

Drawing Lessons Learnt on Operational Capabilities of EU's CSDP Missions in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina

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ABSTRACT

EU has taken on the role of guaranteeing long-term stability through different measures of conflict prevention and peacebuilding in two countries of the Western Balkans, which have undergone a severe armed conflict in the 1990s. This paper undertakes an analysis and evaluation of operational capabilities of civilian mission EULEX Kosovo and military operation EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It draws lessons learned from the challenges the missions have faced in this field of functioning, namely operational capabilities. Furthermore, the article provides a quality assessment comparing both missions' **operational capabilities**, which can lead to improvement in approaches. The overarching feature in both EU missions is the seeming lack of willingness by the EU and its partner nations to continually politically commit to more effort at contributing to well-functioning security sectors of Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina not only "waving their flag on the ground". It draws the conclusion that without the political willingness, both missions are exposed to many operational risks.

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POVZETEK

Evropska unija je v dveh državah Zahodnega Balkana prevzela vlogo zagotavljanja dolgotrajne stabilnosti s številnimi ukrepi za preprečevanje konfliktov in vzpostavljanja miru. Članek vključuje analizo in oceno posameznih vidikov operativnih zmožnosti civilne misije EULEX Kosovo in vojaške operacije EUFOR Althea v Bosni in Hercegovini. Obsega nova spoznanja o težavah, s katerimi sta se misiji spopadali na tem področju delovanja. Hkrati članek podaja tudi oceno primerjave določenih operativnih vidikov obeh misij, uporabno za nadaljnje izboljšave v pristopih. Obema misijama je skupno očitno pomanjkanje politične volje EU in njenih partnerskih držav pri zavezi za stalni in dolgotrajni prispevek k dobro delujočemu varnostnemu sektorju Kosova in Bosne in Hercegovine, ne le, "mahanju z EU zastavo". Podaja tudi zaključek, da sta brez politične volje obe misiji izpostavljeni številu operativnih tveganj.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: Evropska Unija, Kosovo, Bosna in Hercegovina, EUFOR Althea, EULEX, SVOP preprečevanje oboroženih spopadov

INTRODUCTION

European Union (EU) has directed its efforts for conflict prevention in the Western Balkans as part of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), supporting countries which have undergone a period of violence in their recent history, hence directly influencing the stability of a region in EU's proximity. This article is focusing on comparison of the two of the EU's, each in its own way, most ambitious missions regarding their **operational capabilities**, EULEX Kosovo and EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Following the Kosovo conflict in 1999, the United Nations Security Council (UN SC) approved the Resolution 1244, which authorized international military, as well as civil intervention and created UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UN-

MIK) with a mandate until 2008, when Kosovo declared its independence (Llaudes and Sanchez Andrada, 2015). Since 1999 the international community has pledged support to Kosovo with contributing and investing major donor assistance, with most of the funding coming from the EU and its member states. Overall, “Kosovo is the biggest recipient per capita of EU assistance in the world” (Cierco and Reis, 2014), and also the transfer of UNMIK’s powers to the EU after the termination of its mandate followed in 2008. EULEX is EU’s biggest civilian mission in its history, created in a Joint Action Resolution in 2008 (Council Joint Action Resolution, 2008). EU has aimed to establish and strengthen the rule of law in Kosovo and create accountable and sustainable institutions in the country. A comprehensive approach towards strengthening the rule of law includes tackling the topics of justice, security bodies and good governance, which is according to Cierco and Reis (2014), critical for conflict prevention. In June 2016, the Council of EU extended the mandate of the mission until June 2018 and provided over 60 million euros for the mission’s budget (Council of EU, 2016).

EUFOR Althea is often referred to as the first major military operation of the EU and after twelve year of functioning, it is also known as the longest EU mission in its history (Knauer, 2011). Established in December 2004 with decision of the Council of the EU³, it took over responsibilities from the NATO’s Stabilisation Force (SFOR)⁴ in Bosnia in Herzegovina. The goal of the EUFOR Althea mission was at the time of its inception to ensure continued compliance with Dayton Accords, contribute to safe and secure environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina and finally, to support the Euro Atlantic integration of the country (Kim, 2006). However, in the light of improving security situation, the mandate of the operation has been reconfigured four times, most

³ Council Decision 2004/803/CFSP of 25 November 2004 on the *launching of the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina*.

