017, and Ukraine is conveniently located towards the conflicts close to the EU — the Balkan crisis and the situation around the oil-bearing Middle East region. In case Ukraine joins NATO the Russian involvement in these affairs would have been actually isolated from west.

But there were internal features which distinguish Ukraine from those states. Due to several waves of migrations and assimilations, the Holodomor of 1932-1933, as well as military operations on its territory during of Ukraine being a part of the Rzeczpospolita, the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, Ukraine has the complicated national-cultural, demographic and socio-economic history. This is reflected on the significant differences of East and West Ukraine, which are attaining more polarity, especially bearing in mind the size of a territory and population, when it is going about the geopolitical interests of the Ukrainian people.

Another important factor was and still is the stay in one state together with the Russian people from the ancient times that connects people not only geopolitically but at all levels of communication, including a clannish one.
In addition, the Ukrainians are less prone to a communality, collectivism and authoritarianism in the state system than the Russians, with their own nationally oriented and democratic elite, in religious confessions they are closer to the Russian Orthodoxy (which center was originally in Kiev), but culturally they are closer to Europe than to Russia or Asia. “This is not to say that Ukraine is an unstable state, it suggests neither pro-European nor pro-Russian choice of Ukraine is not rigidly defined.”

And do not forget about the external factor - Ukraine is the sphere of vital interests of Russia.

The Russian factor weakly manifested in the cases of all previous former socialist countries. Now NATO encroached on the space of the CIS. Georgia was the first who left the CIS in August 2008, Ukraine could become the first in the CIS, which doomed it to collapse in case of leaving.

One of the problems concerning the NATO-Ukraine-Russia relations is crystallized in the Black Sea area. Most states in the region (Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania) are already NATO members. Both Georgia and Ukraine’s joining the Alliance would shut a ring.

The second problem - the West’s attention to the Caucasus, as the basis for control of the Middle East from the north, where NATO is trying to replace Russia. “The events in the Caucasus allow one to conclude Russia’s intentions are unambiguous - to prevent the possibility of geopolitical connection of Central Asia with Europe via the Caucasus, which means to achieve a monopoly on the role of an integrator of continental Europe and Asia. Russia is ready to do its best for that.”

In addition, in the cases of Ukraine and Georgia the main irritant for Russia is anti-Russian basis of their desire to join NATO. Ukraine and Georgia really have reasons for a hostility to Russia, both historical and contemporary ones. Russia continued to interfere in their politics since the declarations of their independence in the early 1990s. In both cases it was based on national minorities to impact on elections results. In the case of Georgia it came to the self-declaration of independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in August 2008 and the formation of the Russian military presence

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13 Вторая волна расширения НАТО и трансформация постсоветского пространства: взгляд из Украины (2005), Національний інститут стратегічних досліджень, Дніпропетровськ, с.107.
there. Ukraine has more than 17% of Russian-speaking population, generally concentrated in its eastern regions bordering Russia, and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, where the Russians are 60%.

It’s impossible to deny that Russia is a good guarantee of the collective security also. But the strong oligarchy and the insufficient development of Russian capitalism and especially in agriculture, a corruption and a criminalization of the political elite as an inheritance of Stalin’s times are not that attractive features for Ukraine.

Therefore, Georgia continues its way to NATO. Enrollment of Georgia in the list of NATO Aspirant Countries has been known at the Ministerial in December 2011.\textsuperscript{15} Georgia was mentioned in a group of states acting MAP, and it gave a hope to the Georgian side to get the MAP program at Chicago NATO summit in spring 2012.\textsuperscript{16}

But in Ukraine, with the advent of the new presidential administration, the European integration process went quite a different scenario.

NATO’s views on Ukraine as a future brother in arms have never been straightforward and one-dimensional, too. Three waves of expansion in parallel with the acquisition of the experience of the European integration of Central and Eastern European countries joined NATO and the economic crisis of recent years have caused the split within NATO and it became apparent.

Ukraine’s accession to NATO was supported - the U.S. and UK, and the group of “new Europe” with them.\textsuperscript{17}

The main U.S. strategic intentions are reflected in public speeches and publications of one of the key architects of U.S. strategy during the Cold War Zbigniew Brzezinski. During the last decade he expressed his views on this subject, which summed up in his new book, “Strategic Vision: America and the crisis of global power”. In his speeches and interviews that preceded the publication of this book, Brzezinski outlined the main strategic goals of the

\textsuperscript{17} ‘Франция против присоединения Украины к ПДЧ в НАТО’ (2008), РБК-Україна (1 April): available at http://www.rbc.ua/rus/top/show/frantsiya_protiv_prisoedineniya_ukrainy_k_pdch_v_nato_010420081.
U.S., and towards Ukraine in that number.