⁴ Thirty-six countries, led by the United States of America and backed by NATO, sent around 60.000 troops to enforce the Dayton Accords ending the war in Bosnia (1992–5), in a mission called Implementation Force (IFOR) with one-year mandate. It was succeeded by SFOR, established with Security Council Resolution 1088 in December 1996 (Daadler, 1998), with reduced power of approximately 30.000 personnel. During NATO’s 2004 Istanbul Summit, the withdrawal of the SFOR mission was announced (Kim, 2006).

recently in 2012⁵ - also the objectives of the mission changed and now encompass provision of capacity-building and training to the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, support to the country's efforts to maintain the safe and secure environment and support to overall EU comprehensive strategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina (Council of EU Secretariat, 2015).

The objective of the article is to introduce the aspects of **operational capabilities** shared by both, civilian mission EULEX Kosovo and military operation EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina – since both EU's conflict prevention missions vary to the extent that questions, which are essential in one context may be less relevant in another, it was necessary to extract the common characteristics. Drawing from the research in the framework of the project Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention, the emphasis is on these shared and comparable characteristics with a focus on **organisational structures of the mission, decision making processes, security and human resources**.

The conceptual framework aims to evaluate the following elements of the operational capabilities: the processes of planning and execution, adjustments to changes and feedback loops, operational deficiencies, connections within the mission, etc. The analysis is implemented on two levels: politico-strategic and field-operational. Furthermore, both EU and non-EU perspectives are combined, the former including EU perspectives of the policy-makers and EU personnel, and the latter entailing international community and local actors.

This kind of comparative study leads towards greater understanding of EU mission activities and importantly, identification of the successes and potential shortcomings at the implementation of the mandates. Lessons are sought to enhance the understanding of how the effectiveness of the **operational capability** can be improved. Reviewing missions' capabilities can help us as-

⁵ Nevertheless it continues to act in accordance with its peace enforcement mandate, specified in the UN Security Resolution 2183, accepted in 2014 (Council of EU Secretariat 2015).

sess EU CSDP missions' impact in the fields covered by the missions' mandates.

METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

The paper is based on analysis and research in a form of interviews and a focus group discussion carried out in the framework of the project Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention (IECEU). In its conceptual framework the project includes six capabilities under scrutiny: **planning capacity, operational capability, interoperability, competences, comprehensiveness and technologies**. The purpose of the project is to analyse and assess the current situation in the on-going and past EU missions, learning from lessons provided by these missions and providing new solutions, approaches and recommendations for the EU to guarantee long-term stability. Two field trips were organized in February and March 2016: the field trip to Kosovo (led by the University of Ljubljana, supported by CEP and FINCENT), and the field trip to Bosnia and Herzegovina (led by FINCENT, supported by CEP and the University of Ljubljana). In Kosovo, the IECEU researchers focused on the analysis of EULEX, while the researchers responsible for Bosnia and Herzegovina scrutinized the EUFOR Althea operation. The main aim of both field trips was to conduct interviews with the representatives of EULEX, EUFOR Althea, members of the governments of Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the representatives of local institutions involved in security sector reform (Kosovo: customs, police; BiH: armed forces) and the experts from non-governmental organizations, academia and research institutions of both countries. From the methodological viewpoint the interviews (qualitative analysis) present the methodological basis. Analysis of primary and secondary sources serves as a supportive research method.

EULEX – OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY CONSTRAINS

Organisational structure To pursue the overarching aim of the EULEX mission, the support to Kosovo's rule of law authorities to become independent, multi-ethnic, accountable, sustain-

able and free from political interference, EULEX was given two tasks, to support rule of law institutions, and on the other hand, to directly exercise judicial and police powers to a certain extent (Capussela, 2015). Up until 2012, EULEX mission was divided into three main divisions, covering Police, Customs and Justice. The extension of the mandate in 2012 coincided with the downsizing of the mission by about 25% and new restructuring into two sections (EULEX, 2012). The Executive Division works on the mission's executive mandate. It is carrying out the rule of law services in accordance with Kosovo law, instead of local authorities, until they become sufficiently qualified to take over. The Strengthening Division supports Kosovo judicial authorities and law enforcement institutions in establishing higher levels of accountability and sustainability (EULEX, 2016). The new, reconfigured mission structure is better at addressing the needs, division of responsibilities and tasks more comprehensively. However, the organizational allocation of the judges and prosecutors in the EULEX mission is problematic and often raised as a criticism of the mission. Due to the structure, the norm of judiciary independence is not guaranteed and respected in its constitutional meaning of separation of powers – the police, prosecutors and judges are all part of the same organisational division. Although in different departments, they are however still part of the division's leadership structure and have the same head of the division. Hence, the true separation of powers and judiciary independence cannot *de facto* be really possible (Interview no. 3, 16).

Decision making processes The whole decision making process of CSDP is criticized as too complex and lengthy, which leads to addressing the concerns of managing the mission itself, rather than attending to the continuously new challenges arising from its mandate (Interview no. 5, 7). The political significance of deployment of the mission and the statement EU is making with it can even overshadow the importance of the efficiency (Interview no. 4).

But moreover, the decision making process of the EULEX mission is lacking united political vision necessary for its work. It is constrained by the nature of the EU political system since

all EU member states have different approaches regarding the EU's foreign policy. Yet, all CSDP actions, including the decisions about missions, are decided through intergovernmental cooperation and the unanimity voting rule within the Council of the EU, which seriously constrains the possibilities of finding a common political vision and will (Tomescu, 2015). A clear example is that at the time of deployment of EULEX, Kosovo did not receive recognition of independence by several EU member states⁶; which has led to several political compromises when creating policies for EULEX on the level of the EU Council, although the member states commonly agreed upon the necessity of providing funding to Kosovo, with a purpose of ensuring stability in the wider Western Balkans region (Cierco and Reis, 2014). Moreover, EULEX is also financed through the CFSP budget (which CSDP is part of). The mission is therefore doomed to function on the lowest common denominator of political will, which has impacted operational capabilities of the EULEX civilian mission not only on the matters of decision making processes but also in the areas of leadership, training, mission organizational structures and human resources challenges.

Security Another serious challenge are the mission's security limitations due to presumed or actual security threats especially from the northern part of Kosovo, even though the armed conflict concluded before the mission was deployed. These limitations can result in reduced efficiency, affecting the mission's executive mandate (Interview no. 14). However, the safety concerns were reintroduced in 2013 after the shooting incident of the EULEX's customs officer in northern Kosovo, which again reminded of the fragile state of security in the country (Interview no. 20). Moreover, we can connect security with the operational focus of the mission and assess that some new threats are not sufficiently addressed to provide for the security of the mission. Border management is not adequately tackled, due to the lack of border control capabilities, especially in northern Kosovo; however broader challenges, such as the international migration crisis, may directly or indirectly impact Kosovo as well. The EU has to adapt to

⁶ EU member states that did not recognize independence of Kosovo are Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain.

new threats, which may not have existed at the time of the mission establishment, such as the threat of foreign fighters and the rise of violent extremism in Kosovo. These issues are not part of the official mandate; however, they present an increasing security challenge and have a definite impact on operational work of the EULEX mission (Interview no. 20). Furthermore, as a result of the complex and lengthy planning and decision making process of the mission, it would take from one year to one year and a half for the mission to change its operational focus regarding these security issues.

Human resources Firstly, duration of deployments of EULEX staff was mentioned by both international employees and locals of Kosovo to be relatively short. On one hand, majority of staff seconded by the member states is deployed for one year or less, and on the other, the contract renewal is often limited (Cierco and Reis, 2014). Newly arrived staff have little time to adjust to the mission's activities and their deployment is already coming to an end when they do. The short duration of deployments bring negative implications related to operational capacities, as well as cost-efficiency and sustainability of the mission (Interview no. 16). It is practically impossible to establish long term guidance and leadership when evaluating the strategic level continuity if staff need an extensive knowledge of the system of the mission, the country and understanding of the local issues. They also need to establish trustworthy relations with local staff to operate effectively on a bilateral level (Interview no. 7, 8). On the other hand, quick rotations of seconded employees also cause legal and operational discrepancies (Cierco and Reis, 2014), which are partially solved with inclusion of the local staff that have already established relationships and necessary organizational and cultural knowledge; this provides sustainability and continuity to the mission (Interview no. 2, 8). Secondly, short term deployments tend to appeal to younger and less experienced staff – but it is often the member state itself that is not keen on sending their best (especially judiciary) staff and wishes to keep them in their own countries. That presents a challenge, yet to be solved by the mission.