As Brzezinski says, the idea of an expanded West with both Russia and Turkey included would be an important element contributing to greater global stability. An enlarged West - in which the U.S. plays the role of balancer in Asia - would be better able to forge constructive policies to cope with global issues.\textsuperscript{18} So “the US should prod Europe to bring both Russia and Turkey into an enlarged West”.\textsuperscript{19}

Undoubtedly, in the new concept of the United States Ukraine has not its own role, in Brzezinski’s article it was named one of 8 geopolitically endangered species.\textsuperscript{20} It has to be involved in European integration and to be a guider of Russia in this process. According to Brzezinski, «a western policy that encourages Ukraine’s closer ties with the EU is the essential precursor to as well as stimulus for Russia’s eventual closer engagement with the West».\textsuperscript{21}

The U.S. has consistently followed this way.

Supporting of Ukraine for further NATO membership has begun in 2002. The certain decisions of the Prague summit gave hope that Ukraine join the MAP soon. On the eve of the Istanbul summit in June 2004 Ukraine has adopted the Military Doctrine, which contained the ultimate goal – joining NATO. The collaboration went really good during the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko, and Ukraine joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) and met many conditions on the way to NATO. At that time, in 2005-2009, it was clear that the U.S. really lobbies the interests of Ukraine in NATO, despite the strong resistance within NATO.

The question of the accession of Turkey to the EU also have finally started to move. The country formally applied for the EU membership in April 1987, but it took 12 years to obtain candidate status in Helsinki Summit in 1999. After the Brussels summit in October 2005 European Council has begun negotiations for Turkey membership in the EU.


\textsuperscript{20} Brzezinski Zbigniew (2012): 8 Geopolitically Endangered Species. Foreign Policy (Jan/Feb)

In early March 2009 the “reset” of relations between Russia and the United States was declared, which was partly based on good personal relations between the new presidents of the states-competitors - Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev. Within the “reset” Russia joined the WTO with the assistance of the U.S. In April 2010 in Prague President Barack Obama signed the Treaty between Russia and the United States on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

Apparently, the U.S. do sequentially pursues policies in accordance with its new vision of the situation in the world.

Continental members, that “Old Europe” group, have consistently resisted Ukraine to join the Alliance. Between that countries there are France, Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal. Each country had its own reasons for this attitude.

For France, Belgium and Germany (and Germany has its own position on the issue) this is a Russian factor, because the relations with Russia are more important that’s why Ukraine’s membership in NATO could be sacrificed. Most accurately this view was expressed by the foreign minister of France, Francois Fillon. He noted that France opposed the accession of Ukraine and Georgia to MAP in connection with Russia’s position because it is the wrong answer to the balance of power in Europe, in particular between Russia and Europe. Besides of that, the U.S. support is important for France, however, on its opinion, this support has always looked like a pressure and an obtrusion of American position.

For Germany, special economic relations with Russia (Russian gas is 40% in the overall balance of Germany’s consumption of a gas) affects the German position on Ukraine.

For Italy, Portugal and Spain this is creation of an image of Ukraine as a country supplying the illegal immigration, which is perceived as a source of the “soft risk”.

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23 ‘Франция против присоединения Украины к ПДЧ в НАТО’ (2008), РБК-Україна (1 April): available at http://www.rbc.ua/rus/top/show/frantsiya_protiv_prisoedineniya_ukrainy_k_pdch_v_nato_010420081.
24 Брежнява, Тетяна (2005), с.54.
UKRAINE GOES TO EUROPE PER ASPERA AD ASTRA

For the Ukrainian public joining NATO is still a controversial issue. Like most of the Slavic countries of Central and Eastern Europe, we got the independence only 20 years ago, after about 650 years of dependency. The rich resources of the country, a big population, the high quality education provides hope that the state could develop in an internationally neutral non-block condition. But the geopolitical location of Ukraine and its traditional historical ties avert the possibility in this globalizing world.

Certainly, in the modern polypolar world, in conditions of the existence of the non-military threats of asymmetric nature any state is unable to ensure the security of the state house on its own. NATO is an organization that has proven its ability to guarantee the collective security. NATO could adapt to new realities, introducing a broad transformation of its structures. It does also expand the scope of responsibility of the Euro-Atlantic area by accepting new members and the distribution of this area all over the northern hemisphere. So NATO has transformed from a collective defense organization to a collective security organization.