The problem regarding successful work of the personnel lies also in the lack of the common approach, which deepens when connected to the staff rotations. As previously noted EULEX Strengthening Division is in charge of supporting Kosovo's judiciary institutions and local law enforcement agencies through monitoring, mentoring and advising (MMA) tasks. These tasks should be implemented referring to EU know-how, standards and best practices – which should be the rule of action. However, no specification is made to identify what these practices specifically are (Ferati, 2012). The challenge consists of EU best practices not being standardized or gathered across contributing member states, which has a negative impact on operational capability of the mission in the sphere of task performance. Occasionally the working practices, knowledge and experience brought by the seconded staff even contradict the ones from previous rotations, which causes, most notably, the lack of continuity of MMA engagements after each staff rotation (Interview no. 1). Challenge appears when identifying the solutions for ensuring this continuity, with overpassing the internal differences in perception of common EU practices. In judiciary branch, different backgrounds, traditions and experiences of the judges are notable, which again cause the lack of common approach needed to apply the same laws and practices in Kosovo (ibidem). Kosovo police is outstandingly the most positive example of EULEX engagement, whereas their practices having a substantial effect on operational capabilities of the police are related to gender, vulnerable groups and minority training, community and intelligence based policing, riot control units training, integrated border management, customs and dealing with sensitive crimes (Interview no. 1).

Lastly, in terms of human resources, EULEX is facing troubles with the budget allocation and distribution of resources. While there are many resources devoted to the police component (which still lacks a good strategy on staffing), the judicial component is being left behind, which results in a reduced number of cases resolved (Cierco and Reis, 2014).

EUFOR ALTHEA – OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY CONSTRAINS

Organisational structure EUFOR Althea is a military operation created to oversee the military implementation of the Dayton Agreement after decision by NATO to conclude its SFOR-operation deployed after the end of Bosnian wars, and after the adoption of the UN Security Council resolution 1575 approving EU force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EU Council Secretariat, 2015). Due to EUFOR Althea nature as a CSDP military operation, its internal organization structures and execution of plans from the operational perspective follow traditional and standardised procedures according to the arranged OPLAN. At the time of EUFOR Althea's deployment, OPLANs were already prepared by the mission's predecessor SFOR and most of the units partaking in SFOR were only transmitted under the command of EUFOR Althea (Interview no. 21, 23, 31, 33, and 44). The number of troops (around 7.000) did not change after the transfer to EUFOR Althea⁷ and 80% of the initial EUFOR Althea EU personnel were already deployed in SFOR. The units entailed personnel from 22 EU member states and 11 partner nations; 32 of previous nations contributing to SFOR continued their support under EUFOR (Knauer, 2011). On paper, the structure of EUFOR Althea and the functions that it encompasses well match the situation and required tasks in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

EUFOR Althea has a tripartite structure (Knauer, 2011). Operational resources of EUFOR Althea's mission were firstly gathered in three Multinational Task Forces, with 3700 personnel covering Tuzla, Banja Luka and Mostar, additionally 2000 Liaison and Observation Teams (LOTs) members spread across various locations throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina⁸ and 500 personnel in Integrated Police Units⁹ in Sarajevo. Followed by restruc-

⁷ However, the number of troops was reduced soon after deployment, first to 5.500 and to 2.500 in 2007.

⁸ Called Liaison and Observation Teams (LOTs) are the third element of EUFOR Althea and also a local one. The teams of two to ten members are allocated throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, living among local citizens. Their task is intelligence gathering, demonstration of presence and coordination of EUFOR Althea's actions in the field. LOTs are also known as »the eyes and ears of EUFOR Althea on the ground.« (Knauer, 2011).

⁹ The second EUFOR component, Integrated Police Unit (IPU) is a type of military police force (*Gendarmerie*) and their task is general maintenance of safe and secure environment, civil crowd

turing in 2007 and 2012, EUFOR troops were reduced to 600, driven primarily by lack of political will (Interviews no. 24, 25, 26 and 27). Now operating is the Multinational Battalion, tasked with being prepared to conduct activities by itself or in support of Bosnia and Herzegovina's authorities to maintain safe and secure environment. Especially local actors still perceive the presence of EUFOR Althea as a strong political symbol, providing reassurance and reminding population of their country's political objectives (Interview no. 62); moreover, it shows will and ability of the EU and partner nations to work together.

Decision making processes The EU Military Staff, responsible for supervising CSDP operations is using NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) as the EU's operational headquarters (EUFOR Althea Operational Headquarters – OHQ)¹⁰, which then update and develop operational plans in coordination with NATO Strategic Operational Planning Group (SHAPE, 2014). OHQ also coordinates all operational matters, monitors operations and advises on operational questions, as well as participates in operational planning for current operations. Operational planning is normally decided upon and executed together with EU Command Element (EUCE) at NATO Joint Force Command in Italy and HQ EUFOR Althea in Sarajevo (Interview no. 46). There is always a dialogue between phases of planning, as well as OPLANs at OHQ and EUFOR Althea are always coordinated. Finally, EUFOR Commander puts a plan into action, distributes orders and directives within the OPLAN framework. There are regular visits among the EUFOR Althea and Operational Commander, hence enabling personal contact between commanders and supporting EUFOR Althea's Commander leadership from strategic and operational perspective (Interview no. 34). This also supports Operation Commander's understanding of the current situation on the ground. Due to very detailed and coordinated planning process outcomes, the decision-making process is functional; nevertheless, national agendas of EU mem-

and riot control, policing investigations and fight against organized crime, border protection, weapon collection (Knauer, 2011).

¹⁰ For this mission, the SHAPE provides the EUFOR Althea's OHQ and working through the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) or Operation commander (Op Cdr), a European officer.

ber states and their political priorities need to be taken into consideration when discussing major adjustments to the operational plan (Interview no. 29, 34, 35, 47).

Security Since there is a regular exchange of information and personal contact between the leadership, from both strategic and operational perspective, the OPLANs are always also reviewed in light of the security situation and the changes of the operational circumstances in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Interview no. 40, 41, 46, 47).

It is doubtful however, according to some, that the operation would be able to intervene successfully in the case of a large threat to safety and security (Interview no. 50 and 62). EUFOR Althea's situational awareness is limited as a result of reduced number of personnel, which compromises mission's ability to react in a timely manner to safety threats from environment, especially if the security problems break out in several locations simultaneously. The shortage of personnel is posing a critical challenge if the security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina deteriorates (Interview no. 46) and even has an effect on EUFOR Althea's ability to protect or evacuate its own personnel if necessary. There seems to be no consciousness about the possible risks on the level of political decision-making process (Interview no. 25).

Moreover, even when it comes to the security, we can also question the quality of the intelligence sharing. Even though EUFOR Althea's intelligence does liaise with local and international agencies and organizations working in Bosnia and Herzegovina and receives information, operational effectiveness regarding the gathering and analysis of intelligence information is questioned – also due to the fact that EUFOR Althea is facing national unwillingness to share intelligence and hence the information flow within the mission does not work well (Interview no. 24).

Human resources As seen during the restructuring personnel cuts in 2007 and 2012, the operational capabilities of the mission regarding the personnel are influenced by the countries' readiness and political will to contribute staff (Interviews no. 24, 25,

26 and 27). The success of the mission depends highly on human resources and the commander's ability to implement the given task. Concerning the security matters, there are doubts that the human resources are currently sufficient (Interview no. 46).