If to listen to the opinion of the Ukrainians, now more in terms of the Ukrainian-speaking and the “consciously Ukrainian” Ukrainians, for the Orange majority of Ukrainian population joining NATO is not likely to join some military alliance and to participate in the event of war. The main thing for us - an opportunity to get the actual, real independence, from the former USSR in the person of the Russian Federation.

Another reason for the necessity of NATO membership is that the process of integration into the Euro-Atlantic security structure is the fulfillment of certain conditions, initiated by the Membership Action Plan. The fulfillment of these requirements, even without joining NATO, encourage the development of the country’s democratic system, the establishment of reliable security institutions, the rule of law, the spread of democratic values and civil society. It would guarantee the national identity and the unity of the Ukrainian nation, the national culture and the culture of national minorities of Ukraine. An important conclusion is that on this way the democratic changes in Ukraine does not need so much for joining NATO or the EU, as long as they are the choice of Ukraine, of the Ukrainian people which will live in a democratic, economically developed country. Joining NATO and the process of reforming of the certain areas, which precedes the accession, only promote this basic goal of Ukraine.
Furthermore, the NATO membership is still the main condition for joining the European Union. That’s why supporters of European integration, which came to power in Ukraine in late 2004, managed to speed up the process. Ukraine’s aspiration to integration was reflected in the foreign policy of the country with the new president Viktor Yushchenko, who made the program applications for four major tasks: getting a country’s market economy status, the accession to the WTO, an associate EU member status, and the EU member status. During his presidency Ukraine has fulfilled half of these tasks. The recognition of Ukraine as a market economy was 1 December 2005, and 16 May 2008 country became the 152nd member of WTO. Resolution of the European Parliament in January 2005 has urged the country to provide a clear perspective on the possibility of EU membership.

However, despite the continued support for Ukraine’s membership of the European parliamentarians, European Parliament resolutions tone reflects the assessment of the political situation and development of democracy in the country with a new president. Back in February 2010, after new presidential elections the European Parliament resolution has proposed to recognize Ukraine’s right to apply for the EU membership and to develop an action plan to abolish visa regime for Ukraine. Six months later, 25 November 2010 the resolution criticized the election law changes, problems with the media, violations of human rights and freedoms and the SBU interference in the democratic process. From February 2011 the Head of the EU Delegation to Ukraine, Jose Manuel Teixeira stated many times that at present Ukraine does not meet the minimum requirements to discuss EU membership. The EU - Ukraine Summit worked in Kiev at December 19, 2011, the results were: no signing of association agreements or agreements on Free Trade Area. Discussing these results, Teixeira said the association agreement between Ukraine and the EU might not be initialed if the situation with democracy will not improve.25

The Russian factor plays a crucial role in this. As Zbigniew Brzezinski says, "Kiev’s relationship with Moscow has been as prone to tension as its relationship with the West has been prone to indecision. In 2005, 2007, and 2009, Russia either threatened to or did stop oil and natural gas from flowing to Ukraine. More recently, President Viktor Yanukovych was pressured

to extend Russia’s lease of a naval base at the Ukrainian Black Sea port of
Sevastopol for another 25 years in exchange for preferential pricing of Rus-
sian energy deliveries to Ukraine. The Kremlin continues to press Ukraine
to join a “common economic space” with Russia, while gradually stripping
Ukraine of direct control over its major industrial assets through mergers
and takeovers by Russian firms. With America in decline, Europe would
be less willing and able to reach out and incorporate Ukraine into an ex-
panding Western community, leaving Ukraine more vulnerable to Russian
designs.”

As we see the strong pressure on the Yushchenko’s pro-European govern-
ment did not work, and pro-Russian forces have come to power in Ukraine.
Unfortunately, these forces have brought some “bonus” - the unprecedented
corruption, a criminalization of power and a progressive economic decline.
As we think, Ukraine’s driving in reverse from European direction would
last as least 2 years, and unless there will be no some internal political tur-
moils, the processes of European integration of Ukraine will be postponed
by at least 20 years.

CONCLUSIONS

The NATO expansion must go on if some European countries are not yet
attached to NATO. If we analyze all the events inflicted in terms of its en-
largement and Ukraine’s prospects in this direction, we can make some
conclusions.

The phases of the NATO expansion had their own characteristics. From the
beginning of its existence and to the end of “the Cold War” the accession of
new members to NATO was based on strategic considerations if a member-
ship of a country is necessary for NATO, of course, in view of changes in
the international situation.