The sending nations are not always ready to deploy their best people for the positions in the EUFOR Althea operation (Interview no. 34); or not deploy staff for some tasks at all, for example the planned reserve concept. At times nations deploy personnel that are not even qualified for the position, either because of the lack of experience or rank. Also, the training level and the knowledge of the local language are not always adequate, which is a challenge in terms of obtaining information. Moreover, the structure of HQ EUFOR Althea presents itself as suitable formally, but in practice maximum operational output is not always reached. This happens due to the frequent rotation of staff¹¹, which causes the lack of continuity¹² and lower level of effectiveness of the operation (ibidem). Cultural differences are also noted to be one of the reasons for slower processes and disagreements about applying a common approach (Interview no. 35). However, gender perspectives and human rights are areas, thoroughly incorporated into the structures of EUFOR Althea, through the principle of double-hatting by additionally tasking staff functions in relevant crisis management structure with gender and human rights related duties. There might still be a need for greater representation of female soldiers in the EUFOR Althea mission nevertheless.

There is a human resources management problem affecting the intelligence gathering as well. EUFOR Althea is still a major intelligence information provider in Bosnia and Herzegovina, being especially efficient in gathering information regarding the feelings and outlooks of the local population and local authorities – but on the other hand, the operation lacks skilled professionals in the field of human intelligence, especially trained social analysts to assess the atmosphere. They are never deployed due to many member states' restrictions (Interview no. 26).

¹¹ The duration of personnel deployment is usually six months or even shorter period of time.

¹² The lack of institutional memory, as well as looser relationships with local authorities or other international actors in the field are possible consequences.

SHARED LESSONS LEARNED FROM EULEX AND EUFOR ALTHEA'S OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY'S CHALLENGES / CONCLUSION

Both missions were created as a result of EU being perceived as a particularly legitimate actor to support the development of countries in its immediate neighbourhood. Also, the EU holds a certain amount of influence over the Western Balkans region (Hazelzet, 2013). The appeal of the EU is clearly visible when discussing Bosnia and Herzegovina, a potential EU candidate country, which negotiated and signed the stabilisation and association agreement (SAA) in 2008 and submitted its application for EU membership officially in February 2016. EU also provides a single person for the post of the EU Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Head of the EU Delegation, with special powers in Bosnian political system. Similarly to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo is also a potential candidate for EU accession and SAA entered into force in April 2016. After independence in 2008, the country stated that it has a »clear European perspective«. EU also appointed a Special Representative in Kosovo and a Head of the EU office (De Munter, 2016). Hence, EU operations are never "lone wolf" actions, but part of the EU's wider long-term policies towards a country or in our case, a whole region. Such broader EU processes based on conditionality have a positive impact on the missions and EU engagement – any actions are more likely to bring results.

Comparing both EULEX mission in Kosovo and EUFOR Althea operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina we can draw parallels on lessons learned regarding their operational capacity successes and challenges still remaining.

Table 1: comparison of the operational capacities

	EULEX	Althea
Organizational structure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • created specifically for EULEX • reformed in 2012 and it now better addresses the needs of the mission • challenges in terms of norms: separation of powers and judiciary independence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • overtook the structures from NATO • clear military structures, appropriate for addressing the situation
Decision making processes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • only slow change in OPLANs possible • lack of the EU member states' consensus over independence of Kosovo 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • more flexible adjustment of OPLANs
Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • limitations regarding operating in Northern Kosovo • slow adaptability of OPLANs prevents addressing new security challenges 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • shortage of personnel might influence the ability of the mission to react successfully to the change in security environment • no recognition of the possible change in security situation on a political decision-making level • no political will to cooperate in the field of intelligence sharing, information flows are limited
Human resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • lack of political will to provide adequate resources, sufficiently skilled • unequal distribution of resources (less consideration for judges and prosecutors when it comes to budget allocation) • short deployments affect the institutional memory, effectiveness and continuity • failure to attract best quality workers • shortage of judges and prosecutors • lack of a common pool regarding best practices 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • lack of political will by member states to provide adequate resources, sufficiently skilled • short deployments affect the institutional memory, effectiveness and continuity • failure to attract best quality workers • lack of human intelligence workers, liaison officers and general lack of troops • lack of a common pool regarding best practices

Regarding mission's **organizational structures**, EULEX mission was created to respond to a specific need that other actors in the region did not yet address or have failed to do so effectively, and on the other hand, EUFOR Althea took over most of its structures, tasks and units from its predecessor, SFOR. One could argue that due to the fact that NATO has an already established traditional military clear structures, rules of actions and chains of command, EUFOR Althea's organizational structures would have more value to the mission's operational capacities. The structure of HQ EUFOR Althea is indeed appropriate for the situation and current field responsibilities of the mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. EUFOR Althea's mixed structure might seem complicated, but it is also an extremely symbiotic and functional one, and it shows the ability of EU to work together with other institutionalized structures (in EUFOR's case, NATO). However, EULEX new organizational structure divided into Executive and Strengthening Division is also better in addressing the needs of the mission and dividing the duties more comprehensibly, even though it is facing serious challenges when it comes to the norms of separation of powers and judiciary independence.

When it comes to the **decision making processes**, EUFOR Althea has much better starting point than EULEX. EUFOR Althea's adjustment processes for operational plans (OPLANs) are functional, not as rigid and much quicker as in EULEX Kosovo mission, where the change in circumstances would take over a year to be implemented into the operational plans. EULEX's most persisting challenge regarding its decision making processes in all matters related to operational capabilities is still the lack of EU member states' consensus regarding its independence and the fact that it does not enjoy unwavering support of the member states, which puts it into a very challenging environment.

Both missions are seriously affected by **security** difficulties. EULEX is firstly facing the constraint of not being able to operate in Northern Kosovo as well as it should, due to the mission's own limitations regarding the area. But on the other hand, the missions mentioned slow adaptability of OPLAN (deriving from slower and more difficult decision making process) prevents the

mission to successfully address potential new security challenges, such as the rise of radical ideologies and the migrant crisis, which can define the success of the operational work of the mission or lack of thereof. EUFOR Althea faces even more difficulties regarding the security situation, even though the operations get reviewed often in the light of the changes in the operational circumstances, such as deteriorating security situation. The shortage of personnel is pointing out the mission's inability to truly react to the security problem breakout and even their ability to protect its own personnel, while there is no awareness of this situation on the level of the political decision making. The problem of political will to implement change is visible on another level of security objectives, intelligence sharing and enabling the information flows in the mission, which is essential for its operational success. We can conclude that EUFOR Althea faces severe challenges when it comes to the security, especially since it is indeed a military operation with broader security obligations and objectives, while EULEX is a civil one, addressing institutional state-building.

In relation to **human resources**, the biggest problem is the exogenous constrain to the mission, namely the lack of political will by the EU member states. This is clearly visible especially in relation to the need to provide adequate resources in terms of number of sufficiently skilled seconded personnel to the mission. Especially in EUFOR Althea, the planned reserve concept suffers due to the nation's unwillingness or inability to nominate troops and resources to these tasks. EULEX Kosovo is facing challenge of unequal distribution of resources for its human resources capacity – judges and prosecutors get less consideration when it comes to the budget allocation. Short deployments of seconded staff affect institutional memory, continuity and effectiveness of both missions, whereas EUFOR Althea's personnel has even shorter (6 months or less) duration of tour in comparison to EULEX (a year). Both mission fail to attract the best quality seconded workers – EULEX has a shortage of judges and prosecutors, while EUFOR Althea faces a lack of human intelligence workers, liaison officers and a general lack of troops. Moreover, there is a great lack regarding a common pool of EU best practices in both

missions. Consistent standardized practices are not gathered and established across contributing member states, which is especially worsened due to the staff rotation and second best seconded staff, lacking knowledge of the system of the mission, the country and local issues.

Throughout the study on the operational capabilities we can see an overarching theme, arising in almost every characteristic revised. The challenges of the operational work of both CSDP mission are not specific only for one mission, but are shared on at least four levels (organisational structures, decision making processes, security and human resources), and always connected with the broader problem of dysfunctional EU foreign policy, which lacks unanimity by EU members states to form a common vision for it, hence it does not adapt to the changes quickly, without this change posing a risk for the success of the mission's operational work. Member states are more inclined to focus their efforts and commitments bilaterally through their own independent initiatives and similarly wish to follow their interests through various EU structures and mechanisms as well, and CSDP missions are no exception.

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