After the Cold War a process has started, that has been called “the expan-
sion”. It was in a form of so-called “waves” of expansion. The first “wave”
- the accession of Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary to NATO (the nice
reason was the NATO’s 50-year anniversary, the bad one – the NATO ag-
gression against Serbia) - marked the first step, very careful one, of the ex-
pansion to the East, to the former Soviets parish, and grounded the con-
ception of the strict connection of joining the EU only by joining NATO.

Financial flows from the West were going basically “to promote a democracy”, which has opened a peaceful way to Western capital investments to national economies.

The interests of Western investors in these countries in the mid - late 1990s have fully coincided with the interests of a newborn local bourgeoisie, the democratic intellectuals and many “little” Poles, Czechs and Hungarians, for which the wider (if compared with the socialism) capabilities were suddenly opened.

The second “wave” is the join of Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania (the 55th NATO anniversary and 11 September 2001 in New York): the strategy and military capabilities become relevant again, a democracy and a market economy, an access to even cheaper labor and broader markets remained precursors of a membership, but not the first ones. So, NATO has taken the sufficiently questionable allies, from a military point of view, but now it had a foothold on the shores of the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas.

NATO’s rush to accept new members was clear, - not all commitments have been met by that countries by the scheduled date of joining NATO, and there the process of reforms continued even after the accession. Anyway the second “wave” countries’ experience of action for MAP is worthy to be shared.

The third “wave” - Croatia and Albania joined (the 60th anniversary and elections in Afghanistan), and now NATO has the total control of the Adriatic. Also the intentions to the NATO promotion in the Caspian region were actively manifested. At the moment the problem with Georgia and Ukraine appeared. They are countries not only socialist in the past but, more importantly, the parts of the former Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as its successor, and Russian factor have begun playing the key role.

At all stages the direct dependence on large-scale conflicts that would affect the U.S. interests in Europe and its surroundings is observed - as a cause of every wave of expansion; and investments, new markets and a reservation of even cheaper labor for Western manufacturers - as a goal.

We see the Ukrainian way to the NATO membership also has its own characteristics. Ukraine was close to join the MAP. In early 2009 the NATO-Ukraine relations were at a stage of development, the level of cooperation
has already left behind the intensified dialogue and, according to expert estimates, largely met the level of MAP.

But as noted above, we can see there are many negative factors of the geopolitical and internal political nature concerning the The Grand Chessboard in general and the USA-Europe-Russia-Muslim East line in particular, where Ukraine was used as a bargaining chip in early 2010.

From the geopolitical point of view, the U.S. lobby the European integration efforts of Ukraine as a “train” to the European Union with Russian coaches. In practical terms, Ukraine is really a country with a cheap labor and requires large investments in modernizing its economy, which would give some impetus to the depressive European economy. Ukraine has the important geopolitical position, the experience in cooperation with NATO in the use of troops and disarmament. This is something to attract.

But something is to repel.

First, Ukraine is a huge country in Europe, which population reaches to 45 million people, and joining NATO (and after that EU) - threatens the stability of the EU labor market, which now is already in crisis. It inhibits the process of European integration of Ukraine by the continental NATO members.

Second, we have a military-industrial complex, which, of course, requires modernization, but it has a very good market at cheaper prices; we have an economy which increasingly subjects to Russia at various levels and in different ways, but within the last 2 years this process takes an aircraft speed. It inhibits the Ukraine-EU integration process of by the modern Ukrainian international politics.

Third, Ukraine with the new president and his foreign policy do not put the NATO membership and any form of the European integration even in the agenda. The new government has actually withdrawn Ukraine’s application to join NATO and signed a treaty about Sevastopol strengthening the non-aligned, pro-Russian status of a country. It inhibits the European integration process of Ukraine by Russia.

Fourth, the traditions of Ukrainian political, social, economic and national-cultural life do not make hard neither pro-European, nor pro-Russian choice of Ukraine. But Ukraine is not a chess board player, and this process
is, unfortunately, dependent on the situation would go on in the global balance of power.

Nevertheless let us not forget the free choice of the people of Ukraine, who will tell their word during upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections.

In fact, now Ukraine is at a threshold to return to the European Community, which part Ukraine was since its origin, to which it gave sophisticated and highly educated queens, and with which it was plucked up in the XIV century, being dismembered, long once ruled by other countries. The conscious European choice of the Ukrainians is an implementation of their civilization interests in the contemporary regional and global situation.

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